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ARTICLES

REKINDLING LABOR LAW SUCCESSORSHIP
IN AN ERA OF DECLINE
Wilson McLeod*
American law does almost nothing to protect workers when
businesses change hands. When an employer sells or otherwise transfers a business operation, its employees will be lucky if they hold on
to their jobs at all, and extremely lucky if they continue to receive
comparable wages and benefits. If the employees had chosen a union
to represent them in collective bargaining, the new employer may
very well be free to ignore the union altogether, and almost certainly
will not be required to abide by agreements the union won. The
various rules are complicated, but can be easily summarized all the
same: an employer that acquires a business operation will inherit
certain labor law obligations if it wants to. With a few peripheral exceptions, it is all up to the employer.'

* B.A., Haverford College; J.D., Harvard Law School; Member of the California Bar.
Thanks to Joe Vitale for his contributions and to the Fund for Labor Relations Studies for its
generous research grant.
1. The Supreme Court has recognized as much. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing
Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 40-41 (1987).
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This harsh regime is unique among the major industrial nations
the United States' principal competitors in the global economy.'
In this regard only the United States continues to cling to traditional
liberal notions about privity and freedom of contract The sale or

transfer of a business is considered to terminate the employment
relationship - a relationship conceptualized as a "contractual" one and it need only be resumed at the new employer's discretion. Should

the new employer exercise its discretion to "rehire" the employee,
existing law will usually consider the matter an entirely new transaction, so that the parties may negotiate - or, more realistically, the
employer may dictate4 - new terms of employment.
This article will propose a wholesale reform of this harsh regime.

Transfers of businesses should be made as irrelevant as possible from
the standpoint of workers. A change in ownership should not work a
fundamental restructuring of employee rights, or indeed any restructuring at all. The new employer should simply step into the shoes of the
old. Employees should retain their employment on the same terms to
which they are accustomed.

This thesis may appear unspeakably vague to readers familiar
with the body of labor law known as "successorship." It is deliber2. See infra Part II; but see HERBERT NORTHRUP & PHILLIP MISCIMARRA, GOVERNMENT PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES INVOLVED IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 629 (1989)
(questioning this conclusion).
3. Supporters of these traditional notions would, no doubt, vigorously dispute my characterization of their continuing vitality in American labor law. See, e.g., Ribhard A. Epstein,
A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92
YALE LJ. 1357 (1983).
4. As Otto Kahn-Freund observes:
[T]he relation between an employer and an isolated employee is typically a relation
between a bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power. In its inception
it is an act of submission, in its operation it is a condition of subordination, however much the submission and the subordination may be concealed by that indispensable figment of the legal mind known as the "contract of employment."
OTTO KAHN-FREuND, LABoUR AND THE LAW 6 (2d ed. 1977). To the extent that progressive
commentators on labor law should advance a theory of the labor market in their work, see
Michael H. Gottesman, Wither Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100
YALE LJ. 2767, 2774-75 (1991) (reviewing PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE:
THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYmENT LAW (1990)), this article relies on Marxian conceptions of the market and the production process in which employers are considered to be
motivated by a drive for domination and control as well as for immediate wealth-maximization. See Samuel Bowles, The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian,
Neo-Hobbesian, and Marxian Models, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 16 (1985).
5. Labor law successorship contains two components, one which may be labeled "prospective" and the other "retrospective." The former, which is the subject of my discussion in
this article, involves ongoing obligations that affect the conduct of a successor employer's
business. The latter, which I do not consider here, involves the successor's potential liability
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ately so. Labor law successorship has grown into a forest unusually
thick with trees, and fundamental principles and problems can easily
slip from view. To deal with these basic issues effectively, it is nec-

essary to maintain a broad perspective. Similarly, I recognize that my
proposals here are not entirely novel, and that at least to some extent
they have been made and rejected before. But the existing body of
American successorship law emerged a full generation ago, and the
landscape has changed immensely since that time. The world has
become far smaller, its economy far more integrated, and the United
States, it now seems clear, has entered a period of long-term decline.
During that time, moreover, the United States' economic rivals have
all come to adopt legal protections of the kind I will be proposing

here, while the American system of labor law has undergone great
upheaval and prompted great concern about its continuing viability.

Labor law appears to have simply failed, not least because it leaves
five-sixths of American workers outside the scope of its protections."
In Part I of this article, I describe the basic theories underlying

existing successorship law and the shifting economic contexts in
which they have functioned. In Part II, I provide a detailed investiga-

tion of the defects of the existing system, as it applies to both union
for unlawful conduct by its predecessor. See, e.g., Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414
U.S. 168 (1973) (establishing the framework for successor liability for predecessor unfair
labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act); Upholsterers' Int'l Union Pension
Fund v. Artistic Furniture of Pontiac, 920 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a successor may be responsible under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act for unsatisfied
employee benefit obligations incurred by its predecessor); EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding a successor liable under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 for its predecessor's unlawful discrimination against an employee);
see also EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 944-45 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing the theoretical
issues raised by retrospective successorship). The line between the two is not always bright,
however. See, e.g., NLRB v. Aquabrom Div., Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1174, 1180
(6th Cir.), amended, 862 F.2d 100 (1988) (noting that a successor may be required to bargain
with a union as a remedy for its predecessor's unfair labor practices); Bates v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 744 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1984) (subjecting a successor's hiring practices to a Title
VII consent decree that resulted from its predecessor's unlawful racial discrimination).
Prospective successorship also encompasses a minor branch not addressed in this article: the so-called "alter ego" doctrine, which involves the obligations of successors that share
the same ownership as their predecessors. This article will look only at what might be called
"arms' length" successorship. For a critical analysis of the "alter ego" doctrine, see Wilson
McLeod, Shareholders' Liability and Workers' Rights: Piercing the Corporate Veil Under
Federal Labor Law, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.. 115, 147-50 (1991).
6. Figures for 1992 show that only 15.8% of the American labor force now belongs to
a union. See Proportion of Union Members Hits 15.8 Percent, 140 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
180 (1993). Insofar as "traditional" labor law does not significantly affect the worklives of
unorganized employees, it cannot be said to protect them in any meaningful sense. See infra
note 10.
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and non-union workers. In Part III, I consider the ways in which
successorship problems have been tackled in other industrial countries,
particularly Canada and the European Community's member states,
and then in Part IV, I address the complex problem of how an employee-neutral model of business transfers may be adopted in the
United States' unwieldy federal system.
A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY
This article considers the rights of both unionized and non-union
workers, and it uses the general term "labor law" to describe the
legal rules that affect workers, whether or not they belong to unions.
At this point, the erosion of unionization is a basic fact of life. As
noted, less than one-sixth of American workers now belong to a
union, and it no longer makes sense (if it ever did) to segregate
different groups of workers in this way. In recent years, the prevailing dichotomy has been between "labor law," which deals with unionization and collective bargaining, and "employment law," which deals
with everything else, from sex discrimination in the workplace, to
employment-at-will, to wage-and-hour regulation, to employee drug
testing.7 This distinction has become less and less workable over
time, however, and should now be abandoned
This reconceptualization is not simply a matter of selecting a
workable and heuristic intellectual framework; it has serious political
ramifications. First, the prevailing emphasis on "traditional" labor law
that is, more or less, the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 9
- has the effect of overstating its importance, thereby suggesting that
employees are much better off than they actually are. The overwhelming majority of American workers derive no real benefit from this
body of labor law, and they have far fewer rights than those who

7. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U.
CHI. L. REv. 575, 635 (1992) [hereinafter Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism].
8. Cf Steven H. Kropp, Rethinking the Labor and Employment Law Curriculum: Legal
Education's Belated Response to the Demise of Collective Bargaining and the Rise of Individual Rights, 60 U. CINN. L. REv. 433 (1991) (reviewing MATTHEW W. FINKIN Er AL.,
LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE (1989) and SAMUEL ESTRECHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW GOVERNING THE EMPLOYMENT

RELATIONSHIP (1990)). Unlike Professor Kropp, I envision combining "labor" and "employment" law, emphasizing their interconnections, and proposing universal solutions to shared
problems, rather than consigning "labor" law to the scrap-heap.
9. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)).
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do." To pretend that "traditional" labor law constitutes the baseline
protection for American workers is to legitimate a system that effectively denies meaningful rights to the great majority. Like other critics, I believe that the current traditional labor law regime - weak to

start with and sapped by feeble enforcement - has failed in its basic
objective of empowering workers to protect themselves, and that it
requires fundamental revision.

Second, and more important, unifying all employment-related
labor laws under the heading of "labor law," and attempting to tackle
all related employment problems together, lends support to the crucial
project of providing all workers with a decent "floor" of legal
rights." As many commentators have noted, the American labor laws
are unique among industrial nations in the narrowness of their coverage and the meanness of their protections. 2 The inadequacy of the
basic legal regime encourages incomparably aggressive resistance by
American employers to workers and their unions, who are considered
likely to seek expensive protections at the bargaining table. 3 Developing a comprehensive set of basic "labor law" protections for all
employees will not only improve the lives of American workers but
may also diminish employer resistance to unionization and help reinvigorate the role of labor in American public life. 4

10. Concerted activity by nonunion workers is technically protected by the NLRA, but
this is hardly a significant day-to-day protection, especially given the restrictive recent precedents in this area. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); Meyers Indus., 281
N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), petition for review denied, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988).
11. See Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism, supra note 7, at 577. Clyde Summers
has recently undertaken a useful cross-cutting study along these lines, considering, among
other things, the problem of "job security" without regard to rigid boundaries and distinctions.
See Clyde W. Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines
and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457 (1992) [hereinafter Summers, Effective Remedies].
12. See William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARv.
L. REV. 1109, 1111-12 (1989); Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Characterof the
American Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1417-20, 1459-60 (1971).
13. See Charles McDonald, U.S. Union Membership in Future Decades: A Trade
Unionist's Perspective, 31 INnus. REL. 13 (1992); cf Charles J. Morris & William Gaus,
Successorship and the Collective Bargaining Agreement: Accommodating Wiley and Bums, 59
VA. L. REV. 1359, 1381 (1973) (explaining how, under the current system, collective bargaining agreements contain both worksite-specific arrangements and basic protections of the
kind that other countries provide through legislation).
14. See McDonald, supra note 13, at 24; Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism,
supra note 7, at 577, 638.
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I. CHANGING THEORIES OF SUCCESSORSHIP
AND CHANGING CONTEXTS

More than most areas of labor law, successorship doctrine is
deeply infused with ideas about public policy, labor economics, and

business reality. As such, the various legal rules have emerged not so
much from careful statutory analysis or reasoned elaboration of prece-

dent as from conscious choices of the kind typically left to legislative
action.
These underlying ideas and theories have not remained static
over time. An initial model of successorship theory, inspired by the
Supreme Court's 1964 decision in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston"s
and fleshed out by the lower courts'6 and the National Labor Rela-

tions Board in a series of cases culminating in The William J. Burns
International Detective Agency,'" yielded to the markedly different
approach articulated by the Court in NLRB v. Burns International

15. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
16. See K.B. & J. Young's Super Mkts. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 463, 466 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967) (holding that "the right to continued employment does not automatically terminate on change in ownership" and that there is "no valid distinction between a
discharge by [a successor] and a discharge by [the predecessor] at [the successor's] behest on
the eve of the changeover"); United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891,
895 (3d Cir. 1964) (developing a theory of arbitrators' power to modify and adjust collective
bargaining agreements in successorship cases); Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1964) (relying on Wiley to hold "that where there is substantial similarity of operation and continuity of identity of the business enterprise before and
after a change in ownership, a collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration provision, entered into by the predecessor employer, is binding upon the successor employer").
17. 182 N.L.R.B. 348 (1970), enforcement granted in part and denied in part, 441 F.2d
911 (2d Cir. 1971), affid sub nom. NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272 (1972)
(holding that a successor employer is required to adhere to the terms and conditions of employment fixed by its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement). See also Martin Marietta
Corp., 159 N.L.R.B. 905, 905 (1966) (finding an unlawful failure to bargain when a successor "staffed the plant - selecting, dismissing, and retaining employees - without consultation with the Union and in disregard of the seniority rights of the [predecessor's] employees"); Overaite Transp. Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1966), enforced, 372 F.2d 765 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967) (finding an unlawful failure to bargain when a successor
changed employees' terms and conditions 6f employment, even though the successor had
made clear its intentions at the time it rehired them); Chemrock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074,
1078 (1965) (holding that "the individuals employed by the seller of the enterprise must be
regarded as 'employees' of the purchaser" for purposes of hiring and collective bargaining);
cf. Harry Sangerman, The Labor Obligations of the Successor to a Unionized Business, 19
LAB. L.J. 160, 175 (1968) (noting that as early as 1964 the NLRB's General Counsel began
issuing complaints alleging that successors breached their duty to bargain if they failed to
abide by the terms and conditions of their predecessors' collective bargaining agreements).
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Security Services 8 and Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint

Executive Board.19 Today, a generation later, that second theory continues to hold sway," but the assumptions that underpin it have
eroded greatly over time.2
The Wiley regime rested on two fundamental principles, one
normative and one positive. As a normative matter, the Court declared that workers and their unions should be protected against "sud-

den change[s] in the employment relationship" as a result of business
transfers. ' Implicit in that declaration was a view that business considerations -

"the rightful prerogative of owners independently to

rearrange their businesses"

-

could not be allowed to undermine the

policy goal of cushioning employees.'

These normative expressions

in turn relied upon a crucial assumption about positive reality: that
labor concerns were "inevitably ... incidental" in these matters, that
these matters did not directly concern workers at all." The underly-

ing vision, of course, was that things like buying, selling, merging
and acquiring were management decisions for management to make,

while the proper role of the law was simply to provide a modest
floor of protection in case the ordinary course of business
decisionmaking accidently affected bystanders of one kind or another.2

18. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
19. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
20. But see William H. DuRoss, Increasing the Labor-Related Costs of Business Transfers and Acquisitions - The Spectre of Per Se Liability for New Owners, 67 WASH. U. L.Q.
375, 396 (1989) (suggesting that in Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S.
27 (1987), "the Court . . . shifted the focus of the successorship doctrine dramatically away
from the Burns business transferability considerations solely to the employee's view of job
continuity"). See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text for an assessment of this shift.
21. This problem of erosion is not confined to the successorship context. As Terry
Collingsworth has argued, the assumptions underlying the Court's harshly anti-labor decisions
concerning management's duty to bargain over plant closings are no longer valid in light of
the recent globalization of the economy. See Terry Collingsworth, Resurrecting the National
Labor Relations Act - Plant Closings and Runaway Shops in a Global Economy, 14
BERKELEY J. EMPLOYiMENT & LAB. L. 72 (1993).
22. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549.
23. Id. Rather, the Court held the two would have to be balanced. Id.; see also James
Severson & Michael Willcoxon, Comment, Successorship Under Howard Johnson: Short Order Justice For Employees, 64 CAL. L. REV. 795, 810 (1976) (explaining the Court's emphasis on protecting employees at this "point in the evolution of the successorship doctrine").
24. See Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549 ("[N]egotiations leading to a change in corporate ownership . . . will ordinarily not concern the well-being of the employees, whose advantage or
disadvantage, potentially great, will inevitably be incidental to the main considerations").
25. Cf. Samuel Estreicher, Successorship Obligations, in LABOR LAW AND BusmNoss
CHANGE: TEORETICAL AND TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 63, 66 (Samuel Estreicher &
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The Burns" decision eight years later expressed a very different
set of views. Acting against a background of eager acquisition and
conglomeration in the American business world, ' the Court turned
Wiley's basic positive assumption on its head, declaring that labor
matters might actually represent a central issue in business transfers,
and that labor law strictures might impose serious and dangerous obstacles:
A potential employer may be willing to take over a moribund busi-

Daniel Collins eds., 1988) [hereinafter LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGB] (suggesting that
successorship protections were developed as a quid pro quo for preserving management's
unfettered discretion in entrepreneurial matters). But see Eileen Silverstein, The Fate of Workers in Successor Firms: Does Law Tame the Market?, 8 INDUs. REL. LJ. 153, 160 (1986)
[hereinafter Silverstein, Does Law Tame the Market?] (arguing that the Wiley doctrine actually
provided almost no protections to workers and that the Court was really relying on the expectation that "the operation of a market economy w[ould] impose sufficient control on successor discretion to make explicit legal protection of worker interests unnecessary").
It is crucial to draw the connection between the labor-protective approach of the Court
and the Board in Wiley and its progeny, and their contemporaneous pro-capital decisions
concerning the "core of entrepreneurial control." Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379
U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); see Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg.
Co., 380 U.S. 263, 273-74 (1965) (holding, per Justice Harlan, author of Wiley, that management may lawfully close its entire business and terminate all its employees for any reason,
including anti-union animus); General Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 951, 952 (1971), enforced
sub nom. Local 864, UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that "decisions
such as [the sale of an employing enterprise], in which a significant investment or withdrawal
of capital will affect the scope and ultimate direction of the enterprise, are matters essentially
managerial in nature" and do not fall within the scope of mandatory bargaining). The General Motors decision further expressed the view that such bargaining would exceed unions'
competence, declaring that "the determinative financial and operational considerations are
likely to be unfamiliar to the employees and their representatives." General Motors, 191
N.L.R.B. at 952; see LAM v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 473 F.2d 549, 557 (1st Cir.), cert,
denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972) (contending that "employees are [not] in a position to judge the
complex financial considerations involved" in a merger) (Railway Labor Act context).
For a full investigation of this labor law vision, see Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The
Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE LJ. 1509 (1981) [hereinafter Stone,
The Post-War Paradigm].
26. NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
27. See John Russo, Corporate Restructuring and the Decline of American Unionism, 18
POL'Y STUD. J. 374, 375 (1989-90). I do not mean to suggest here that the Court set out to
devise labor law rules that would be helpful for Wall Street. But see DuRoss, supra note 20,
at 433 (proposing that "employers . . . trigger [a] review [of successorship law] by demonstrating through econometric statistics that these obligations stagnate the economy"). Still, the
changing behavior of American business during this era does provide a more viable explanation than the more superficially likely possibility that a mere change in Court personnel
prompted the shift in approach. See JAMES ATLE ON, VALUES AND AssUMPTIoNs IN AMEICAN LABOR LAW 170 (1983). Wiley was a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Harlan.
Burns provoked four. dissenting votes (in favor of a more conservative outcome), including
that of Justice Brennan, and Howard Johnson .was written by Justice Marshall over Justice
Douglas' solo dissent.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol11/iss2/1

8

McLeod: Rekindling Labor Law Successorship in an Era of Decline
1994]

Rekindling Labor Law Successorship

ness only if he can make changes in corporate structure, composition of the labor force, work location, task assignment, and nature
of supervision. Saddling such an employer with the terms and conditions of employment contained in the old collective-bargaining

contract may make these changes impossible and may discourage
and inhibit the transfer of capital.'

Smoothing the path of business transfers became the primary
purpose of the legal rules, and labor law was not to stand in the way.
The talk was now of contract and markets, private ordering, not regulation and government involvement."' It was assumed that the market
would take care of things on its own.3" By and large, the Court
thought, successors could be relied upon to retain the existing
workforce, recognize its union, and work out a reasonable and mutually satisfactory arrangement - "rather than... face uncertainty and
turmoil."'3,
Twenty years after Burns the ground has changed dramatically.
The Court's revisionist approach proved to be a harbinger of things to
28. Burns, 406 U.S. at 287-88. Sentiments like these were not entirely foreign to previous successorship cases. See Chermrock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1086 (1965) (Member
Jenkins, concurring and dissenting) (arguing that successorship obligations "encumber[ ] stagnant and unprofitable enterprises by reducing the flexibility available to prospective buyers
and tend[ ] to foreclose any rejuvenation which might result from sales to new owner-managers"); cf Charles G. Bakaly, Jr. & James S. Bryan, Survival of the Bargaining Agreement:
The Effect of Bums, 27 VAND. L. REv. 117, 128 (1974) (contending that "these policies are
hardly novel . . . .and are basic axioms of a free enterprise economy").
Although this statement in Burns has become a classic statement of capitalist dogma in
labor law, it is not necessarily valid under neoclassical capitalist theory. See Keith N. Hylton
& Maria 0. Hylton, Rent Appropriation and the Labor Law Doctrine of Successorship, 70
B.U. L. REV. 821, 837 (1990) (explaining that under the Coase Theorem, restrictions on
successor action imposed by successorship law should only affect sale prices, not determine
whether or not sales occur).
29. See Theodore H. St. Antoine, Judicial Caution and the Supreme Court's Labor Decisions, October Term 1971, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 269, 276 (1973) (noting the
"Willistonian" tone in Burns); cf Morris & Gaus, supra note 13, at 1387 (contending that
Burns "seemed to regard [a collective bargaining] agreement primarily as a contract of sale
which fixes the price for labor at a particular plant"). Sarah Siskind has described the shift
rather more bluntly, stating, "Rather than protecting employee rights . . . the Court opted to
protect capital." Sarah Siskind, Employer Instability and Union Decline: Problems in the Law
of Successorship, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEw YORK UNIvERsrrY 39TH ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR § 8.0314], at 8-13 (1986).
30. See Silverstein, Does Law Tame the Market?, supra note 25.
31. Burns, 406 U.S. at 291; see Silverstein, Does Law Tame the Market?, supra note
25. This approach is in accordance with the basic industrial pluralist regime, in which the
legal rules are to provide a measure of protection, to make sure the basic process gets under
way, but are not to regulate the actual results. The best illustration of this view is the Supreme Court's decision in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); the best academic
analysis is Stone, The Post-War Paradigm, supra note 25.
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come, not only in labor law, or even law in general, but in econom-

ics and politics across the board. Labor considerations did become a
primary factor in corporate transactioneering; management did win its
flexibility; and labor law rigidities were not permitted to interfere
with the basic processes of capital accumulation and capital allocation
and capital manipulation.

The consequences, however, have not been pretty. Today businesses change hands at a rate greatly increased even over the late

1960s,32 and workers are much more likely to get caught up in these
maneuvers.3 The typical transaction is no longer the preservation of
a healthy enterprise or the rejuvenation of a failing one, but the restoration of an "undervalued" target to profitability, as rapidly as possible, by any means necessaryY Unlike earlier times, moreover, labor
considerations often provide the central reason for business transactions.' And while aggressive tactics to wring money out of "labor

32. On average, there were more than twice as many mergers and acquisitions recorded
each year between 1982 and 1989 (3434) as there were between 1965 and 1970 (1643).
Compare U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1991, at 540 (Chart No. 888) (111th 6d. 1991) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1991] with U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1981, at 537 (Chart No. 904) (102d ed. 1981). The size of entities
acquired in the 1980s was also unprecedented. The value of the companies and divisions
exchanged between January 1983 and January 1987 was calculated as being equivalent to
almost one-fifth of the market value of all traded stocks, see For Better Or For Worse?,
Bus. WK., Jan. 12, 1987, at 38, while the value of mergers in 1985 was more than five
times as great as in 1965 or 1975. BENNETt HARRISON & BARRY BLUESTONE, THE GREAT
U-TURN: CORPORATE RESTRUcTURING AND THE POLARIZING OF AMERICA 59 (paperback ed.
1990).
This rise in speculative activity has been persuasively linked to managerial shortsightedness and ineptitude rather than coherent long-term business strategy. See Robert H. Hayes
& William J. Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, 58 HARv. Bus. REv. 67
(1980).
33. In 1987 alone, a full 10% of the workforce was involved in a merger, acquisition or
related transaction. See Jeanette A. Davy & Christine L. Scheck, Are Union Representatives
Effective Communicators During Mergers and Takeovers?, LAB. STUD. J.,Fall 1991, at 3, 3-4
(citing A. BoUNO & J. BOWDITCH, THE HUMAN SIDE OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 5
(1989)).
34. Cf.Silverstein, Does Law Tame the Market?, supra note 25, at 173 & n.79 (explaining that mergers and acquisitions have traditionally involved healthy businesses and criticizing
the Court's excessive attention to "moribund" enterprises).
35. Unfortunately, much of the evidence in this regard tends to be anecdotal - if one
can describe events like RJR Nabisco's dismissal of 2000 workers after Kohlberg Kravis
Roberts' 1988 leveraged buyout as an "anecdote." See Alan E. Garfield, Helping the Casualties of Creative Destruction: Corporate Takeovers and the Politics of Worker Dislocation,
16 J. CORP. L. 249, 254-55 n.32 (1991) (cataloging the wreckage of some major hostile
takeovers during the 1980s).
Two studies of peripheral aspects of the problem are Frank R. Lichtenberg & Donald
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costs" were socially unacceptable a generation ago, they have now
become standard operating procedure, even among the largest and
most respected of American corporations. 6 Thus, as the Burns Court
suggested, today new owners tend to buy companies with an eye to

"restructuring" -

a euphemism that usually translates into heavy job

losses and deep slashes in wages and benefits.'

The possibility of

terminating "overfunded" pension plans and skimming off the surplus
has been a particular temptation, as has the prospect of replacing
high-seniority, full-time employees with low-seniority, part-timers. 8
Even in the best of cases, employees of transferred companies are
almost sure to lose their accumulated seniority and vacation benefits. 9

Siegel, The Effect of Ownership Changes on the Employment and Wages of General Office
and Other Personnel, 33 J. L. & ECON. 383 (1990), which found overall declines in wages
in employment following ownership changes, but as the title indicates, focused largely on
administrative personnel; and Charles Brown & James L. Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on Labor, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 9 (Alan J.
Auerbach ed., 1988), which found "little support" for the perception that acquisitions harm
labor, but confined its attention to small Michigan companies sold during the late 1970s and
early 1980s. One commentator thus dismissed Brown and Medoff's study as "hav[ing] little
to do . . . with . . hostile takeovers and other ownership changes among large firms."
Geoffrey Carliner, Comment, in Brown & Medoff, supra, at 25. Although they are full of
horror stories, successorship cases themselves provide a uselessly skewed sample, since successors that respect workers and their unions are unlikely to get sued.
There is a negative corollary to this increased attention to labor matters: many corporations avoid acquiring unionized operations and divert their resources to nonunion targets. As
one vice-president described his company's approach, "In reviewing a candidate for acquisition, we look much more at the employee relations component now than we did in the
1960s." Ki MOODY, AN INJURY TO ALL: THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN UNIONISM 122 (1988)
(quoting Asil Verma & Thomas Kochan, The Growth and Nature of the Nonunion Sector
Within a Firm, in CHALLENGES AND CHOICES FACING AMERICAN LABOR 92 (Thomas Kochan
ed. 1985)).
36. See RICHARD BELOUS, THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF THE TEMPORARY, PART-TME AND SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE 1 (1989); Stuart Silverstein, Playing
Hardball in Workplace, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1992, at Al.
37. HARRISON & BLUESTONE, supra note 32, at xxviii. The conventional apology for job
slashing in this context is that "many of those same jobs would eventually be lost, even in
the absence of takeovers, because of the backwash of the long wave of inflation-disinflation
and the intensification of international competition." HARVEY SEGAL, CORPORATE MAKEOVER:
How AMERICAN BUSINESS IS RESHAPING FOR THE FUTURE 118 (1989).
38. See Russo, supra note 27, at 378; see also Steve Gunderson, Making the Case for a
National Commission on American Labor Law and Competitiveness, 42 LAB. L.J 585, 593
(1991) ("Many leveraged buyouts and company mergers come at the expense of employee
benefit plans, especially retiree health plans that are eliminated or scaled back to reduce
costs"). See infra text accompanying notes 205-17 for an analysis of the legal rules that
permit such activity.
39. See Marion Crain-Mountney, Comment, The Unenforceable Successorship Clause: A
Departurefrom National Labor Policy, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1249, 1253 n.6 (1983).
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At the same time, these trends have been exacerbated by dramatic changes in the basic financial structure of capitalist activity,
especially with respect to the role of debt.' With the rise of the
"junk bond" and similar innovations, a substantial proportion of successorship transactions, particularly those involving hostile takeovers
and leveraged buyouts, end up producing financially weak acquirers
entities that are desperate to generate debt-servicing revenue in any
way they can. Labor costs have been found to provide one of the
expenses most readily susceptible to a cash-strapped new
management's control ! Typically, then, employees of highly leveraged companies will be pressured to accept sharp wage and benefit
concessions; even if they are lucky enough to have the power to
refuse, the alternative may well be their employer's bankruptcy. 2
The rise of "privatization" - a concept that was just about
unknown twenty years ago - has inflicted similar kinds of hardships
in the public sector. Guided by the imperative of "efficiency," a close
cousin of the entrepreneurial concerns sketched out in Burns, governments throughout the United States have begun turning over many of
their functions to private contractors, who typically endeavor to
achieve their savings the old-fashioned way - through drastic wage
and benefit cuts 3 While the merger-and acquisition frenzy of the
1980s did calm down at least for a time, thanks to recession and
enforcement of the securities laws, a decade and more of budget
constraints at all levels of government suggests that "privatization"
may gather yet more steam.
Most fundamentally, this is also a different era for American
workers in general. Flush with post-war prosperity, the United States
approached full employment in the late 1960s, in the years between
Wiley and Bums, but unemployment rates almost doubled during the
1980s;' the problem became structural, fundamental, no longer just a
40. See HARRISON & BLUESTONE, supra note 32, at 56.
41. See WEILER, supra note 4, at 16; see also BELOUS, supra note 36, at 98 (explaining

how cutting labor costs has become a preferred means of achieving short-term profitability
and satisfying financial-market pressures).
42. See Russo, supra note 27, at 378.
43. See Al Bilik, Privatization:Defacing the Community, 43 LAB. LJ. 338 (1992); HARRISON & BLUESTONE, supra note 32, at 78, 97-99. For an analysis of the sociological and
philosophical values that are jeopardized by privatization, see Craig Becker, With Whose
Hands: Privatization, Public Employment, and Democracy, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 88

(1988).
Subcontracting by private-sector employers has also burgeoned in recent years, with
similar consequences. See Kim Moody, The Sweatshops Are Back, LAB. NOTES, July 1993, at

1.
44.

See JULIT B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERIcAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF
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frictional inconvenience. Among those who lost jobs as the result of
1980s plant closings, for example, only three-fifths found new jobs,
and almost half of them were for lower pay.45 In light of these
changes, legal rules that facilitate or encourage the elimination of
jobs, and the displacement of those who hold them, have much more
serious consequences than they did a generation ago.
Perhaps even more important than the quantity of jobs is their
quality. Give or take a few blips in recession years, real wages went
up consistently between 1945 and 1970, at an average of more than
two percent per year.' Since the early 1970s, however, real hourly
wages have been falling almost as steadily.47 Today, real wages for

nonsupervisory workers are nearly one-eighth less than they were in
1973, and scarcely higher than they were in 1965, the year after

Wiley was decided." Twenty-five years ago the United States had
the most equal distribution of wealth among the developed industrial
nations; today it has the most unequal.49 What this adds up to, Kim
Moody concludes, is "a substantial deterioration in the standard of

living of the American working class."5
Much of this decline is the result of the explosion of low-wage,
no-benefit employment - the much-derided "McJobs," "the kind of
jobs where if you hold three of them, you still can't pay the rent."'"
One third of all American workers - and almost one-fifth of fulltime, year-round workers - now receive poverty-level wages." At
LEISURE 75 & n.68 (1991).
45. See SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 65 (1991).
46. See BELous, supra note 36, at 1; Gary Burtless, Introduction and Summary, in A
FUTURE OF LousY JOBS?: THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF U.S. WAGES 1, 2 (Gary Burtless
ed., 1990) [hereinafter A FUTURE OF LOUSY JOBS?].
47. See ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 204 (1991). Wages peaked in 1973

at $11.31 per hour (in constant 1990 dollars) but by 1990 had fallen to $10.03.
48. Id. See also SCHOR, supra note 44, at 199 n.78.
49.

See Competitiveness Linked to Workforce Issues, 139 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 310, 311

(1992) (comments of Ira Magaziner).
50. MOODY, supra note 35, at 8.
51. William Greider, Who's Pulling Bill Clinton's Strings?, ROLLING STONE, Apr. 30,
1992, at 33, 35 (comments of Tom McNutt, United Food & Commercial Workers). The bestknown study showed that nearly three out of five new jobs created between 1979 and 1984
paid poverty-level wages, whereas the ratio for the 1963 to 1979 period was less than one in
five. HARRISON & BLUESTONE, supra note 32, at ix. More recently, the Census Bureau has
released a revisionist study showing "that nearly three-quarters of the 6 million jobs created
during the last economic expansion were in high-paying industries" but critics have pointed
out that "many jobs created within those high-paying industries were, in fact, low-paying
jobs." Study Finds Most New Jobs in '87-'89 in High-Paid Fields, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15,

1992, at A4.
52. See SCHOR, supra note 44, at 150; Segment of Full-Time Workers Earning Very Low
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the same time, the number of part-time workers (who are
disproportionately Black and female) 3 has increased substantially, so
that even if the hourly wage were tolerable the bottom line on the
paycheck still is not." On the whole, though, part-time workers actually receive much lower hourly wages than full-timers; like the growing ranks of temporary employees and so-called "independent contractors,"55 they are also far less likely to receive health insurance or
pension coverage from their employers. 6 The prevailing euphemism
for these shifts - all permitted, indeed encouraged, by existing law
is "flexibility.""

Wages Surged in Past Decade, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1992, at A2. According to the Census
Bureau, "the proportion of full-time, year-round workers making too little to lift a family of
four above the poverty line" increased by almost 50% between 1979 and 1990. Id.
53. See Linda Yount & Susan Williams, Temporary in Tennessee: CATS for Stable Jobs,
15 LAB. RES. REv. 73, 77 (1990); c.f Camille Colatosti, A Job without a Future, DOLLARS
& SENSE, May 1992, at 9, 9-10 (explaining how temporary agencies promote job segregation
by race and sex).
54. See BELOUS, supra note 36, at 16 (showing that the "contingent" workforce of parttime, temporary, and contract personnel grew by at least 20% between 1980 and 1988, to at
least 25% of the workforce, and that this rate of growth is 40% faster than the workforce as
a whole). Part-time work is rarely the choice of the employee; "the official data on part-time
work make it clear that practically 100 percent of the net additional part-time jobs created in
the United States since the late 1970s are held by people who would have preferred full-time
jobs but could not find any." HARRISON & BLUESTON, supra note 32, at 47.
The growth in part-time employment alone actually understates the basic trend toward
reducing the number of adequately-waged, full-time jobs. In recent years, many full-time
employees have been forced to work longer and longer hours so that management can avoid
the expense of hiring additional personnel. Overall, worktime has increased perceptibly over
the last twenty years, with accompanying increases in job stress and elimination of leisure
time. See ScHoR, supra note 44, at 1, 31, 40.
55. See Hired Guns Boom in Workplace, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1993, at Al.
56. Among blue-collar employees, part-timers averaged $4.95 per hour, 78% less than
full-timers; among service employees, $4.15 per hour, 61% less; and among clerical employees, $5.70 per hour, 54% less. See BELous, supra note 36, at 104. Almost four-fifths of fulltime employees received health insurance from their employers, while less than a third of
part-timers did. Three-fifths of full-timers received pension coverage, while less than one-fifth
of part-timers did. See id. at 105-06. In many instances temporary employment agencies do
make insurance available, but only to employees who work a certain minimum number of
hours per week, and they then make sure that no one reaches that level. See Colatosti, supra
note 53, at 9-10.
The Clinton Administration intends to study the possibility of improving "contingent"
workers' access to employee benefits. See Benefits Studied for Part-Time Workers, L.A.
TIMES, June 16, 1993, at DI.
57. See HARRISON & BLUESTONE, supra note 32, at 39; David Harvey, Flexibility:
Threat Or Opportunity?, SOCLIST REV., Jan.-Mar. 1991, at 65. As Camille Colatosti notes,
the notion of "flexibility" is really only a euphemism or, as she calls it, "corporate mythology." In her view, "the increased use of temporary workers occurs . . . because capital wants
a vulnerable and cheap work force - one that makes do with little job security and is too
weak to organize effectively." Colatosti, supra note 53, at 9.
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Unionization, the bulwark of good wages," has also become
much rarer since the days of Wiley and Bums, and employers have
grown much more willing to take aggressive steps to rid themselves
of unions.5 9 Just as non-union employers now resort to aggressive
bullying to make sure they remain "union-free,"' and unionized em-

ployers prepare for contract negotations by fortifying their factories
and soliciting "replacement workers,"'" successor employers will often go to great lengths to start anew and "union-free," with a cheaper
and uncontaminated workforce. 2 In this regard, the very process of
merging and acquiring has itself played an important role, strengthening management's hand by building larger, stronger entities that can
more easily overpower labor, 3 especially given the almost hopeless

ineffectiveness of the strike weapon, which is slowly fading into oblivion.'
58. In 1991 the union-nonunion wage differential for full-time workers stood at 23%.
The typical union worker earned $526 per week and the typical non-union worker $404. See
Labor Month in Review, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1992, at 2. Deunionization has been
shown to be an "important" "determinant of the deterioration of the economic position of the
less skilled" in recent years. McKinley L. Blackburn et al., The Declining Economic Position
of Less Skilled American Men, in A FUTURE OF LOUSY JOBS?, supra note 46, at 31, 62.
59. As noted above, only 15.8% of the American labor force is unionized. See supra
note 6. The post-war high was 34.7% (in 1954), and as late as 1964 and 1972, when Wiley
and Burns were decided, the levels were still 28.9% and 26.4% respectively. See MIcHAEL
GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORoANIzED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1988).
For an overview of management's strategic shift toward deunionizing and "zapping
labor," see HARRISON & BLUESTONE, supra note 32, at 21-52, and Peter Cappelli, Employers
and Unions: New Tactics and Strategies, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSIrY FORTIEH ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENcE ON LABOR 1-1 (B. Stein ed., 1987).
60. See McDonald, supra note 13, at 17 (suggesting that "[i]t has become an article of
faith for most private-sector employers that unionization must be avoided at all costs").
61. See THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? TRYING TO BE FOR LABOR
WHEN IT'S FLAT ON ITS BACK 237-38 (1991); see also Richard Trumka, Future of the
NLRB: From the Union's Standpoint, in THIRD ANNUAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
INSTITrUTE 325, 331 (M. Volz ed., 1987) (describing employers' "militarization . . . of industrial communities" with "kileg lights at night, concrete pillboxes, and the importation of soldiers of fortune").
62. Successors have also been known to adopt ultra-aggressive tactics like pre-recruiting
strikebreakers and introducing paramilitary security forces. See Union Shows How to Fight in
West Virginia, N.Y. TiMES, May 8, 1992, at A7.
63. See Gary Fields, The United States Economy and an Agenda for Labor, SOCIALIST
REv., Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 73, 78.
64. The Bureau of Labor Statistics recorded only 35 strikes involving 1000 or more
workers in 1992, and only 40 in 1991. The 1992 figure is the lowest since the BLS began
recording in 1947. The 1991 figure is tied for second-lowest with 1989. By comparison,
1974, the peak year in the last quarter-century, witnessed 424 strikes, while the figures for
1972 (Burns) and 1964 (Wiley) were 250 and 246 respectively. See Major Strikes Hit Record
Low During 1992,-142 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 186 (1993); STATISTICAL ABSTRACt 1991,
supra note 32, at 423 (Chart No. 694). Over the last five years, the annual average was 44.
In the Wiley-Burns era, 1964 to 1972, it was almost eight times as high at 328. STATISTICAL
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In view of today's organizing realities, moreover, successorship
rules that allow employers to discard union obligations will usually
mean the loss of unionized workplaces that will not be canceled out
by organizing victories somewhere else, as would have happened in
earlier days.' This deunionizing process then brings about a vicious
cycle: because existing successorship law leaves unions so helpless to
protect their members against corporate transformations, they become
less attractive to American workers, so that labor's weakness both in
organizing and in American life in general is exacerbated.'
After twenty years, the time has come to declare the Burns experiment a failure and to develop a protective regime of the kind

hinted at in Wiley and brought to fruition in other industrial countries.
Such a regime must extend beyond the confines of "traditional" labor
law to cover the totality of the American workforce, union and nonunion alike. Successorship protections should become part of the basic
floor for all American workers, a basic social regulation like unemployment insurance and the overtime laws.

ship

I certainly do not mean to suggest that adjustments to successorlaw will cure all the ills I have pointed to. The

deindustrialization of the United States and other advanced economies,

and international capital's systematic drive for "flexibility" and the
lowest common denominator, are fundamental, long-term developments that transcend ordinary legal reforms. Nevertheless, I believe
that the prevailing strategy of the American business community to "compete" by cutting wages, eliminating benefits, and disregarding
worker safety - has been a disastrous mistake, and that public policy
at all levels should attempt to chart a new course. A new law of
successorship that provides genuine employee protections and discour-

ABSTRAcr 1991, supra note 32, at 423 (Chart No. 694); Current Labor Statistics: Work
Stoppage Data, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Jan. 1984, at 123 (Chart 37). Although legal shifts are
partly to blame, see John G. Kilgour, Can Unions Strike Anymore? The Impact of Recent
Supreme Court Decisions, 41 LAB. LJ. 259 (1990), the decline of the strike probably has
more to do with growing levels of unemployment and workers' increasing willingness to
cross picket lines.
65. See Paul C. Weiler, Hard Times for Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 58 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1015, 1017-18 (1992) [hereinafter Weiler, Hard Times for Unions].
66. See Russo, supra note 27, at 378; see also Stone, supra note 7, at 583 (citing Henry S. Farber, The Recent Decline of Unionization in the United States, 238 Scd. 915 (1987))
(attributing union decline in large part to diminishing employee confidence in the power of
unions to obtain better wages, job security, and other working conditions); cf Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possi.
bilities, 55 U. Cal. L. REV. 73, 104-05 (1988) (explaining how stronger successorship doctrines could increase labor's role in corporate decisionmaking).
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ages slash-and-bum business transactions can make a small but important contribution.
II.

DEFECTS IN THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK

OF SUCCESSORSHIP LAW
The basic problem with American successorship law is that it
does not exist. The legal system does nothing to ensure that employees will retain their jobs across a change in ownership, or that those
jobs will continue to provide a similar level of wages and benefits.
These are the fundamental issues that any body of labor law successorship needs to resolve, and the American system, essentially one of
laissez-faire, falls miserably.
For the five-sixths of American employees who work without the
benefit of a union, the legal system currently provides just about no
protection whatsoever. As such, a critical analysis of the existing
doctrinal framework requires little space. With regard to unionized
workers, there is a large and complex body of law, but even here a
successor employer retains almost total discretion to avoid any burdens, so that its significance is easily overstated.
In this section, I provide a sketch of the existing system and a
criticism of some of its most serious defects. This is by no means an
exhaustive discussion; successorship was something of a cottage industry in labor law during the 1970s, back when the Supreme Court's
decisions were fresh and workers' wages were rising every year, and
the doctrinal niceties have been comprehensively explored in literally
scores of articles.67 I begin with successorship under the NLRA and
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947
("LMRA"), 6 which, with some peripheral exceptions, only affect
unionized workers in private-sector workplaces outside the transportation industry, but which illustrate most of the problems in American
successorship law generally. I then consider other pertinent federal
statutes - particularly those regulating transportation carriers, federal
service contractors, employee benefits, and plant closings - and then
pass to a (necessarily brief) discussion of successorship under state

67.

See Craig A. Crispin, Comment, The Successorship Doctrine: In Search of a New

Focus, 17 WlLAMETrE L. REv. 405, 407 n.3 (1981) (citing 25 articles on successorship
published between 1968 and 1976 and describing this list as an "extremely limited sample").
For an exhaustive, if not entirely neutral, overview of current law, see NORTHRUP &
MtScIMARRA, supra note 2, at 193-461.

68. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
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law, which determines the fate of most non-union workers.
A.

Federal Law

1. The NLRA and the LMRA

The Supreme Court has been primarily responsible for both the
basic principles and the technical rules of successorship under federal

labor law. Although the Labor Board began holding successors liable
for predecessor unfair labor practices within three years of the passage of the Wagner Act, and began requiring successor employers
to bargain with incumbent unions as early as 1944,70 it was the
Court's Wiley decision in 1964 that brought successorship to the
forefront of labor law.7' Then, after the NLRB undertook to adapt
and expand Wiley,' the Court rebuffed these efforts and fixed its
own firm limits on employee rights in Burns and Howard Johnson.73

More recently, in an important if somewhat technical 1987 decision,
Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB,74 the Court ratified
the Board's implementation of Burns and declined employer invita-

tions to weaken the law still further.
Based on these precedents, labor law successorship boils down to
a few key principles. As noted above, however, these are not fixed
obligations, and will only take effect if the employer so chooses.

69. See Kiddie Kover Mfg. Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 355 (1938), enforced sub nom. NLRB v.
Colten, 105 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1939).
70. See South Carolina Granite Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1944), enforced sub nom. NLRB
v. Blair Quarries, Inc., 152 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1945). The Board's early analysis was substantially similar to the inquiry used today. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lunder Shoe Corp., 211 F.2d
284, 287 (Ist Cir. 1954) (finding a successor bargaining obligation and rejecting the
employer's claim that "basic changes occurred in the working force, products, machinery,
operations and supervisory staff").
71. Wiley was not, however, the first case involving a union's attempt to require a successor to arbitrate under its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Matter of
the Arbitration Between Greenstone & Amusement Clerks, Local 1115c, 166 N.Y.S.2d 858
(Sup. CL 1957) (applying New York law to deny successor's motion to stay arbitration);
Application of Swift & Co., 76 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (same); see also IAM v.
Shawnee Indus., Inc., 224 F. Supp. 347 (W.D. Okla. 1963) (applying traditional corporate law
principles to hold that a successor was not bound to its predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement); Gold v. Gibbons, 3 Cal. Rptr. 117 (Ct. App. 1960) (same); LAM, Lodge No. 6
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 328 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (same). Arbitrations against
successors were also actually conducted. See, e.g., C-F-M Co., 37 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 980
(1962) (Kates, Arb.).
72. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Both these decisions and the court cases
cited in note 16 have never been explicitly overruled, but they retain no life whatsoever.
73. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
74. 482 U.S. 27 (1987).
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An employer will be considered a "successor" for labor law purposes only if it:
a. Acquires control of an existing business operation by a means
other than a purchase of stock, and makes no important changes
to the employees' jobs. (Bums, Fall River Dyeing).
b. Retains enough of the predecessor's employees that those
employees constitute a majority of the new workforce. (Bums,
Howard Johnson). Note that it doesn't have to retain any of the
predecessor's employees, though. Existing law only bars the employer from discriminating against them on the basis of union
membership (or race, sex, religion, national origin, age, or disability).75
If the employer chooses to become a successor, it may have to:
a. Recognize the predecessor's employees' union and bargain
with it in good faith. (Burns).
b. Allow an arbitrator to decide whether it should be bound to
the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement, in whole or in
part. (Wiley).
But if the employer chooses to become a successor, it is not required' to:
a. Pay the employees the same wages or provide them with the
same benefits or working conditions that they received from the
predecessor, unless an arbitrator orders the employer to do so
and the employer does not succeed in having the arbitrator's
award vacated. (Burns, Wiley).
b. Comply with the collective bargaining agreement between the
predecessor and the predecessor's union, again unless an arbitrator orders it to do so and the employer does not succeed in

75.

See NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988); see also Civil Rights Act of

1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988); Age Discrimination in Employment Act
§ 4(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1988); Americans With Disabilities Act § 102(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a) (Supp. M1 1992).

76. Any of these obligations may, of course, be assumed voluntarily; and in some cases
consent may be implied. However, the NLRB is extraordinarily reluctant to find such constructive consent. See, e.g., Field Bridge Assocs., 306 N.L.R.B. 322 (1992), enforced sub
nom. Local 32B-32J Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. NLRB, 982 F.2d 845 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2995 (1993). The employer may also be required to apply predecessor
terms and conditions of employment unless it makes clear its intention to change them at the
time it hires its workforce. See infra note 146 and accompanying text. Finally, as a practical
matter, the successor may sometimes have little choice but to hire the existing workforce and
thereby acquire certain obligations. See Sue J. Henry, Is There Arbitration After Bums?: The
Resurrection of John Wiley & Sons, 31 VAND. L. REv. 249, 280 (1978).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

19

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 11:2

having the arbitrator's award vacated. (Bums, Wiley).
Finally, by choosing not to become a successor, the new employer

is not only freed of any bargaining requirement, but is also immune
from any obligations under the predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement, even if that agreement is expressly made binding upon
successors (Howard Johnson).

Each of these points gives rise to a number of problems, some

of which are simply complications of this particular regime and others
basic matters that must be addressed under any system of labor law
successorship. These issues are considered sequentially.
a. The continuity of the enterprise
The basic theory of existing labor law successorship is simple:

business transactions do not necessarily alter workers' views about
union representation. As such, a change in ownership, without more,
will not nullify a group of employees' decision to have a union represent them.
Ordinarily, once a union is certified as the representative of a

group of employees, the employer is precluded from questioning its
majority status, and must bargain with the union in good faith concerning the terms and conditions of the employees' employment. This
bar is almost absolute during the first year after the certification; after
that first year the union's status may be challenged only when the

employer produces solid evidence to back up a good-faith doubt
about its continuing support from a majority of the employees. The
rationale is stability. There cannot be union elections every day, or
every month; a union must be given a certain degree of leeway to do
what it is supposed to do.'

Within this framework, the identity of the employer is not con77. See Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 37-39; see also Briggs Plumbingware, Inc. v.
NLRB, 877 F.2d 1282, 1288-89 (6th Cir. 1989) (explaining the doctrine in the successorship
context).
Successor employers do enjoy a little more leeway than other employers to challenge
the union's majority status. Successors are permitted to retract their voluntary recognition of a
union at any time, instead of being required to bargain in good faith for a "reasonable time,"
as is usually the case. See Landmark Int'l Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 815, 818 (6th
Cir. 1983); Harley Davidson Transp. Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1531 (1985). This new rule encourages employers to stir up anti-union sentiment in the workforce at a time when, as the Supreme Court has recognized, workers may be reluctant to align themselves with the union.
See Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 40.
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sidered significant. A simple change in ownership does not create a
good-faith doubt about the union's status." Only if there has been a
wholesale change in the employing enterprise, so that the employees
are genuinely likely to feel differently about their work and thus
about their choice of representative, does the union's certification
become ineffective. Successorship law thus begins with rules about
the kinds of changes that do and do not affect union certifications.
Compared to other aspects of the current successorship regime,
and even compared with the systems of other countries that provide
meaningful protections in this area,79 the current approach to this
"continuity of the enterprise" problem is not seriously deficient. It
does have a few holes, though, and the analysis is unduly complex.
Unfortunately, these complexities tend to vitiate workers' rights.
i.

The varieties of affected transactions

Under current law, the form of the transaction by which a successor takes control of a business is of little importance. An employer
can be held to successor obligations whether it arrives via a partial or
total sale of assets, a lease, a subcontract, a competitive bidding process, a leveraged buyout, and, last but perhaps no longer least, a
governmental "privatization."' Even when the new owner takes over
following a bankruptcy or receivership sale, successorship may still be
found.8
When the new employer takes control by means of a stock purchase, though, the conventional analysis suggests that successorship
doctrine does not apply. The new employer is considered to remain
the same legal entity and thus to be bound to existing contractual and
statutory obligations.' It cannot alter the composition of the

78.
79.

Bunts, 406 U.S. at 279.
See infra text accompanying notes 241-63.

80. See United Tel. Workers v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 665, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Bazelon,
CJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 827 (1978) (listing various different possible succes-

sorship situations); see also Garcia v. Hudson Lumber Co., 679 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Cal.
1987) (applying successorship doctrine in the LBO context); Base Servs., Inc., 296 N.L.R.B.
172, 175 (1989) (holding that successorship status may be found even when the predecessor
here the U.S. Army - "was not covered by the Act").
81. See, e.g., Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 32, 43-44 & n.10 (liquidator's auction);
Nephi Rubber Prods. Corp., 303 N.L.R.B. 151 (1991), enforced, 976 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir.
1992) (bankruptcy sale); Derby Refining Co., 292 N.L.R.B. 1015 (1989), enforced sub nom.
Coastal Derby Refining Co. v. NLRB, 915 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1990) (bankruptcy reorganization plan).
82. See, e.g., Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 751 (7th Cir. 1989); Western Boot
& Shoe, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 999 (1973); see also Hylton & Hylton, supra note 28, at 852-60
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workforce or the terms and conditions of employment any more than
the predecessor could have done. In recent years this principle has
become a little clouded, however, with several courts of appeals ex-

pressing uncertainty about the inapplicability of successorship rules in
this situation.83
The courts' unease is justified: this long-standing omission makes
little sense. Guided in part by Wiley, which referred briefly to New
York corporate law in its decision ordering a successor into arbitration, the NLRB appears to have given undue weight to traditional,
formalistic principles of state corporate law that should have no relevance in the context of federal labor law.' Whether or not a stock
purchaser can be conceptualized as the "same" entity as its predecessor, under traditional corporate law or otherwise, does little to ad-

(arguing in favor of the asset purchase/stock purchase distinction). Recently, a California
district court applied this rationale in the merger context, holding that the newly formed
entity was "the same" as the merged companies, so as to preserve existing obligations. Miller
v. California Pac. Medical Ctr., 788 F. Supp. 1112, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 1992), vacated and
remanded on different grounds, 991 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, the court did
apply a form of successorship analysis, holding that there had been no such changes following the merger that employee attitudes concerning union representation would have changed.
See id. at 1116. The NLRB General Counsel itself appeared uncertain about the law on this
point, arguing as an alternative theory that the new entity was properly a Burns successor.
See id.at 1115. Earlier Board decisions, however, have suggested that successorship does
apply in the merger context. See Southern Cal. Water Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 771, 772 (1979).
Stock purchases are not an especially popular form of business transfer in the United
States. The choice to use this method typically revolves around tax considerations, see 8
ZOL AN CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS Ch. 175 (1992), and indeed in other jurisdictions where .the tax considerations are different, stock sales are overwhelmingly dominant and
asset sales are almost unknown. See Alvin Price, Practical Implications of the Acquired
Rights Directive in Relation to Company Acquisitions, in IRISH CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN LAW,
ACQUIRED RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES: PAPERS FROM THE I.C.E.L. CONFERENCE 61, 61-62 (1988)
[hereinafter ACQUIRED RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES] (describing the strong preference for stock
transactions in Ireland).
83. See, e.g., NLRB v. Rockwood Energy & Mineral Corp., 942 F.2d 169, 175 (3d Cir.
1991); EPE, Inc. v. NLRB, 845 F.2d 483, 490 (4th Cir. 1988); UFCW, Local 152 v. NLRB,
768 F.2d 1463, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1985); NLRB v. Edjo, Inc., 631 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1980);
see also MPE, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 519 (1976) (applying successorship principles to hold that
a stock purchaser was not bound to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; somewhat
cryptic rationale).
84. Wiley noted that under New York corporate law the survivor of a merger is bound
to the merged company's contractual obligations, see Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 550 n.3, and
in Burns the Court gave as one ground for its different approach the lack of a similar "background of state law." Burns, 406 U.S. at 286. See Sangerman, supra note 17, at 162 (questioning the relevance of state corporate law in the successorship context); see generally
McLeod, supra note 5 (criticizing the adherence to traditional principles of state corporate law
in labor cases). But see Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Labor Law Successorship:
A Corporate Law Approach, 92 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1993) (proposing to tie labor law successorship more closely to corporate law successorship).
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vance the 'analysis. A stock purchaser can do what it wants with a

new company, just like an asset purchaser, and an asset purchaser can
preserve an existing operation intact." A stock purchaser may well
change the name of the business and fundamentally restructure its

operation, even transform it into a "substantially different enterprise."' By the same token, many asset purchasers go out of their
way to acquire existing business names, trademarks, customers, and
goodwill - in other words, to preserve as much continuity as possible and
do their utmost to ensure that the entity remains "the
8
same." 7
Accordingly, stock purchases should be added to the long list of

transactions to which successorship doctrine applies, so that continuity
would be decided on a case-by-case basis. I am somewhat reluctant to
propose this revision given the harshness of existing successorship
law; after all, it is a good thing that at least employees of stock purchasers do not have their rights placed in jeopardy through business
transactioneering, even if the legal rule that gives them this protection
is difficult to understand. The stock-purchase exception should be
eliminated, therefore, only if the existing rules are reformed so as to

provide meaningful guarantees.
ii.

Changed circumstances: the employee perspective

Over the last few years, and especially since the Supreme
Court's decision in Fall River Dyeing,8 the NLRB and the courts

have begun to take a more employee-protective view of the kinds of
operational changes that will preclude a finding of successorship 9

85. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 84.
86. EPE, Inc. v. NLRB, 845 F.2d 483, 490 (4th Cir. 1988).
87. See, e.g., Boardman Co., 91 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 489, 494 (1988) (Harr, Arb.)
(describing an asset purchase in which the successor acquired the predecessor's name, trademark, contracts, bids, and even telephone numbers); see also HARRISON & BLUESTONE, supra
note 32, at 65 (describing the 1987 asset purchase of Greyhound, which was designed to
maximize the appearance of continuity).
88. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987).
89. See, e.g., Delta Carbonate, Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 118 (1992), enforced, 989 F.2d 486
(3d Cir. 1993); UFCW, Local 152 v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 1463, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1985); NLRB
v. Jeffries Lithograph Co., 752 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1985). But see Smegal v. Gateway Foods,
Inc., 819 F.2d 191, 194 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 928 (1987). Employer advocates have greeted this shift with considerable dismay. See, e.g., DuRoss, supra note 20, at
397 (criticizing as "myopic" this new focus on "the employee's view of job continuity" instead of "operational modifications").
The Board's shift would appear attributable in part to a string of appeals court decisions vacating Board orders in cases where the agency had failed to find successorship but
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Where various kinds of alterations in business structure were once
considered sufficient to permit an employer to escape labor obliga-

tions," a lack of continuity will now be found only if the bargaining-unit jobs change in such a way that employees are likely to feel
differently about union representation.9 Thus, even when there has

been a considerable change in the basic direction of the business,'
or a substantial hiatus between the predecessor's shutdown and the

successor's start-up,93 the successor may still incur a bargaining obligation, provided that the bargaining-unit jobs remain largely unaffected.

This is a healthy development, but it needs to be taken a step
further, for the law is still burdened with an unduly complex analysis.
Successorship determinations currently require a thoroughly unnecessary examination of a string of meaningless factors pertaining to
business matters. These include whether the new employer uses the

same plant, machinery, and equipment, employs the same managers
and supervisors, services the same customers, and produces the same

neglected to focus on how operational changes would have affected employee attitudes toward
union representation. See District 1199P, Nat'l Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees v.
NLRB, 864 F.2d 1096 (3d Cir. 1989); UMW Local Union 1329 v. NLRB, 812 F.2d 741
(D.C. Cir. 1987); UFCW, Local 152, 768 F.2d at 1472-73.
90. See, e.g., Woodrich Indus., Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 43 (1979); Radiant Fashions, Inc., 202
N.L.R.B. 938 (1973); Lincoln Private Police, Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. 717 (1971); see also United
Steelworkers v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1342 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (holding that a
shift from conventional to ESOP financing precluded a finding of continuity and a Wiley
arbitration order). Operational changes of this kind are, of course, "far more common than
changes that affect the working conditions of employees." Stephen B. Goldberg, The Labor
Law Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 735, 753 (1969).
91. A substantial change in the employees' jobs will not be sufficient in and of itself.
See, e.g., Systems Management, Inc. v. NLRB, 901 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1990) (changing from
full-time to part-time schedule does not undo continuity). And of course an employer cannot
defeat successorship by simply paying decreased wages - even dramatically decreased wages.
See id. (50% hourly wage cut).
92. Fall River Dyeing provides a useful example. The successor engaged solely in special-order "commission" textile dyeing, while two-thirds of the predecessor's work had involved mass-production "converting" dyeing. See Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 30, 32.
Regardless, the production process remained the same, and the workers continued to use the
same machines, so the Court found sufficient continuity from the employee perspective. See
id. at 44.
93. Marvin Dicker, Sale of Assets, Mergers, and Acquisitions: A Management View, in

LABOR LAW AND BuStNEsS CHANGE, supra note 25, at 169, 173. See, e.g., Nephi Rubber
Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1992) (16-month hiatus); NLRB v.
Rockwood Energy & Mineral Corp., 942 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1991) (five-year hiatus). See also
UFCW, Local 152 v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 1463, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (remanding case to the
Board for an explanation of how and why an 18-month hiatus could have affected
employees' attitudes toward union representation).
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product.' The problem is not so much that this unnecessarily detailed investigation wastes time and resources (although it clearly

does) but that it may prejudice the more important inquiry. In a close
case, where bargaining unit jobs have changed somewhat but not
overwhelmingly, evidence of irrelevant changes in sales structure and
customer base might tend to tip a fact-finder - or, perhaps more
important, a cautious General Counsel unsure about whether to issue

an unfair labor practice complaint in the first instance

-

against a

finding of continuity of the enterprise." If these peripheral issues are

discarded, and the analysis becomes solely and exclusively an inquiry
into the nature of bargaining unit jobs, the matter will be considered

on a clean slate, and employers will no longer be able to rely on
irrelevant factors to the detriment of their employees.
b.

Job insecurity

In the years following Wiley, both the NLRB and a number of

federal courts assumed that the basic policy of providing "some protection to the employees from a sudden change in the employment

relationship"' required protection of the most fundamental kind: assurances that employees would not simply lose their jobs altogether
as the result of business transfers.97 But Burns and Howard Johnson

94. See, e.g., Bell Glass Co., 293 N.L.R.B. 700, 708 (1989); Premium Foods, Inc., 260
N.L.R.B. 708, 714 (1982), enforced, 709 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1983). Theodore Kheel has criticized this approach:
It is not entirely obvious why the Board sees various of the [business-related]
factors as being in any way relevant to a determination of bargaining duties. One
might reasonably ask what possible difference it could make to a given group of
employees that the new employer continues to purchase supplies from the old
supplier, or obtains financing from the same institution.
4 THEODORE KHEEL, LABOR LAW § 17.0311], at 17-18 (1991).
95. It is vital to consider this problem from the charging party's standpoint. Ordinarily,
the NLRB regional office will demand evidence from the charging party to sustain a successorship charge; if the union cannot affirmatively prove the continuity of the business structure, or if the employer provides evidence of business changes (evidence the union will rarely
be in a position to rebut), the Region will typically decline to issue a complaint. Cf. Ellen I.
Dannin, Labor Law Reform - Is There a Baby in the Bathwater?, 44 LAB. LJ. 626 (1993)
(emphasizing the crucial role of the NLRB's regional offices in the underenforcement of the

NLRA).
96. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964).
97. The Board approached the job security problem somewhat indirectly. In Chemrock
Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1965), it held that a successor had unlawfully failed to bargain in
good faith with the representative of "its employees," ruling that predecessor employees were
to be considered the successor's "employees" for bargaining purposes, even though the successor had not hired them. Then, in Martin Marietta Corp., 159 N.L.R.B. 905 (1966), the
Board found that a successor violated its bargaining obligation by failing to take seniority
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did away with this approach, and today successor employers enjoy

more or less total discretion in hiring, so that unionized workers stand
to lose their jobs unless the successor wishes to retain them. The
Court appeared to assume both that the market would sort things out
in a reasonable fashion (because many successors would choose to
retain predecessor employees, under strike pressure or otherwise,
while those discarded would soon find comparable jobs somewhere

else) and that the legal system would provide sufficient protection
through its ban on discrimination against union members.
Today, however, neither the market nor the law appears to work.
As described above, great shifts in the American economy and the
strategies of American business have seriously undermined the standard of living for working Americans. Given the rising "cost of job

loss," falling out of a well-paying job is a distinctly more serious
affair than it was twenty years ago." At the same time, the rise of

the "union-avoidance" strategy in corporate America means that successors are much more likely not to (re)hire a unionized workforce
than they were back when unionization was still accepted as a basic

into account in its hiring decisions. In Burns itself, of course, the Board required the successor to adhere to the terms and conditions of employment fixed by its collective bargaining
agreement - a requirement both the Supreme Court and almost all commentators interpreted
to include a term prohibiting discharge (and thus "restructuring" of the workforce) except for
good cause. See NLRB v. Bums Int'l See. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 288 (1972); Lawrence
F. Doppelt, Successor Companies: The NLRB Limits the Options - And Raises Some Problems, 20 DEPAUL L. REv. 176, 186-87 (1971). But see Henry, supra note 76, at 279 n.22
(arguing that preserving the terms of the predecessor agreement does not require retention of
the predecessor workforce).
The Second Circuit (and, of course, the Sixth Circuit in Howard Johnson, 482 F.2d
489 (1973)) took the position that a successor that maintained continuity of the business
enterprise was required to arbitrate under the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement,
even if it had hired hardly any of the predecessor's employees. See Monroe Sander Corp. v.
Livingston, 377 F.2d 6, 12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967). The assumption
there was that an arbitrator could order reinstatement of predecessor employees that the successor had failed to hire. But see TriState Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB. 408 F.2d 171, 173
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (finding no NLRA violation when a service contractor refused to hire its
predecessor's employees).
98. "Mhe cost of job loss is the difference between current earnings and expected income during the year following an employment termination." Juliet B. Schor & Samuel
Bowles, Employment Rents and the Incidence of Strikes, 69 REv. ECON. & STAT. 584, 585
(1987). This cost has increased markedly to the extent that underlying rates of unemployment
have risen, particularly in regions suffering long-term distress. Unionized manufacturing jobs
pay much better than the new breed of "McJobs," and the unemployment insurance system
covers fewer workers and pays diminished benefits. See Barbara Rhine, Business Closings and
Their Effects on Employees - Adaptation of the Tort of Wrongful Discharge, 8 INDUS. REL.
LJ. 362, 365 n.1l (1986) (describing the inadequacies of the unemployment insurance system).
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cost of doing business. Such successors have little to fear from the

union members they displace, for strikes, especially effective strikes,
are now little more than a historical memory."

The antidiscrimination remedy, meanwhile, is distinctly ineffective, both because of the general flaws in this area and because of the
peculiar circumstances that arise in successorship cases. As Michael
Gottesman and Clyde Summers have demonstrated, the NLRA's antidiscrimination provision, Section 8(a)(3), grants only the feeblest of
remedies - reinstatement and back pay, less interim earnings - and
it is lethargically and unzealously enforced."w The NLRA's baseline

conception of discrimination, moreover, is the individual case. As
Cynthia Estlund points out, this myopia "permit[s] the artful employer
to engage in massive and systematic union avoidance without serious-

ly risking liability.. ' ...
Given these deficiencies, something of a consensus has emerged
that Section 8(a)(3) is inadequate to protect workers' rights to selforganization in representation proceedings."°e That failure is perhaps
even more striking in the successorship context, where discharged
workers are required to make out an extraordinarily stringent case. 3

A mass termination of predecessor employees will not be taken as
99. See supra note 64.
100. See Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 363-72 (1990) [hereinafter Gottesman, Rethinking
Labor Law Preemption]; Clyde W. Summers, Effective Remedies, supra note 11, at 475-77.
Reinstatement is almost meaningless in that few victims accept such offers, and the overwhelming majority of those who do are fired again within a year or two of their return to
work. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1792 (1983).
101. Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and Union Avoidance: Misunderstanding
the National Labor Relations Act, 71 TEx. L. REv. 921, 933 (1993).
102. See Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption, supra note 100, at 363-64; but
compare Weiler, Hard Times for Unions, supra note 65, with Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard
D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at the Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 953 (1991) (ascribing different significance to evidence that a substantial proportion of union supporters are discharged in the course of representation elections).
103. To show that a successor abused its hiring program so as to avoid union obligations,
it must be established that there is substantial evidence of union animus; lack of a
convincing rationale for refusal to hire the predecessor's employees; inconsistent
hiring practices or overt acts or conduct evidencing a discriminatory motive; as
well as a reasonable inference from the evidence that [the successor] conducted its
staffing in a manner precluding the predecessor's employees from being hired as a
majority of [the successor's] overall work force to avoid the Board's successorship
doctrine.
Dasal Caring Ctrs., Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 60, 69 (1986), enforced, 815 F.2d 711 (6th Cir.
1987).
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sufficient in itself. There must be direct and "substantial" evidence of
anti-union sentiment on the part of the new employer, the kind of

evidence that is rarely available from "savvy" successors."0 ~ Where
discriminatory motives must be inferred, both the Board and the

courts are noticeably reluctant to act. In the extreme cases, of course,
discrimination will be found and relief provided,"6 but in cases that
merely cry out rather than scream, the employer will get away with
1 06

it.

For example, although it is generally considered suspicious if an
employer discards an experienced workforce in favor of new employees with no relevant experience at all, °" the NLRB has found "not

104. Id. at 69; see Severson & Wilicoxon, supra note 23, at 842-43. I take this remarkable adjective from B. Glenn George, Successorship and the Duty to Bargain, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 277, 290 (1988).
105. These remedies can be vigorous. In mass-discrimination cases, it is presumed that
absent the discrimination the successor would have hired a majority, and the new employer is
held to the terms and conditions of employment established by its predecessor's collective
bargaining agreement. In such cases, moreover, there need not be evidence of discrimination
against a sufficient number of individual employees to constitute a majority. Once the successor has created a "climate of futility" in its hiring program, predecessor employees will be
excused for their failure to apply, and will be awarded reinstatement and back pay in accordance with the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. Love's Barbeque Restaurant, 245
N.L.R.B. 78 (1979), enforced sub nom. Kallmann v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1981).
The Ninth Circuit refused to enforce that part of the so-called "Love's Barbeque remedy" that
assessed back pay at the old contract rate, see 640 F.2d at 1103, but the Board continues to
use this measure "because the successor's unlawful failure to recognize and bargain with the
union [leaves it] without an adequate or reasonable alternative basis for calculating what rates
would have been arrived at through lawful bargaining." State Distrib. Co., 282 N.L.R.B.
1048, 1049 (1987). The Love's Barbeque remedy remains intensely controversial among appellate judges. Compare U.S. Marine Corp. v. NLRB, 944 F.2d 1305, 1319-24 (7th Cir. 1991)
(en bane), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1474 (1992) with 944 F.2d at 1327-31 (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
106. As examples of suspicious successor hiring that survived Board scrutiny, see R & L
Cartage & Sons, Inc., 292 N.L.R.B. 530 (1989); Kessel Food Mkts., Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 426
(1987), enforced, 868 F.2d 881 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989); General Processing Corp., 267 N.L.R.B. 1281 (1983). For an example of a manuever that failed to get
by the Board but proved successful with a reviewing court, see Southwest Merchandising
Corp. v. NLRB, 943 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Sometimes the Board's failures in this
regard may result from inadequate investigations by the General Counsel. In proceedings
involving the Inland Container Corporation, for example, the General Counsel initially failed
to satisfy the Board that discrimination had occurred, forcing the discriminatees to file a
private suit for age discrimination, in which they uncovered evidence that Inland Container
had hired only individuals with a "demonstrated willingness to work in a nonunion environment" - a criterion which even the Board was willing to find objectionable. Compare Inland
Container Corp., 267 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1983) with Inland Container Corp., 275 N.L.R.B. 378
(1985).
107. See, e.g., NLRB v. Foodway of El Paso, 496 F.2d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 1974); NLRB
v. New England Tank Indus., 302 F.2d 273, 276 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 875
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inherently implausible" and discriminatory an employer's policy of
refusing to hire anyone with any experience in the pertinent industry
even if the obvious consequence is that none of the unionized
predecessor employees will be hired." s Similarly, if a long-time union employee were to tell a successor that she wanted to work on a
union basis, the successor's refusal to hire her would not be considered discriminatory. In the eyes of the law she would be demanding
"terms and conditions to which [s]he is not legally entitled" - the
continuing presence of the union at a time when the employer, still in
the midst of its hiring process, might not necessarily end up as a
legal successor, employing a union majority. As such her request
would become a valid reason not to hire her." Painstaking legal
analysts may trace the logic here, though few unemployed workers
would succeed in digesting it. It probably approaches the legendary
paradox that one cannot be "fired" for going on strike, but may be
"permanently replaced."....
In successorship cases after Burns and Howard Johnson, then,
hiring tends to become something of a game. Often the new employer
will incur great expense or devise elaborate stratagems to avoid hiring
predecessor employees. One anti-union successor, for example, chose
to hire 525 new employees to fill 220 job slots at its newly acquired
meatpacking plant, and then ended up having to fire 275 of them in
short order. Most of the newcomers were "wholly inexperienced,"
with the predictable consequence that productivity at the plant was
extremely poor."' In similar fashion, another meatpacking company
decided to hire "nearly two hundred persons . . . for a unit normally
comprised of just over eighty," and the non-union substitutes were
almost 90% slower than the union workforce; indeed, the new workers turned out to be so incompetent that meat had to be destroyed."'
That company brought in its new workers from over two hundred and
fifty miles away; in a similar sort of case, a Pittsburgh bus line went
to the trouble of conducting its hiring and training three hundred
miles away in Detroit, so as to keep the process hidden from the

(1962).
108. See Inland Container Corp., 267 N.L.R.B. at 1190.
109. Packing House & Indus. Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 590 F.2d 688, 696 (8th Cir. 1978).
If the new employer had already hired a predecessor majority, of course, the employee's
request would be rendered superfluous, and a failure to hire because of this request would be
considered discriminatory.
110. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
111. UFCW, Local 152 v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 1463, 1474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
112. Packing House, 590 F.2d at 693.
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former employees."' One successor, meanwhile, considered the mat-

practically, and simply tried bribing the union to "bow
ter more
14
out."'

A different variation on the game involves a successor who does
wish to retain predecessor employees, given their skill and experience,"' but nevertheless wants to avoid any union obligations. Such
a successor will carefully control its hiring so as to ensure that it
retains a solid complement of experienced workers, but not enough
that it ends up with a workforce majority of predecessor employees." ' The numerical analysis in successorship cases is now very
strict: where once the NLRB was satisfied if the successor merely
retained "substantially the same workforce,"'" 7 and courts would accept "a good substantial proportion,"".. today a rigid mathematical
demonstration of majority status is required."9 As such, employers
will sometimes do strange things to make sure they do not reach the

fatal number of fifty percent plus one.
Whether successor employers' hiring behavior is testament to

irrational anti-unionism of a pathological variety, or the new "rational" strain of anti-unionism that seeks to cut labor costs by any
means necessary,"m it should not be condoned as a matter of nation-

113. See Shortway Suburban Lines. 286 N.L.R.B. 323 (1987), enforced per curiam, 862
F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1988).
114. NLRB v. Foodway of El Paso. 496 F.2d 117, 118 (5th Cir. 1974).
115. See Henry, supra note 76, at 280 n.122 (explaining that successors may often hire
the predecessor's employees because "they are the only personnel with sufficient skill, training, and experience to operate the business smoothly and efficiently immediately after the
successor takes over.").
116. For egregious (and botched) examples, see Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. NLRB, 967
F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1992); U.S. Marine Corp. v. NLRB, 944 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1991) (en
banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1474 (1992).
117. John Stepp's Friendly Ford, Inc., 141 N.L.R.B. 1065, 1069 (1963), rev'd, 338 F.2d
833 (9th Cir. 1964). As late as 1982, longtime Board member John Fanning maintained the
position that an absolute majority was not required in every case. See, e.g., General Processing Corp., 263 N.L.R.B. 86, 87 n.4 (1982).
118. NLRB v. Lunder Shoe Corp., 211 F.2d 284, 287 (1st Cir. 1954); see also Retail
Clerks Union, Local 775 v. Purity Stores, Inc., 116 Cal. Rptr. 40, 42 (Ct. App. 1974) (ordering a successor to arbitrate and rejecting its argument that "there [was] no evidence that a
majority of [the predecessor's] employees entered [its] employment," because Howard Johnson
did not necessarily require a majority, only "substantial continuity").
119. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 782-83 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3d ed. 1992) ("In no
decision since Burns has the Board found successorship absent a finding of 'majority"').
120. See Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, Employer Behavior in the Face of
Union Organizing Drives, 43 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REV. 351, 364 (1990) (concluding that
'irms behave in a profit-maximizing manner in opposing an organizing drive"). Chicago
School law-and-economics, meanwhile, suggests that anti-union behavior is "rational predatory
action." Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CH-. L. REV. 988, 994
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al labor policy. As I argue below, workers should be entitled to retain
their jobs across a change in ownership, unless the job is eliminated

for valid economic reasons.
c. The uselessness of contract
Negotiating contractual protections against displacement through
corporate transformations is a highly unpromising route for workers
and their unions. As a practical matter, the retrenchment of successorship law has imposed firm limitations on the effectiveness of such

protections, and both courts and arbitrators have accepted, if not welcomed, those limitations.
At the outset, however, any discussion of contractualism under

the NLRA must emphasize the fundamental imbalance of the American labor law regime. Even in the heyday of industrial pluralism the so-called Pax Americana period of post-war prosperity and rising
expectations - labor never achieved true equality of bargaining pow-

er."2 ' Today, after a series of devastating economic restricturings
and restrictive legal decisions,' workers are more powerless than
ever. In this regard the American system is extreme but not excep-

tional. By definition, every capitalist economy rests upon an imbalance of bargaining power between labor and capital. In a capitalist

economy, reliance upon contract is necessarily a prescription for substantive injustice. All that can vary is the degree of that injustice.

In the context of successorship law, moreover, these basic disadvantages are accompanied by specific legal obstacles that block viable
contractual protections. First and foremost, of course, is the Howard

(1984). Cf. Estlund, supra note 101 (explaining how prevailing interpretations of the NLRA
fail to deal with "rational" anti-unionism).
121. See generally Stone, The Post-War Paradigm, supra note 25.
122. For an account of the devastating consequences of business restructuring on American unions, see HARRISON & BLUESTONE, supra note 32.
Together with Burns and Howard Johnson, the most serious adverse legal decisions
include First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB. 452 U.S. 666 (1981), and Milwaukee Spring
Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984), petition for review denied, 765 F.2d
175 (D.C. Cir. 1985), which severely undermine unions' ability to defend against capital
mobility; Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985), and Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989). which jeopardize strike
solidarity; and Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992), which hampers union organizing in the name of defending employer property rights. Perhaps equally significant is
American business' recent resuscitation of an older precedent, NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel.
Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), to reintroduce full-scale strike-breaking into American labor relations at a time when "Reaganomics [has] created a pool of scabs as big as Lake Michigan."
GEOGHEGAN, supra note 61, at 232.
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Johnson doctrine, a rule which simply cannot be contracted around.
Under Howard Johnson, unions have just about no recourse against a
successor that chooses not to allow a majority of its workforce to
consist of predecessor employees, even if the union had negotiated an
express contractual provision requiring preservation of the workforce
and the bargaining agreement. The best that can be achieved is an
explicit guarantee from the predecessor that it will secure the
successor's assumption of the collective bargaining agreement, but
here courts and arbitrators generally ignore all but the strongest contractual prohibitions, and even the most explicit language will not
actually ensure compliance, either by the predecessor or the succes1
sor. 2

Howard Johnson itself suggested that unions seek injunctive
relief to secure compliance with successorship clauses before deals are
actually consummated." To the extent this alternative was intended
to balance the harsh underlying rule of successor discretion, it has
been a dismal failure. Courts have proven extremely hostile to union
claims of this kind: only once in the last twelve years has a union
obtained an injunction and successfully blocked a sale or similar
transfer of control."
Second, even though successorship is a mandatory term of bargaining under the NLRA, negotiating appropriate protections is
sometimes made dangerous as a result of Section 8(e) of the Act,'"
which has been used to invalidate a variety of union protective efforts. Section 8(e), added in the Landrum-Griffin reforms of 1959 as
an attempt to block "top-down" organizing tactics, prohibits unions
from, among other things, forcing employers to "cease doing business" with any other employer." Restrictions of this kind will only

123. See infra notes 158-64.
124. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 258
n.3 (1974); see also Kramer & Schindel, Bargaining Obligations and Corporate Transfonna.
lions, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNivERsrrY 33RD ANNUAL NAIONAL CONFERENCE ON
LABOR 256 (1981).
125. See infra note 173.
126. See Lone Star Steel Co., 639 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911
(1981).
127. NLRA § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1988).
128. Section 8(e) provides, in pertinent part, that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to
enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to
cease doing business with any other person, and any contract entered into hereto-
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be upheld if they are found to be attempts to preserve work for a

existing group of employees rather than to extend unionization to a
new group of employees."

In the successorship context, employers typically argue that a
contractual successorship provision attempts to make them "cease

doing business" with potential buyers who do not wish to assume
union obligations.' Whether a contract restriction will be held to
violate Section 8(e) usually depends on the form of the transaction
involved' - a matter the union cannot reasonably be expected to
know at the time it demands the clause. Thus, a typical successorship

provision, purporting to extend the collective bargaining agreement to
"successors and assigns," will be legal if the employer sells its entire
operation and thus ceases "doing business" altogether, or if the sold
operation is "separate and distinct" from the rest of the enterprise, so
that the "business" will continue unaffected despite the change in
It will be illegal, however, if the employer merely
ownership.'
leases or subcontracts its operation and continues to "do business"
with the lessee or subcontractor after the transaction is completed."
Even when a sale is involved, the successorship clause will be invalid

if sales of employing enterprises are found to occur frequently in the
ordinary course of the employer's business. Such a provision is then
considered an attempt to preserve work for the union's members as a

whole and not merely for the employees of that specific employer."
Judges have shown little sympathy for unions' efforts to protect

fore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforceable and void.
NLRA § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1988). For an explanation of the history and purpose of
§ 8(e), see International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 701, 221 N.L.R.B. 751, 752
(1975).
129. See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
130. Employers have also contended that successorship provisions improperly interfere with
their right to "deal[ ] in products of any other employer" within the meaning of Section 8(e).
See Lone Star Steel Co. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
911 (1981) (holding that a successorship clause relating to the sale of a steel company's coal
mines did not affect the employer's "product," for that product is steel, not mines).
131. See NLRA § 8(e), 29 U.S.C § 158(e) (1988).
132. United Mine Workers, 231 N.L.R.B. 573, 574-75 (1977), enforced sub nom. Lone
Star Steel Co. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981);
see also District No. 71, IAM, 224 N.L.R.B. 100 (1976).
133. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local 531, 623 F.2d 61 (9th Cir.
1980).
134. See National Maritime Union, 196 N.L.R.B. 1100 (1972), enforced, 496 F.2d 907
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); see also National Maritime Union v. Commerce Tankers Corp., 457 F.2d 1127, 1137 (2d Cir. 1972).
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themselves through contract, and although one court has refused to
use the Burns capital mobility policy as a basis for invalidating an

otherwise-valid contract clause, 35 it would appear that others take
that policy very seriously, even if they do not always say so explicitly. In an indirectly related context, for example, Section 8(e) has been
used to invalidate union efforts to protect their members from manipulations of corporate form -

io -

the so-called "double-breasting" scenar-

and these violations have also resulted in crippling damages

awards."3
Despite these obstacles, and the predictions of conventional economic theory," more and more collective bargaining agreements

actually do contain successorship provisions,' but the surveys do
not explain how many of these provisions are of the almost-useless
"passive" type that have crushed employee expectations in so many
cases.13 9 More important, to the extent the true value of any succes-

135. See Lone Star Steel Co. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 545, 555 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 911 (1981).
136. See Northeast Ohio Dist. Council of Carpenters, 310 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (Apr. 6,
1993); Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 949 F.2d 1241 (3d Cir. 1991) (en
bane); Sheet Metal Workers Local 91 v. NLRB, 905 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990), on remand,
305 N.L.R.B. 1055 (1991). Union insistence on the adoption of contract provisions that contravene § 8(e) violates § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1988), and violations
of § 8(b)(4) may be remedied by damage awards under § 303 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. §
187 (1988). Section 303 provided the basis for the crushing liability imposed in Limbach.
137. A standard economic analysis suggests that unions will tend not to negotiate successorship provisions because they are unable to value them properly: they do not know how
likely it is that management will transfer the business and bring the successorship clause into
operation. See Hylton & Hylton, supra note 28, at 850. There may also be a gap between
union leadership and rank-and-file on this point, with the membership unwilling to sacrifice
wage and benefit increases in order to win protective contract language that would only address contingencies. See Burton F. Boltuch, Workplace Closures and Company Reorganizations: Enforcing NLRB, Contract and Noncontract Claims and Obligations, 7 LAB. LAW. 53,
55 n.3 (1991).
138. One leading survey of four hundred collective bargaining agreements showed that the
number of agreements containing successorship provisions had risen from 34% in 1983 to
38% in 1986 to 43% in 1989, then held steady at 43% in 1992. See 2 Collective Bargaining
Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 32:21, 36:5 (1992). The figures for 1979 and 1975 were 29% and
22% respectively. See Wendy C. Skjerven, Note, Labor Policy and Private Determination of
Successor Liability: Illinois' Successor Clause Statute, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 575, 575 n.1
(1989).
139. See Boltuch, supra note 137, at 78 (describing the disbelief unions usually feel when
they discover that typical successorship language is next to useless). "Passive" language may
simply recite that the agreement "shall be binding" upon successors, or that 'the agreement is
made between the union and the employer and "its successors and assigns." In contrast, "active" language affirmatively requires the predecessor to secure the successor's adoption of the
agreement, or expressly prohibits sales or transfers in the absence of such assumption. For
examples of weak successorship language, see NORTHRUP & MISCIMARRA, supra note 2, at
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sorship clause - ensuring that the successor will be bound to the
collective bargaining agreement - has been frustrated by the Howard
Johnson doctrine,"4 there is precious little use in negotiating such
clauses, and precious little significance to their existence.
i.

The disappearance of Wiley

Although Wiley technically remains good law, it has been all but

overruled in practice. Successors are rarely forced into arbitration any
more and almost never saddled with predecessor collective bargaining
agreements. Given the cost of litigation and the bias of the law, unions have even grown reluctant to file suit seeking to have obligations
imposed upon successors. 4 ' The basic reason for the shift is the
374. For examples of strong successorship language, see Boltuch, supra note 137, at 101-07.
Most arbitrators ignore passive language. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
140. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
141. See 4 THEoDoRE KHEEL, LABOR LAW 76 n.81 (1992 Cum. Supp.).
In recent years, perhaps because of the dangers posed by business transactions that are
motivated by the prospect of "zapping labor," unions have pursued a panoply of new legal
theories against successors. What these theories have in common is that they are not really
"successorship" theories but creative applications of common-law remedies. Unfortunately, they
are also united in imposing substantial litigation costs and in failing to produce many end-ofthe-day legal victories.
First, unions have successfully charged successors with tortious interference with contract if they persuade predecessors not to require assumption of the collective bargaining
agreement in accordance with the terms of the agreement. See, e.g., UMW v. Eastover Mining Co., 623 F. Supp. 1141 (W.D. Va. 1985). But see Andrew J. Kahn, Comment, Tortious
Interference with Contract Under Section 301, 10 INoUs. REL. LJ. 258, 260 (1988) (noting
that five circuits have held that such claims are not available under the LMRA). Other intentional torts have also been tried out. See Kraus v. Santa Fe S. Pac. Corp., 878 F.2d 1193
(9th Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 493 U.S. 1051 (1990) (affirming employer's liability for
tortious interference with an economic relationship based on its having employees fired to
avoid successorship-related costs); Glass Molders Int'l Union v. Wickes Cos., 707 F. Supp.
174 (D.NJ. 1989), after remand, 578 A.2d 402 (NJ. Super. 1990) (permitting a union to
prosecute an action for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage against a
defendant whose attempted hostile takeover of an employer prompted devastating layoffs to
service new, defensive debt).
Courts have disagreed as to whether unions may prosecute fraudulent conveyance actions against successor employers. Compare LAM Local 437 v. U.S. Can Co., 441 N.W.2d
710 (Wis. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990) (holding such suits not preempted)
(LMRA context) and IAM v. Allegis Corp., 545 N.Y.S.2d 638 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (same) (RLA
context) with Deford v. Soo Line R.R., 867 F.2d 1080 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 927
(1989) (contra) (RLA context) and Brown v. Keystone Consol. Indus., 680 F. Supp. 1212
(N.D. Ill.
1988) (same) (LMRA context). Regardless of the federalism issues, though, so far
no union appears to have won such a suit.
Another possible approach, suggested (albeit with skepticism) by one court of appeals,
is to assert an "equitable servitude on chattels" theory and argue that a successor is bound to
a predecessor's collective bargaining agreement containing a successorship clause because it
knew of the predecessor's obligations at the time it took possession of its assets. See Ameri-
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Court's warning in Burns about the dangers of burdening capital,'42
and although Burns distinguished NLRB proceedings from Section
301 court actions, 43 the Court itself abandoned this distinction in
Howard Johnson,' and lower courts now take Burns as their guiding light in Section 301 cases.
The entire point of Wiley was that arbitrators had the power to
enforce collective bargaining agreements against successors and that
federal courts could assist this process by ordering such arbitrations
and enforcing the awards that came out of them. 45 Thus, over the
eight years between Wiley and Burns, a number of arbitrators enforced predecessor agreements against new owners," and several

courts took the view that labor contracts would automatically be
binding on successors under Section 301."4 Neither Burns nor
Howard Johnson did anything to interfere with these holdings, or
with the holding of Wiley itself. Burns, by its terms, dealt only with
the issue of bargaining obligations under the NLRA, while Howard
Johnson imposed limits only on the nature of the continuity necessary

to send successors into arbitration, and said nothing about the obligations of successors once such continuity was found.'" Thus, even
can Bell, Inc. v. Federation of Tel. Workers, 736 F.2d 879, 887 (3d Cir. 1984). For a useful
practical overview of possible legal avenues, see Boltuch, supra note 137.
Finally, it is of course possible to prevent destructive transactions by non-legal means.
See, e.g., Teamsters Claim Victory in Fight for Safeway Jobs, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1992, at
D1 (describing a union's successful boycott effort to prevent a subcontract). But see James
Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New Union.
ism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEx. L. REV. 889 (1991) (describing the potential legal
pitfalls of boycott campaigns).
142. See Burns, 406 U.S. at 287-88.
143. See id. at 285. The crucial difference, the Court held, is the applicability of § 8(d)
of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988), which provides that a collective bargaining obligation "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or to require the making of a
concession." See id.; H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970). Section 8(d) does not
come into play in § 301 cases.
144. See Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 255 ("Although [the NLRA § 301] distinction was
in fact suggested by the Court's opinion in Burns . . . we do not believe that the fundamental policies outlined in Burns can be so lightly disregarded").
145. See Henry, supra note 76, at 264.
146. See, e.g., Houston Beverage Co., 58 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 980 (1972) (Post, Arb.);
Lake States Leasing Co., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 935 (1966) (Gunderman, Arb.); K & K
Restaurant Corp., 67-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8048 (1966) (Singer, Arb.).
147. See, e.g., Teamsters Local Union 524 v. Billington, 402 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1968);
Wackenhut Corp. v. International Union, United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir.
1964); International Bhd. of Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers v. Great Northwest Fibre
Co., 263 F. Supp. 167 (E.D. Wash. 1967); see also Holayter v. Smith, 104 Cal. Rptr. 745
(Ct. App. 1972) (applying Wiley and Wackenhut in a California-law case involving an employer not engaged in interstate commerce).
148. In dictum, however, Howard Johnson did distinguish Wiley on the ground that the
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after the Supreme Court's retrenchment, courts and arbitrators could
have enforced predecessor contracts against successors as a matter of
if the contract contained no successorship language of
routine, even
49

any kind.'

But that is not what happened. After Bums and Howard Johnson, enforcing contracts against successors came to be considered an
interference with capital reallocation and fundamental national labor

policy."5 Thus, in an important 1976 decision, the Ninth Circuit
refused to bind a successor to its predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement, even though it had retained an identical operation and
hired the entire predecessor workforce." Other courts have followed

survival of the predecessor after it sold its assets provided the union with an alternative
source of relief, whereas in the merger context the successor is the only surviving entity. See
Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257-58; see also Edward Sweeney, Comment, Dodging the
Supremacy Clause: Do State Successor Statutes Survive Federal Labor Law Preemption?, 13
INDUS. REL. L.J. 183, 201-02 (1991) (questioning the enforceability of predecessor agreements
in light of Burns and Howard Johnson). Given an opportunity to rule on this question in an
important case that arose shortly after Howard Johnson, the Court twice declined to grant
certiorari (on a unanimous vote in both instances). See United Steelworkers v. U.S. Gypsum
Co., 492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 1097 (1974)
(enforcing an arbitration award binding an asset purchaser to the predecessor agreement). The
Fifth Circuit also refused to grant rehearing in U.S. Gypsum after the Supreme Court decided
Howard Johnson. See 498 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1974).
149. The collective bargaining agreement in Wiley did not contain any successorship language; the Supreme Court's order was based solely on the broad arbitration clause itself. See
Wiley, 376 U.S. at 552-55. This history notwithstanding, "[c]urrent law and arbitral precedent
are both clear that absent a Successors/Assigns clause no successorship obligation ensues."
8528, at 5361 (1980) (Tamoush, Arb.).
Roadway Express, 80-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH)
150. See, e.g., Wood v. IBT, Local 406. 807 F.2d 493, 500 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Bartenders Local 340 v. Howard Johnson Co., 535 F.2d 1160 (9th
Cir. 1976); see also Printing Specialties & Paper Prods. Union No. 447 v. Pride Papers
Aaronson Bros. Paper Corp., 445 F.2d 361 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1001 (1971)
(relying on the Second Circuit's pro-capital opinion in Burns). But see U.S. Gypsum, 492
F.2d at 725-26 (refusing to scrap the Wiley doctrine in light of Burns and holding that an
"arbitrator was not prohibited by national labor policy from holding [a successor] to the dues
check off and wage reopener provisions of its predecessor's labor agreement").
151. See, e.g., Bartenders, 535 F.2d 1160; see also Southward v. South Cent. Ready Mix
Supply Corp., 7 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 1993) (reaffirming the principle announced in Bartenders).
Note, however, that in Bartenders the union deliberately chose to seek a judicial rather than
arbitral ruling on the effectiveness of the collective bargaining agreement, and that the NLRB
successfully prosecuted a successorship action against the new employer. See Bartenders, 535
F.2d at 1161 n.1, 1164.
Even under the current extraordinarily flexible rules, a careless employer may find itself
bound to the terms of a predecessor collective bargaining agreement. If it assumes the agreement, deliberately or accidentally, it will of course be bound. See, e.g., Burns, 406 U.S. at
291. More important, if all or almost all its workforce consists of predecessor employees, it
will sometimes be required to bargain with the union about their initial terms of employment,
and if no bargaining takes place, the terms fixed by the predecessor's labor agreement will
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suit, and today arbitrators are extremely reluctant to enforce obligations against successors' and courts are firmly opposed. Today,

remain the benchmark. See, e.g., Appelbaum Indus., Inc., 294 N.L.R.B. 981, 982 (1989). This
obligation will not take root, however, if the successor makes clear to the employees at the
time of their rehire that the terms of employment will be different. See Spruce Up Corp.,
209 N.L.R.B. 194, 195 (1974), enforced, 529 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1975). This Spruce Up
exception has been interpreted broadly, so that even vague or offhand suggestions of changes
will allow the employer unilaterally to impose sweeping new initial terms of employment.
See, e.g., Holiday Inn of Victorville, 284 N.L.R.B. 916, 916 (1987). This sub-doctrine is the
progeny of a somewhat cryptic aside in Bums. See Burns, 406 U.S. at 294-95 ("[Tlhere will
be circumstances in which it is perfectly clear that the new employer plans to retain all of
the employees in the unit and in which it will be appropriate to have him initially consult
with the employees' bargaining representative before he fixes terms").
152. Since Howard Johnson, only three reported arbitration decisions have enforced collective bargaining agreements against successors, either wholly or partially, and the most recent
of them is fifteen years old. See Standard Beverage Co., 80-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH)
8022 (1979) (Thomell, Arb.) (holding successor to its predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement with respect to those predecessor employees it chose to hire, but denying relief for
those not hired); Schneier's Finer Foods, Inc., 72 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 881 (1979) (Belkin,
Arb.) (imposing upon a successor the economic terms of its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement, but not the non-economic terms); B & K Invs., Inc., 71 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 366 (1978) (Turkus, Arb.) (binding a successor to its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement, with minor modifications). B & K Investments, moreover, involved a stock
transaction, such that commercial contracts would have been binding on the successor in any
event, as a matter of state corporate law.
For a recent decision denying successor obligations based on the Burns dictum about
capital mobility, see Clark Cincinnati, Inc., 98 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1009, 1011-12 (1992)
(Geggin, Arb.).
Some recent articles have misrepresented the state of the law on this point. Sometimes
this is a matter of misleading emphasis: for example, Celestine J. Richards, Note, The Efficacy of Successorship Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements, 79 GEO. LJ. 1549 (1991),
devotes six pages of detailed analysis to the problem of binding successors, but never explains the rarity of these cases and cites only three decisions in which successors were
bound, one of which preceded Howard Johnson and the most recent of which dates from
1979. See id. at 1560-66. In other instances the distortion appears more serious. One article
asserts that "[w]here new employers have been ordered to arbitrate whether the transferee was
bound . . . a number of arbitration decisions have found an express obligation to assume the
collective bargaining agreement." Raymond Wheeler & Patricia Murray, Mergers, Acquisitions,
and Takeovers: Labor Relations Consequences of Corporate Transactions, 7 LAB. LAW. 111,
125 (1991). Yet none of the four cases cited to support this proposition are proceedings
against successors; all involve predecessors only. See id. at 125 n.60. Thus, although an
"express obligation" was indeed found in each case, it was solely a predecessor obligation,
and in none of these cases was an agreement imposed upon a successor, in whole or in part.
153. See, e.g., Philadelphia Joint Bd., ACTWU v. After Six, Inc., 141 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2709 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Operating Eng'rs, Local 542 v. Evans Asphalt Co., 721 F. Supp. 73
(M.D. Pa.), aft'd, 891 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Boltuch, supra note 137, at 64
("since Burns, courts have not enforced awards that bind the successor"). The one exception
is Local 1115 Joint Bd. v. B & K Investments, 100 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2174 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
which involved a stock transaction. More recently, the Second Circuit enforced an award
against an asset purchaser, but the successor had expressly assumed the collective bargaining
agreement on a prospective basis, and the dispute involved a "retrospective" obligation to pay
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an arbitral award binding a successor might well be vacated as an af-

front to "public policy.""lM
Even so, the circle has not been completed. If Burns has triumphed over Wiley, as it certainly seems to have done, there is no
principled reason why successors should be forced to arbitrate at all.
If assuring free capital mobility is to be the central policy in this
area, then it should never be upset - not by the Board, not by
courts, not by arbitrators." Yet matters remain in a curious kind of
limbo: as one court put it, "a successor employer may be compelled

to arbitrate under the arbitration clause of the predecessor's collective
bargaining agreement, even though ultimately the arbitrator may be

precluded from imposing on the successor employer any of the
agreement's substantive obligations.""1 The only reason this curious
state of affairs persists is the Supreme Court's failure to overrule
Wiley, so that lower courts oscillate between limiting it to its facts
and pretending that it still retains substantial vitality."

employee benefit contributions incurred by the predecessor. Stotter Div. of Graduate Plastics
Co. v. District 65, UAW, 991 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1993).
For an interesting illustration of the state of judicial attitudes, compare the Third
Circuit's views in American Bell, Inc. v. Federation of Tel. Workers, 736 F.2d 879 (3d Cir.
1984) and 797 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1986), with the views of the district court in the same
case, AT & T Info. Sys. v. Local 13000 CWA, 650 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
154. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's recent attempt to reaffirm the traditional finality
of arbitration awards and to restrict judges' power to invalidate decisions that violate "public
policy," see United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987), lower
courts remain eager to invoke the "public policy" doctrine to set aside arbitration awards that
favor workers. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 993 F.2d 357 (3d
Cir. 1993); Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, No. 915, 915 F.2d 840 (2d
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 922 (1991).
One court has rejected an argument that an award ordering a successor to comply with
its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement violates the public policy in favor of capital
mobility, but that was in 1974, long before the rise of the "public policy" doctrine and the
arrival of most of today's federal judges. See United Steelworkers v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 492
F.2d 713, 726 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1975). More recently, another
court has rejected a public policy argument against holding a predecessor liable for failing to
secure adoption of the agreement by its successor, but the court took pains to distinguish this
from an award binding the successor, and explicitly declared that the successor could not
have been required to assume the agreement. See Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied
Workers Int'l Union v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 962, 972-73 (D.NJ.), aff'd, 941
F.2d 1201 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 877 (1992).
155. See Severson & Willcoxon, supra note 23, at 814.
156. UFCW Local 1529 v. Chambers Big Star 52, Inc., 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2120, 2125
(W.D. Tenn. 1986).
157. Compare, e.g., Wood v. IBT, Local 406, 807 F.2d 493 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1006 (1987) (finding Wiley inapplicable because the seller remained in existence
following the sale, state law did not establish successorship in the asset sale context, and
there were certain differences in the operation following the sale) and American Bell, Inc. v.
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Nevertheless, the bottom line is clear. Under existing law suc-

cessors have no contract obligations unless they choose to assume
them, and workers can do almost nothing about it.
ii.Pursuing the predecessor
Because pursuing the successor has become so unproductive,

workers and their unions must necessarily confine most of their attention to predecessors. Here, arbitrators continue to issue favorable

awards from time to time -

and courts usually still enforce them"'

but sometimes with reluctance... and generally only if the collective bargaining agreement contains strong, mandatory language that

-

demands affirmative action by the employer." When it is up to the
Federation of Tel. Workers, 736 F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1984) (denying declaratory relief because
the successor had applied the old agreement's terms to the individual bargaining unit employees, even though the grievance in question involved subcontracting - that is, the failure to
apply the agreement to all employees) with Gigliotti Corp. v. Building & Constr. Trades
Council, 583 F. Supp. 396 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (ordering arbitration against a successor) and
Graphic Arts Int'l Union Local 1B v. Martin Podany Assocs., 531 F. Supp. 169 (D. Minn.
1982) (same). Not all courts continue the pretence. See, e.g., 152 W. 58th St. Owners Corp.
v. Local 32B-32J, SEIU, 514 N.Y.S.2d 11 (App. Div. 1987) (refusing to order a successor to
arbitrate, based on a traditional contractual analysis); United Steelworkers v. South Bend
Lathe, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1342 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (refusing to order a successor to arbitrate on
the puzzling ground that it was financed through an employee stock ownership plan).
158. See, e.g., Zady Natey, Inc. v. UFCW, Local No. 27, 995 F.2d 496 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 470 (1993); Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Int'l Union v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 962 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 941 F.2d 1201 (3d Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 877 (1992); TL Distrib., Inc. v. Local 99, Office and Distribution
Employees Union, 551 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983);
see also Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. United Transp. Union, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 804 (Ct.
App. 1992) (upholding, under California law, an arbitration award barring the privatization of
a bus line). Courts also continue to order arbitration of disputes of this kind, based on the
traditional presumption of arbitrability. See, e.g., Local No. 381, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs v. Tosco Corp., 823 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1987).
In Zady Natey, the Fourth Circuit rejected an employer argument that would have
devastated unions' efforts to negotiate sucessorship protections: the contention that language
purporting to extend the contract to "successors" should only take effect if the new employer
became a "successor" within the meaning of Burns. Had this position been accepted, buyers
and sellers could both avoid liability simply by making sure the buyer did not hire a majority of predecessor employees.
159. See, e.g., Kohn, Inc., 93 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1124, 1132 (1989) (Dworkin, Arb.).
"The fact that the Successorship Clause imposed an unwieldy, perhaps an impossible restriction on Management's fundamental discretion to close its business is undeniable." Id.
160. Compare Los Angeles Mutual Dairymen's Ass'n, 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1
8279 (1987) (Weiss. Arb.) (finding breach by predecessor in failing to comply with strong
mandatory language and secure successor's assumption of the collective bargaining agreement);
Martin Podany Assocs., Inc., 80 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 658 (1983) (Gallagher, Arb.) (same);
and Roadway Express, 80-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCI-)
8528 (1980) (Tamoush, Arb.) (same)
with Gallivan's, Inc., 79 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 253 (1982) (Gallagher, Arb.) (finding no
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courts rather than arbitrators to make the initial determination, however, even predecessors are likely to escape liability.16' And although

the damages for failing to secure assumption of a collective bargaining agreement can sometimes be massive,"

such awards are not

equivalent to an actual guarantee of continued employment for the
bargaining unit. Only the successor can provide meaningful relief of
grievances concerning continued employment, discharge for just cause,
and seniority rights." Going after the predecessor, then, is a very

breach; weak language); Kroger Co., 78 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 569 (1982) (Howlett, Arb.)
(same); and Storer Broadcasting Co., 78-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH)
8087 (1978) (Ellmann,
Arb.) (same). This arbitral approach has been strongly criticized for being "at variance with
recognized principles of contract interpretation," Daniel Collins, The Role of Labor Arbitration, in LABOR LAW AND BusINEss CHANGE, supra note 25, at 79, 83, and there are a few
exceptions to this pattern. See Boardman Co., 91 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 489 (1988) (Harr,
Arb.) (finding violation by predecessor based on weak successorship language); Marley-Wylain
Co., 88 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 978 (1987) (Jacobowski, Arb.) (same); Herbert J. Caplan, Inc.,
81 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 22 (1983) (Levine, Arb.) (same); see also High Point Sprinkler
Co., 67 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 239 (1976) (Connolly, Arb.) (finding breach by predecessor
based on weak contract language, but where the sale was not quite at anus' length). Without
some sort of successorship clause, though, arbitrators will not find sale-related obligations
based on other contractual theories, see Decatur Herald & Review, Inc., 73 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 745 (1979) (Jones, Arb.), although language in a sales agreement can be used as a
basis for imposing successorship obligations. See Gary A. Marsack & Phoebe M. Eaton,
Successorship Law: The Impact on Business Transfers and Collective Bargaining, 65 MARQ.
L. REV. 213, 231 (1981).
Typically the employer's liability arises from its failure to ensure the adoption of the
collective bargaining agreement, but liability has also been imposed for discharges without
just cause if the employer terminates the workforce prior to a change in ownership that
should be irrelevant under the successorship provisions of the contract. See, e.g., Roadway
Express.
161. Compare UMW v. U.S. Steel Mining, Inc., 895 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding
no breach); UMW v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 891 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1989)
(same); and Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. PYA/Monarch of
Tex., Inc., 851 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1988) (same) with District 17, UMW v. Allied Corp., 765
F.2d 412 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 905 (1985) (finding breach) and UMW
v. Eastover Mining Co., 603 F. Supp. 1038 (W.D. Va. 1985) (same). In "straight" § 301
actions like these, the court acts as the finder of fact, whereas in arbitration cases it may
vacate awards only in exceptional circumstances. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v.
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960).
162. See Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Int'l Union v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 758 F. Supp. 962 (D.NJ.), affd, 941 F.2d 1201 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
877 (1992) (refusing to vacate an arbitration award requiring an employer to pay $2 million
in damages for failing to secure assumption of the contract). Note, though, that even the
Owens-Illinois court would have found a contractual remedy against the successor difficult to
swallow, declaring that the seller and its union "could not purport to impose liability on a
non-signatory third party." lId at 971.
163. Henry, supra note 76, at 270. Predecessors may also often be insolvent or nonexistent following the transaction, see Severson & Willcoxon, supra note 23, at 839, but then so
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poor substitute.
To the extent courts and arbitrators are willing to find predecessor breaches and award meaningful damages, though, predecessors
might be expected to begin complying with their agreements and
assuring successor performance. As such, contract might still win the
day. More likely, however, employers would become less willing to
agree to serious successorship language in the first place,'" so that
the basic problems of contract - workers' inability to negotiate from
a position of strength - will return to the fore.
iii. The problem of injunctions
Injunctive relief will almost always be necessary if a union wishes to use the arbitration process to hold a predecessor to its bargain
and prevent it from disposing of its business without obtaining the
requisite protections for its workers. Without such relief the deal will
go through, even if it blatantly violates the contract, and the union
will be effectively precluded from obtaining meaningful remedies after
the fact, since arbitrators cannot (or at least do not) rescind sales."
Efforts of this kind are treated in the same manner as other
attempts to preserve the status quo pending arbitration, and these sorts
of injunctions are notoriously difficult to obtain. To win such relief, a
union must demonstrate both that the underlying grievance is arbitrable - usually no great burden under the broad traditional presumption of arbitrability" - and, more important, that it meets the traditional criteria for injunctive relief, most troublesomely the "irreparable injury" requirement."
On this score courts have proven hostile on at least two

may successors, especially in today's world of intentional liquidations and treasured tax losses. See, e.g., Martin Podany Assocs., Inc., 80 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 658 (1983) (Gallagher,
Arb.) (union pursues predecessor after successor becomes insolvent).
164. Cf NORTHRuP & MisciMARRA, supra note 2, at 376 (suggesting that "successors and

assigns clauses have been included in labor agreements as a boilerplate or 'throw-in' provision").
165. See Local Lodge No. 1266, IAM v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 287 (7th Cir.
1981); Collins, supra note 160, at 84.
166. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83

(1960). Some courts have found successorship disputes non-arbitrable, however. See General
Drivers Local No. 563 v. Bake Rite Baking Co., 580 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
167. For a typical case applying this analysis, see UAW v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp.,
656 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 (N.D. Ohio 1986). On the irreparable injury point, typically the

union will be required to show "both injury resulting from the contract breach that would not
be fully redressed by the arbitration award and injury from the frustration of the arbitral
remedy by the employer's conduct." Boltuch, supra note 137, at 58.
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grounds." First, although inquiry into the likelihood of success on
the merits is supposed to be minimal, so as to avoid ruling on the
grievance itself and thereby usurping the arbitrator's function, several
courts have found it difficult to restrain themselves." Second, courts
are extraordinarily unreceptive to the notion that job loss can be
considered "irreparable injury."'7 Most courts have implicitly accepted the view that a union is "some sort of business devoted to the
filling of its treasury," so that after-the-fact awards of back pay are
held to be the equivalent of preserving jobs."'
In addition to these doctrinal hurdles, some courts have also
invoked the Burns capital mobility policy here, suggesting that "routine issuance of injunctions against the sale of businesses could in
many instances be extremely disruptive and costly."'7 Others appar168. Some courts have also denied injunctive relief on the ground that the balance of the
equities favors management. See, e.g., Goodyear Aerospace, 656 F. Supp. at 1294.
Courts have also been reluctant to issue injunctions in cases involving successors'
discriminatory failure to hire predecessor employees and to bargain with their union. See, e.g.,
Scott v. El Farra Enters., Inc., 863 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1988) (modifying district court's inadequate injunction); Dunn v. Pilgrim Indus., 624 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (denying injunctive relief altogether); Kobell v. Suburban Lines, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2990, 2993-94
(W.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 731 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1984) (denying injunctive relief and characterizing the union's claim as "insubstantial" and a "flight[ ] of fancy"). But see Asseo v. El
Mundo Corp., 706 F. Supp. 116 (D.P.R. 1989) (issuing injunction). Note that the employer
ultimately lost on the merits in El Farra, Pilgrim Industries, and Suburban Lines. See El
Farra Enters., 295 N.L.R.B. 905 (1989); Pilgrim Indus., 286 N.L.R.B. 244 (1987); Shortway
Suburban Lines, 286 N.L.R.B. 323 (1987), enforced per curiam, 862 F.2d 309 (3d Cir.
1988). On the other hand, the NLRB does appear to have grown more vigorous and more
successful in some recent injunction actions. See Hunter Hails NLRB Efforts in Successorship
Cases, 140 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 493 (1992); e.g., Watson v. Moeller Rubber Prods., 792 F.
Supp. 1459 (N.D. Miss. 1992).
169. See, e.g., Automobile Mechanics' Local 701 v. Trax, Inc., No. 87 C 9179, 1987
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10118 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 1987); General Drivers Local No. 563 v. Bake
Rite Baking Co., 580 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Wis. 1984); see also NORTHRUP & MiSCimARRA,
supra note 2, at 441 (praising this heightened judicial scrutiny).
170. See, e.g., UFCW, Local No. 626 v. Kroger Co., 778 F.2d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 815 (1986); Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, Local Union No.
215 v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437, 439 (6th Cir. 1982). But see Local
Lodge No. 1266, LAM v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 283 (7th Cir. 1981); Joint Council
of Teamsters No. 37 v. Portland Auto Delivery Co., 90 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2786, 2789 (D. Or.
1975). Cf IBT, Local Union No. 251 v. Almac's, Inc., 894 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1989) (reversing district court finding of irreparable injury from the closing of a distribution center).
171. National Maritime Union v. Commerce Tankers Corp., 325 F. Supp. 360, 366
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), vacated, 457 F.2d 1127 (2d Cir. 1972). Arbitrators considering requests for
injunctive relief in cases of this kind do not necessarily demonstrate the same hostility. See,
e.g., Sexton's Steak House, Inc., 76 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 577, 579 (1981) (Ross, Arb.)
(finding "irreparable damages
. . . unless the Employer is ordered to comply with the
contract as a condition of his sale" and holding that "[t]he benefits intended to be protected
could only be partially returned by a monetary award").
172. Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 289; cf Wood v. IBT, Local 406, 807 F.2d 493, 500 (6th
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ently do not need to actually invoke the policy, but simply base their
decisions on Burns sub silentio.

As a result of these hurdles, unions almost never succeed in
winning status quo injunctions against business transfers. There have
been a total of three reported successes since the Howard Johnson

decision back in 1974, and the last reported instance occurred more
than twelve years ago."r Even with the negative state of the law,

though, simply filing suit and moving for injunctive relief may still
prompt some kind of settlement. 74 But perhaps more often, the union does not even find out about the transaction until it is too late,

and it5 does not have a meaningful opportunity either to bargain or to
7
sue.

1

Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987) (suggesting that "policy considerations" favored a successor that refused to assume its predecessor's contract).
173. Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 289; Teamsters Local 961 v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., 502
F. Supp. 1292 (D. Colo. 1980); Local 1115 Joint Bd. v. B & K Invs., Inc., 96 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2353 (S.D. Fla. 1977). In a 1985 case, a union did obtain a status quo injunction that
prevented a predecessor from dissipating its assets pending arbitration, but the transaction
itself went through unaffected. See Nursing Home & Hosp. Union No. 434 v. Sky Vue Terrace, Inc., 759 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1985). There are several other cases in which lower court
injunctions were vacated on appeal or temporary restraining orders were issued and then
dissolved. See
1BT,
Local Union No. 251 v. Almac's Inc., 894 F.2d 464 (Ist Cir. 1990)
(district court injunction reversed); Miscellaneous Drivers, Local 610 v. Kroger Co., 858 F.2d
415 (8th Cir. 1988) (TRO dissolved); Local 879, Allied Indus. Workers v. Chrysler Marine
Corp., 735 F.2d 1367 (7th Cir. 1984) (district court injunction reversed, as explained in subsequent related proceeding, 819 F.2d at 787); UAW v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 656 F.
Supp. 1283 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (TRO granted, preliminary injunction denied); see also 11T,
Local Union No. 2707 v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 813 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir.) (per curiam),
stay granted, 480 U.S. 1301, vacated and remanded sub nom. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. IBT,
484 U.S. 806 (1987) (RLA context, injunction against merger granted, then stayed, then vacated when the matter became moot as a result of the stay).
Arbitrators occasionally enjoin transactions based on successorship clauses, but these
cases are necessarily aberrational: the employers in question must agree to suspend the transaction pending arbitration. Arbitrators cannot issue injunctions against recalcitrant employers
who refuse to submit to immediate arbitration. See, e.g., C.P. Nat'l Corp. v. IBEW Local
125, 123 L.RR.M. (BNA) 2805 (D. Or. 1986); Sexton's Steak House, 76 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) at 579.
Some recent articles on successorship appear either negligent or disingenuous in describing the state of the law in this area. For example, in arguing in favor of a restrictive,
contract-based successorship regime, one 1989 Note asserts rather blithely that unions "have
successfully enjoined sales and mergers pending arbitration," cites the Panoramic case, above,
for that proposition, and fails to point out that this is the only reported case in the eight
years preceding the publication of the Note. Skjerven, supra note 138, at 586. More seriously, a 1991 article ascribes continuing vitality to the possibility of injunctive relief by pointing
to the district court's injunction in Almac's, above, while neglecting to alert the reader that
the injunction was vacated on appeal (more than a year prior to the article's publication). See
Wheeler & Murray, supra note 152, at 125-26.
174. See Boltuch, supra note 137, at 56.
175. See Henry, supra note 76, at 269. Under a recent NLRB modification, employers are
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2. Other Federal Statutes
a.

The Railway Labor Act and statutory
protection of transport employees

For a number of historical reasons, federal regulation of transport
industries has given rise to a variety of special statutory protections
for workers not only in successorship situations but also with regard
to liquidations and abandonments of existing operations. The various
provisions are complex and highly particularized, and although many
transport employees remain a great deal better off than other workers,

there is very considerable room for improvement in this area.
Labor relations matters for railroad and airline workers are gov-

erned by the Railway Labor Act, a statute that in many respects
differs sharply from the non-transport labor laws. 6 Most strikingly,
the RLA has recently been held not to have a successorship doctrine

of any kind, so that successor transport employers are not required to
recognize or bargain with incumbent unions (let alone respect existing

labor contracts) even if there is overwhelming continuity in the enterprise and in the workforce."

mergers,'

In the case of airline and railroad

the National Mediation Board will simply "extinguish"

no longer required to notify unions of pending sales as soon as they are "'under active consideration,"' but need only give enough notice "so that the union is not confronted at the
bargaining table with a sale that is a fait accompli." Riedel Int'l (Willamette Tug & Barge
Co.), 300 N.L.R.B. 282, 283 (1990). Insofar as the only remedy for failing to comply with
this rule is an after-the-fact effects bargaining order, employers have little incentive to comply
unless they want to.
176. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, § 1. 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45
U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988)) [hereinafter "RLA"].
177. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Wheeling & Lake Erie R.R., 741 F. Supp.
595 (E.D. Va. 1990), aft'd, 943 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1991); WMLIAM E. THOMAS & FRANK J.
DOOLEY, THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AND AvIATION AFTER DEREGULATION 32 (1990) ("The
National Mediation Board has yet to formulate a coherent policy on successorship obligations

or whether contracts can formulate the same").
NMB-ordered recertification of a union as bargaining representative following a merger
does not have the effect of preserving the existing collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g.,
British Airways, 16 N.M.B. 17, 25 (1988) (airline industry); Grand Trunk W. R.R., 17
N.M.B. 282, 304 (1990) (railroad industry). Rather, a predecessor union's agreement may

continue to fix the "status quo" terms and conditions of employment, even if they are inferior to those provided by the current union's agreement. See Association of Flight Attendants
v. USAir, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1992).
178. See Proceduresfor Handling Representation Issues Resulting From Mergers, Acquisitions or Consolidations in the Airline Industry, 14 N.M.B. 388 (1987); Procedures for Handling Representation Issues Resulting From Mergers, Acquisitions or Consolidations in the
Railroad Industry, 17 N.M.B. 44 (1989) ("Railroad Merger Procedures"). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has recently invalidated the Railroad Merger Proce-
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all union certifications unless the union-represented employees consti-

tute an "uncontrovertible" majority of the new, expanded unit,79 or
unless the employer voluntarily recognizes the union."w After such a
government-imposed extinction, unions lose their collective bargaining
victories and must re-organize the employees from scratch.' Within
this system, then, a transport union has no means of assuring its
continuing status following a merger or acquisition, even by negotiating an express successorship provision in the collective bargaining

agreement. The best it can hope to do is seek arbitration against the
predecessor, claiming damages, and even that avenue seems somewhat
questionable under existing law." Like workers covered by the

NLRA, of course, transport workers cannot require their employers to
bargain about decisions to sell all or part of their operations."
Along with several related statutes,' however, the Interstate
Commerce Act establishes a complex set of regulations that protects
railroad employees against disruptions from various kinds of business
transactions.'" These regulations are not intended to empower work-

ers. As Eileen Silverstein notes, they are simply "incidental costs of a

dures, holding them "incompatible with the certification regime established by the RLA."
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. NMB, 988 F.2d 133, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
These principles also apply to certain kinds of acquisitions, which are relatively rare in
these industries (except with respect to the sale of route rights or trackage). See Midway
Airlines, Inc., 14 N.M.B. 447 (1987).
179. USAir, Inc., 16 N.M.B. 412, 428, reconsideration denied, 17 N.M.B. 28 (1989); see,
e.g., 16 N.M.B. at 427. A simple mathematical majority is not good enough; extinctions and
elections have been ordered even when unions have proved majorities as high as 61% and
62.5%. On the other hand, the NMB did preserve a certification when the union showed a
79% majority. See 17 N.M.B. at 36-37.
180. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc., 15 N.M.B. 42 (1987). Even in cases of voluntary
recognition, however, the NMB will not declare existing collective bargaining agreements to
bind the successor. See id. at 49.
Inexplicably, the NMB will extinguish a union's certification if the union had been
recognized voluntarily on both of the carriers in question; majority status is held to be uncertain in such circumstances. See USAir, 16 N.M.B. at 428.
181. See, e.g., USAir. Note that under the RLA a union is required to win a majority of
the entire bargaining unit, not just a majority of the votes cast, as under the NLRA. Like the
NLRB, however, the NMB does not appear especially concerned about anti-union tactics by
employers during election campaigns. See, e.g., Federal Express Corp., 16 N.M.B. 433, 455
(1989).
182. See Association of Flight Attendants v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 879 F.2d 906, 912-16
(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990).
183. See Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490,
491 (1989); CSX Transp., Inc. v. United Transp. Union, 950 F.2d 872, 878-79 (2d Cir.
1991).
184. See, e.g., Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 § 405, 45 U.S.C. § 565 (1988).
185. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 10901(e), 11347 (1988).
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program directed at improving transportation systems."'" By and
large, moreover, the exceptions have come close to swallowing up the
rules. In the case of airline employees, the rules have simply been
abolished. Labor protection was swept away with the comprehensive

deregulation of 1978, and Congress has not yet provided an effective
replacement.' n
When a rail carrier sells one or more of its lines to another rail
carrier, and when two carriers merge, the Interstate Commerce Commission will generally impose labor protective conditions so as to

ensure that "the employees of the affected rail carrier will not be in a
worse position related to their employment as a result of the transaction" for a period of four years. 1" Among other things, the standard set of conditions requires guaranteed employment for the existing
workforce and the assumption of existing collective bargaining agree-

ments."s If the line is sold to an employer that is technically entering the railroad industry for the first time, however, such protections

are only required at the Commission's discretion, which it almost
never exercises for the benefit of workers."o Similarly, if the rail

186. Silverstein, Does Law Tame the Market?, supra note 25, at 178.
187. See NORTHRUP & MISCIMARRA, supra note 2, at 556-58; THOMAS & DOOLEY, supra
note 177, at 149-75; see also ALPA v. Department of Transp., 791 F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (approving the government's policy of refusing to provide labor protective provisions in
airline mergers). The sole remaining protection for airline employees is a hiring-preference
provision, which places all carriers under a duty to hire "furloughed" or otherwise terminated
employees before individuals without industry experience. See 49 U.S.C. § 1552(d) (1988).
But even this provision has never been properly implemented. See Hon. Bob Graham, Protecting Airline Employees, Protecting the Public Interest, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. LJ. 1, 8 & n.45
(1992).
188. 49 U.S.C. § 11347 (1988).
189. See IAM, Dist. Lodge No. 19 v. Soo Line R.R., 850 F.2d 368, 371 (8th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1010 (1989) (summarizing these so-called "New York Dock conditions"). For an explanation of the complex history of this body of law, see New York Dock
Ry. v. United States, 609 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1979). For a discussion of the different protective
conditions that are imposed in different kinds of transactions, see NORTHRUP & MISCIMARRA,
supra note 2, at 637-40.
Although existing labor agreements are made binding on the new carrier, special dispute resolution systems imposed as part of the package of labor protective provisions may
override contractual commands. See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n,
499 U.S. 117 (1991). The ICC also retains a limited power to modify existing agreements.
See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States, 987 F.2d 806, 812-13 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
190. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. ICC, 914 F.2d 276, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 959 (1991); see also Winter v. ICC, 828 F.2d 1320, 1321 n.4 (8th
Cir. 1987) (explaining the rationale for the different treatment of non-carrier acquisitions).
Acquisition by a non-carrier is governed by 49 U.S.C. § 10901(e) (1988), under which labor
protective conditions need not be imposed. This loophole allows for manipulations of corpo-
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line in question is deemed "abandoned," an existing carrier may acquire it, even under suspicious circumstances, without having to worry
about expensive labor protections. 9 ' But no matter who acquires the

line, and by what means, only the primary corporation will be made
subject to the protective conditions, and employees of related subsidiaries will be left out in the cold." The specter of Burns definitely
haunts this area as well. 93
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the Urban Mass Transit Act,
which ensures that "fair and equitable arrangements are made ... to
protect the interests of employees affected" by mass transit grants,'"'

rate form: in RLEA, the acquiring carrier was a newly created subsidiary of an existing carrer that was formed apparently for the sole purpose of availing itself of Section 10901(e). See,
e.g., Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. ICC, 999 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
The ICC has also exempted from approval requirements "spinoffs" of existing lines to
new carriers, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 10505 (1988). See Class Exemption for the Acquisition
and Operation of Rail Lines Under 49 U.S.C. 10901, 1 I.C.C.2d 810 (1985), a.fd sub nora.
Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. ICC, 817 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1987); cf.United Transp. Union
v. ICC, 891 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (rebuffing challenge to new ICC rules making it
easier for rail carriers to form interlocking directorates).
191. See Black v. ICC, 762 F.2d 106, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1985); but see Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n v. ICC, 825 F.2d 238, 239 (9th Cir. 1987) (remanding an abandonment
case to the ICC because of its failure to provide a "carefully articulated, reasoned balancing
of factors" to explain its refusal to impose labor protective conditions).
Note also that the ICC has no authority at all to impose labor protective conditions
when so-called "distress purchases" are involved. See Simmons v. ICC, 766 F.2d 1177 (7th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986) (interpreting 49 U.S.C. § 10905).
192. See Kansas City S. Indus. v. ICC, 902 F.2d 423, 438 (5th Cir. 1990). This has
become a particularly glaring problem with the rise of intra-corporate line leases in recent
years. See NORTHRUP & MISCIMARRA, supra note 2, at 539-46.
193. See In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 658 F.2d 1149, 1173-75 (7th
Cir. 1981) (invoking the Burns capital mobility argument to justify the failure to bind new
carriers to predecessor collective bargaining agreements).
194. Urban Mass Transit Act § 13(c), Pub. L. 88-365, 78 Stat. 307 (codified as amended
at 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1988)) [hereinafter UMTA]. Specifically, the Secretary is required to
ensure that "collective bargaining rights" and all "rights, privileges, and benefits . . . under
existing collective bargaining agreements" are continued, and that employees do not suffer "a
worsening of their positions with respect to their employment." Id. These requirements may
have ramifications for some NLRA employers. See Springfield Transit Management, 281
N.L.R.B. 72, 79 (1986) (holding a successor to the terms of its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement, on the ground that these terms were fixed pursuant to the UMTA's laborprotection provisions).
A more specific statute of this variety, the 1986 Metropolitan Washington Airports Act,
Pub. L. No. 99-500, Title VI, § 1002, 100 Stat. 1783 (1986) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 24512461 (1988)), provides similar protections to employees at National and Dulles airports, see
49 U.S.C. § 2457(a), but has been interpreted narrowly so as to confer minimal rights on
employees. See Federal Firefighters Ass'n, Local 1 v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 821, 82324 (D.D.C. 1989), ajffd sub non. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. Professional Fire Fighters Ass'n Local 3217 v. United States, 959 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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also tended to operate as a kind of successorship protection for urban
transit workers, because these grants were frequently used to buy out
existing private transit lines and turn them over to public authori-

ties.'95 Today, however, public ownership and control of transit lines

is almost universal, so that as a practical matter the protections of the

UMTA are confined to ensuring "fair and equitable arrangements" for
workers employed by existing public lines.'" With the rise of privatization, however, the statute may once again assume significance as a
successorship protection. Federal assistance will be disallowed if contractors fail to maintain existing jobs under existing conditions.1"

The patchwork of protections for transport employees is plainly
inadequate to prevent harsh disruptions to workers affected by business transactions in these industries, which have become especially
volatile in recent years. Like other employees, union and non-union
alike, transport workers deserve straightforward and comprehensive

protections.
b. The Service Contract Act of 1965
The Service
provides explicit
successor federal
the same wages

Contract Act of 1965 is the only federal statute that
successorship guarantees.' 98 Under the Act, every
service contractor is required to give its employees
and benefits they would have received under the

predecessor's collective bargaining agreement." 9 This is a creditable

195. See NORTHRUP & MISClMARRA, supra note 2, at 602.
196. See NORTHRuP & MISCIMARRA, supra note 2, at 602, 610-11. Note that public transit employees are not covered by the RLA but by state public sector labor laws. If these
laws are deemed inadequate to protect workers' rights, federal assistance must be discontinued. See id; see also Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Local 732, Amalgamated
Transit Union, 403 S.E.2d 51 (Ga. 1991) (describing a statutory revision designed to comply
with the UMTA and reduce the scope of a transit authority's managerial discretion).
197. Cf. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. United Transp. Union, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 804
(CL App. 1992) (enjoining the privatization of a bus line and noting California's parallel
legislation protecting transit workers).
198. Federal Service Contract Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-286, 79 Stat. 1034 (1965)
(codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-358 (1988)).
199. See Service Contract Act § 4(c), 41 U.S.C. § 353(c) (1988). More sweeping
protections in this vein extend to all employees and not just employees of successors, but a
fortiori, employees of successors benefit as well. See Davis-Bacon Act, ch. 411, § 1, 49 Stat.
1494 (1931) (codified at 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a to 276a-5 (1988)) (requiring that federal construction contractors pay employees the "prevailing wage" in the locality); Walsh-Healey Act,
ch. 881, § 1, 49 Stat. 2036 (1936) (codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1988)) (requiring that
federal supply contractors pay the "prevailing wage"). Similarly, although as a matter of
practical fact most beneficiaries of these statutes are union employees, they do extend to nonunion workers as well.
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protection, but it is important to make clear what it does not provide.
It does not require the successor to hire the predecessor's employees,
to recognize predecessor employees' seniority rights, or to arbitrate
grievances under the predecessor's agreement;' ° and it does not ac-

cord workers a right to sue if the successor fails to meet its obligations." As such, the successor is permitted to ignore the predeces-

sor union, as well as to hire a new workforce with limited experience
and thereby win contracts away from employers with more senior,
higher-paid employees.' Finally, although the statute permits the

Secretary of Transportation to waive the wage-preservation provisions
if he or she finds the old contract's wages are too high, he or she is

not permitted to do so if the wages are too low.' In essence, then,
the Act is a peculiar kind of wage-stabilization provision, and not a
genuine protection for service contract workers against business disruptions.
c. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
Continuity of employee benefits across a change in ownership
which like all other benefits matters is regulated by the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")

-

generates a compli-

cated set of issues. Perhaps the clearest analytical division falls be-

tween obligations that result from collective bargaining, on the one
hand, and non-bargained obligations on the other; there are also cer-

tain problems peculiar to different kinds of pension plans. As with
successorship under the NLRA, though, the sometimes-Byzantine

200. See Clark v. Unified Servs., Inc., 659 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); Trinity
Servs., Inc. v. Marshall, 593 F.2d 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1978); SEIU, Local Union No. 36 v.
GSA, 443 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Pa. 1977). In an unusual recent arbitration decision, Vinnell
Corp., 98 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 319 (1991) (Concepcion, Arb.), the arbitrator held that
although a service-contract successor "was not bound by any provision of the [predecessor's
agreements] as such," it nevertheless violated the agreement by failing to pay holiday pay in
accordance with the agreement. id. at 324. The arbitrator further opined that the successor
"had an implied, if not expressed [sic] obligation, to recognize the accrued seniority of the
employees continuing in service from [the predecessor]" and that "[t]he principle is that a
right earned under a predecessor agreement is carried forward." Id.
201. See Miscellaneous Serv. Workers, Teamsters Local 427 v. Philco-Ford Corp., 661
F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1981).
202. See Clark, 659 F.2d at 52; see also Silverstein, Does Law Tame the Market?, supra
note 25, at 179 (arguing that anti-union contractors may be as interested in getting rid of
unions per se as in reducing labor costs).
203. See Gracey v. IBEW, Local 1340, 868 F.2d 671 (4th Cir. 1989).
204. Pub. L. No. 93-406, tit. 1, § 2, 88 Stat. 832 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
1001-1461 (1988)).
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details should not obscure the basic inadequacies of the system.
Whether or not its employees are covered by a collective bargaining

agreement, a successor need not maintain existing pension, medical,
or other benefit plans
20

-

or provide benefits at all

-

unless it wants

to.

If a benefit obligation arises from a collective bargaining agree-

ment, that obligation will generally be terminated with a change of
employer, just like other contract requirements, unless the transaction
is structured as a purchase of stock rather than assets. Only if the

successor chooses to assume the obligation will it continue across a
change in ownership or control."

As such, a successor can avoid

benefit obligations by ensuring that a majority of its workforce does
not come from the predecessor, or by retaining the old workforce but
making it "perfectly clear" from the outset that the terms of employment will be changed.'

If the predecessor was obliged to make contributions to an
underfunded multiemployer pension plan, however, the change in
ownership will usually trigger (potentially crushing) "withdrawal liability" for the seller.' Unlike other benefits obligations, this liability
cannot be avoided simply by having the successor continue to make

contributions; the successor must also post substantial bonds to ensure
that the underlying liability will ultimately be satisfied.'
But
ERISA does not require assumption of the contribution obligation; the
successor is free to cut off contributions to the existing plan if it

chooses, even to discontinue all pension benefits.1 ° As such, this

205. See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 482 (1992) (under ERISA, "employers remain free to create, modify and terminate
the terms and conditions of employee benefits plans without governmental interference"). As
such, employer decisions "to establish, amend, or terminate" employee benefit plans (as opposed to administering such plans or managing their assets) "are not to be judged by fiduciary standards" and thereby subjected to close judicial scrutiny. Musto v. American Gen. Corp.,
861 F.2d 897, 911-12 (6th Cir. 1988).
206. See, e.g., Hawaii Carpenters Trust Funds v. Waiola Carpenter Shop, Inc., 823 F.2d
289 (9th Cir. 1987) (enforcing a contribution obligation against a successor that hired a majority of predecessor employees and failed to specify changed terms of employment at the
time of their hire).
207. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
208. See Godchaux v. Conveying Techniques, Inc., 846 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1988); see
also New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund v. St. Lawrence
Transit Mix Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D.N.Y. 1985) (imposing withdrawal liability on a
seller).
209. See ERISA § 4084, 29 U.S.C. § 1384 (1988); John S. Welch, Employee Benefits
Issues, 10 INDUS. REL. L.J. 59, 84, 87-88 (1988).
210. A successor may be held liable for withdrawal liability incurred by its predecessor,
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problem is really nothing more than an issue to be worked out in
negotiations between buyers and sellers, and it has little to do with
workers - except insofar as the risk of withdrawal liability acts to
reduce the number of transactions involving employers with such
obligations, and thus to reduce the likelihood of employees losing
their jobs or seeing them deteriorate as the result of transactioneering.
Single-employer pension plans are rather more easily discarded,
and have been more significant in successorship cases. As elsewhere,
stock purchasers are technically required to continue existing plans,
while asset purchasers are not;' but such plans may generally be
"terminated" at any time, with the proviso (adopted only in 1986)
that they are fully funded."' As a practical matter, then, continuation
or termination is a choice for the successor. Plan terminations have
actually become a common accompaniment to corporate acquisitions
in recent years; "excess" funds, although initially contributed for the
sole benefit of employees, may lawfully be appropriated by the new
employer for its own purposes, typically to pay down debt incurred
through high-leverage financing.' Conversely, some employers have
terminated their own pension plans to generate cash to prevent certain
kinds of corporate acquisitions - hostile takeovers, that is. But no
matter what the employer's motivation, employees tend to receive far
less in benefits than they would have absent the termination; 4 the
concept of "full funding" is something of a lawyer's and actuary's
term of art.
ERISA also creates certain successorship obligations and complications with respect to welfare (i.e. non-pension) plans. Once again,
though, these are tangential difficulties. The basic law is that the
successor can do what it wants; if it chooses it may simply terminate
all welfare plans, including basic health insurance. One peripheral

on a "retrospective" successorship theory. See Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund v. Hayes, 789 F. Supp. 1430, 1435-36 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
211. See ERISA § 4069(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1988); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpo-

ration Opinion Letters Nos. 76-111 and 76-115 (1976). The successor does not even have to
give credit for service with the predecessor unless it maintains the "same" plan. See Carver
v. Westinghouse Hanford Co., 951 F.2d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 1991).
212. See ERISA § 4041(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b) (1988). Termination without full funding
is still permitted in cases of bankruptcy and insolvency. See ERISA § 4041(c), 29 U.S.C. §
1341(c) (1988). Of course, "bankruptcy" and "insolvency" are themselves terms of art in this
era of Chapter 11.
213. See 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d) (1988); Mark Daniels, Pensions in Peril: Single Employer
Pension Plan Terminations in the Context of Corporate Bankruptcies, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. U.

25, 37 (1991).
214.

See Russo, supra note 27, at 378.
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exception involves what is known as "continuation medical coverage":
even if they take control by means of an asset purchase, a unique

regulatory framework requires successors215 to make group health
insurance available to predecessor employees (at the employees' cost)

for up to eighteen months.216
Severance pay considerations, meanwhile, may sometimes prompt
a predecessor to insist upon the rehiring of its employees, for if employees lose their jobs as the result of business transactions, the predecessor could suffer substantial liability under its severance-pay

benefit plan. Ensuring "rehire," meanwhile, even if it is for a short
time or under inferior conditions, will generally allow the predecessor

to escape liability, for courts have given employers extraordinary
leeway to deny severance benefits to employees who are rehired by
217
successors.

In sum, ERISA provides almost no protection to employees
whose benefits are jeopardized by business transfers. As part of a

comprehensive overhaul, then, this vital federal statute needs considerable reform. I address this matter in Part IV below.
d. The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
The

Worker

Adjustment

and

Retraining

Notification

Act

("WARN") 218 contains a rather peculiar provision concerning employ-

ment losses caused by sales of employing enterprises. As with the

ERISA withdrawal liability problems discussed above, though, this is
essentally only a detail to be ironed out between the buyers and

215. As elsewhere, these obligations may be avoided if there is insufficient evidence of
enterprise continuity following the transfer of control. See Leiding v. FDIC, 940 F.2d 1538,
1991 WL 154047, at *3 (10th Cir. 1991).
216. See Proposed Internal Revenue Code Regulation, 26 C.F.R. § 1-162-26, Question and
Answer 6, 52 Fed. Reg. 22,716 (June 15, 1987); Brauer, Special Section: COBRA - What
the Courts Think COBRA Means: The Early Cases, 5 BENEFS LJ. 61, 70-71 (1992). Although these regulations have not yet been finalized, courts have approved their interpretation
of the statute. See Johnson v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 765 F. Supp. 1478 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
This "continuation coverage" law, usually referred to as COBRA from the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 in which it was included, allows employees who
experience certain "qualifying events" - most notably a voluntary or involuntary termination
of their employment - to continue to enroll in the employer's group health insurance plan,
at their own expense, for a period of up to 18 months. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (1988).
217. See Welch, supra note 209, at 85. For an overview of the severance plan problem,
see Mark Daniels, The Regulation of Severance Plans Under ERISA, 12 INDUs. REL. LJ.
340, 357 (1990). For an example of the harsh consequences of the prevailing judicial approach, see Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc., 827 F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 1987).
218. Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101-2109 (Supp.
111 1992)).
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sellers of businesses, and has little real significance for workers.

The basic requirement of WARN is that employers must provide
sixty days' notice of "plant closings" or "mass layoffs," or risk liability for up to sixty days' backpay to the affected employees." 9 If a
sale will bring such consequences - most likely a "mass layoff'
arising from a reduction in the workforce by the buyer or from the
buyer's refusal to hire predecessor employees m - then the seller is
required to provide notice to employees laid off on or before the
effective date of the sale, and the buyer is required to provide notice
to employees laid off after the date of the closing?' Interestingly,
employees of the seller are deemed employees of the buyer as of the

time of the sale, so that even if they are not rehired, any liability for
failure to give notice will fall upon the buyer rather than the seller.=m
Based upon these provisions, the AFL-CIO has suggested that

notification would not be required when the buyer agrees to hire the
predecessor's employees. m This view must surely be correct; under
such circumstances - and also where the successor refuses to hire up
to forty-nine predecessor employees - there would be no "mass
layoff' under the terms of the statute.' Less persuasively, one com-

219. See WARN §§ 3(a), 5(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2102(a), 2104(a) (Supp. 11I 1992).
220. Note, however, that under the terms of the statute, this provision technically applies
to both plant closings and mass layoffs. See WARN § 2(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(b) (Supp.
III 1992).
221. See Ud Although both the statute and the accompanying interpretive regulations speak
only of "sales," one court has invoked this provision in the merger context, although it vacated this holding when it became apparent that the transaction in question was not actually a
valid merger under state law. See Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 778
F. Supp. 297, 303 n.9 (E.D. La. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 15 F.3d 1275 (5th Cir.
1994) and 790 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. La. 1992). As with the NLRA successorship doctrine,
then, the form of the transaction may be insignificant.
222. See WARN § 2(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(b) (Supp. 111 1992); cf. Chemrock Corp.,
151 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1078-81 (1965) (holding, in a pre-Burns case, that predecessor employees
would be considered "employees" of the successor for bargaining purposes under NLRA
Section 8(a)(5)). Obviously, though, the parties to any sale are likely to negotiate about the
allocation of any liability in this regard. For example, the buyer could amend the purchase
price, demand indemnification from the seller, or, as was once common in Britain as an antisuccessorship evasion mechanism, arrange for mass termination of the predecessor workforce
before the actual time of sale. See infra note 260.
223. See DuRoss, supra note 20, at 421-22.
224. A "mass layoff' requires an "employment loss" for 50 or more employees. See
WARN § 2(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3) (Supp. I1 1992). It further requires a minimum of
six months of job-lessness, see WARN, 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (a)(6), so that a purchaser will
avoid WARN liability even if it only rehires predecessor employees after a five-and-a-half
month layoff. See 54 Fed. Reg. 16052 (Apr. 20, 1989).
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mentator has argued that "sellers will be under great pressure to avoid
the risk of monetary penalties for inadequate notices by insisting that
the buyer retain the seller's workforce."' As the Department of Labor notes, all that is really required here is "pruden[ce]": the buyer
and seller simply need to "determine the impacts of the sale on work-

ers" and "arrange between them for advance notice to be given.' 'z
After all, WARN does not impose any genuine obligations: it does

not prevent employers from disrupting their employees' lives, it only
prevents them from disrupting them in secrecy.'
B.

State Law

To all intents and purposes, the existing successorship doctrines
provide no protection at all to non-union workers, whose rights, such

as they are, come from state law. The great majority of such workers
-

who constitute, it bears repeating, more than five-sixths of the

total -

are employed "at-will," and although the traditional at-will

doctrine has been whittled away almost everywhere, the exceptions
still very definitely prove the rule.' By and large, non-union work-

ers have no rights against predecessor employers, successor employers, or any employers at all, and if they lose their jobs through the
sale of a business they are simply out of luck. 9

225. DuRoss, supra note 20, at 422.
226. 20 C.F.R. § 639A(c)(2) (1989).
227. See Wilson McLeod, Judicial Devitalization of the WARN Act?, 44 LAB. L.J. 220
(1993) (criticizing the weakness of WARN and courts' failure to enforce it vigorously). Note,
however, that the NLRA allows employers considerable secrecy in sales transactions: WARN's
60-day notification requirement might well be in conflict. See Riedel Int'l (Willamette Tug &
Barge Co.), 300 N.L.R.B. 282 (1990).
228. Courts in 45 states and the District of Columbia have found exceptions to the at-will
rule. See 9A Indiv. Emp. Rts. Man. (BNA) 505:51-52 (1992); Montana has also legislated
such exceptions. See MONT. CODE ANN., tit. 39, ch. 2, §§ 901-914 (1987). These exceptions
have all been developed in the context of wrongful firings, not wrongful refusals to hire;
employer freedom in hiring is still almost total, except of course for prohibitions on invidious
discrimination. See Mark A. Rothstein, Wrongful Refusal to Hire: Attacking the Other Half of
the Employment-At-Will Rule, 24 CONN. L. REv. 97 (1991); see also, e.g., statutes cited supra note 75.
The exceptions may be grouped in three categories - discharges in violation of an
express or implied contract, discharges against public policy, and discharges that breach a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The first exception depends on the employer's carelessness; the second has been cut back with narrowing constructions of "public policy," see,
e.g., Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992); and the third has lost much of the
momentum it once had (see Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988)).
229. See, e.g., Buck v. Billings Mont. Chevrolet, 811 P.2d 537 (Mont. 1991) (rejecting
employee's wrongful termination claim against the purchaser of his former employer's stock).
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Of course, non-union workers are free to negotiate agreements
requiring continued employment in the event of a change in business
ownership, but only the most dedicated followers of neoclassical
revisionism could take comfort in this possibility. Yet even so, such

an extraordinary independent contract would be no more effective
than a collective agreement in ensuring compliance by an unwilling

successor. Any remedies, necessarily second-best, would have to come
from the predecessor.
In the absence of an express agreement as to successorship,

promises of continued employment by a predecessor employer have
been held insufficient to bind the successor." Rather, the traditional

common-law rules of contracts and corporations will prevail, so that
stock sales and mergers will preserve contractual obligations, whereas
employees will be unable to enforce such promises against asset
purchasers except in extreme and unusual circumstances. 2
State collective bargaining laws - for both the private and the

public sectors

-

may also include successorship protections of one

kind or another, but the restrictive federal strictures appear to have

been adopted more or less on a wholesale basis.

3

In one recurring

230. Unlike rank-and-file employees, executives with superior bargaining power may well
be in a position to negotiate protections against disruptions relating to change in ownership.
See Zachary D. Fasman & Keith Fischler, Labor Relations Consequences of Mergers and
Acquisitions, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 14, 27 (1987); c Chapin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 107 Cal. Rptr. 111 (Ct. App. 1973) (awarding contractual severance pay to employees hired, but then laid off, by a successor employer).
231. See, e.g., Conrad v. Rofin-Sinar, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 167, 170 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
(rejecting as "meritless and . . . unsupported by case law" an argument that a successor is
bound to a predecessor's promise of continued employment other than in extraordinary circumstances) (applying Michigan law); Parker v. Diamond Crystal Salt Co., 683 F. Supp. 168,
172 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (holding that "no reasonable jury could find that [an employee] had
a legitimate expectation that he would retain a job under the new ownership absent unsatisfactory work performance") (applying Michigan law); Pfeifer v. United States Shoe Corp., 676
F. Supp. 969, 974 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that a successor employer "had no obligation"
to hire an employee "based on [an] alleged oral contract between" the employee and the
predecessor) (applying California law). Unionized employees who seek to enforce such promises will encounter federal preemption problems. See Engleman v. Knudsen Corp., 121 Lab.
10,176 (D. Haw. 1991).
Cas. (CCH)
232. See Conrad, 762 F. Supp. at 170 (holding that an asset purchaser will be bound to
a seller's promise of continued employment only if (1) the buyer has expressly or impliedly
agreed to assume the seller's liabilities, (2) the transaction amounts to a de facto consolidation or merger, (3) the transaction was fraudulent, (4) the sale did not involve good faith or
lacked fair consideration, or (5) the buyer is a "mere continuation or reincarnation" of the
seller). For an explanation of the traditional corporate law (restated in Conrad), see 15
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 7121-7122 (S.Flanagan
et al. eds., 1990 rev. vol.).
233. See, e.g., Truckee Meadows Fire Protection Dist. v. International Ass'n of Fire Fight-
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situation, for example, most state courts have found bargaining
agreements extinguished when government departments are reorganized so that the employing entity undergoes some kind of structural
change.'
There are also various state analogues to the more specialized
federal protections. Several states have imposed detailed guarantees

for workers in transportation industries,

'

for example, or enacted

laws along the lines of the Service Contract Act, requiring that gov-

ernment contractors pay prevailing wages and benefits if a service is
privatized.'

By far the most significant state initiatives, however, are statutes
that purport to bind successors to preexisting collective bargaining
agreements. Since Howard Johnson, at least seven states have enacted
requirements that hold successors to predecessor agreements if the
agreement contains a successorship provision, and three have passed

laws preserving predecessor agreements regardless of the existence of
a successorship clause.

7

Apparently fearing federal preemption,

ers, Local 2487, 849 P.2d 343 (Nev. 1993) (relying on NLRA doctrine to hold that successorship is a mandatory subject of bargaining under Nevada public-sector collective bargaining
law); San Clemente Ranch v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 633 P.2d 964 (Cal. 1981)
(adapting the NLRA successorship doctrine to California agricultural labor law and requiring
that the purchaser of a ranch must recognize and bargain with the seller's union); but see
Board of Educ. v. Prince George's County Educators' Ass'n, 522 A.2d 931 (Md. 1987)
(holding that the structure of Maryland public-sector bargaining law precluded a successorship
doctrine).
234. See, e.g., Michigan Educ. Ass'n v. North Dearborn Heights Sch. Dist., 425 N.W.2d
503 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a school district's collective bargaining agreement
did not continue its effectiveness following a merger with another district); Peters v. Health
& Hosps. Governing Comm., 430 N.E.2d 1128 (Ill. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982)
(refusing to find successorship obligations when control over county hospitals was statutorily
transferred to a new entity); Northwest Arctic Regional Educ. Attendance Area v. Alaska Pub.
Serv. Employees, 591 P.2d 1292 (Alaska 1979) (holding that newly formed school districts
were not bound to predecessor agency's bargaining agreement). But see AFSCME, Local 298
v. City of Manchester, 366 A.2d 874 (N.H. 1975) (enforcing a bargaining agreement against
a "successor" public employer that broke away from another agency).
235. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTLt. CODE §§ 30750(b), 30752, 30753(a) (1990); R.I. GEN.
LAWS, § 39-6-30 (West 1990).
236. See R.I. GEN. LAWS, §§ 36-16-1 to -2 (Supp. 1991); but cf Division 819, Amalgamated Transit Union v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 623 A.2d 266 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1993) (holding that a transit authority was not bound to the collective bargaining agreement entered into by one of its contractors after the transit authority rescinded the contract
and sent the contract out for new bids).
237. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1127 (West 1991) (enacted 1975); DEL. CODE ANN., Ch. 19,
§ 706 (Supp. 1992) (enacted 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT., Ch. 48, 2558 (Supp. 1990) (enacted
1987); MASS. GEm. LAWS ANN. Ch. 149, § 179C (West 1993) (enacted 1979); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 338.01 (Supp. 1992) (enacted 1990); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.30 (Anderson
1991) (enacted 1978). All these statutes, except Delaware's, also require that a seller notify
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though, three of these laws exempt NLRA and RLA "employers"
from their coverage, rendering them more or less irrelevant; interest-

ingly, the
restrictions.'

more-recently enacted statutes contain no such
As explained below, these statutes might indeed run

into preemption problems, but no such challenges appear to have been
mounted, and in fact there are no reported cases at all involving these

laws.
Unfortunately, no states have yet required that successors retain
existing workers when they take control of a business, irrespective of
whether those workers belong to a union." As I argue below, such
a requirement would provide significant protection to union and nonunion workers alike. Given the apparent willingness of the states to

legislate in this area, such preservation-of-employment laws, in combination with modified contract-preservation laws, may well be the
most promising avenue for reform. I consider this approach in detail
below.

purchasers of the existence of the collective bargaining agreement and the successorship
clause, but only Minnesota's makes clear that the seller's failure to do so does not render the
agreement unenforceable against the purchaser.
The statutes in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. Ch. 149, § 20E (Supp. 1992) (enacted 1989), PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, §§ 25852588 (Supp. 1991) (enacted 1990), and R.I. GEN. LAWS, § 28-7-19.1 (Supp. 1991) (enacted
1991), do not require the existence of a successorship clause to ensure the continuing force
of the agreement.
238. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1127(c) (West 1988); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 149, §
179C (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.30(D)(2) (1991). But see MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. Ch. 149, § 20E (Supp. 1993) (no exception). Even states that have declined to include
such exceptions have indicated preemption concerns. See 66 DEL. LAWS Ch. 220, § 1(d)
(providing for severability of the statute should it be invalidated in part); Skjerven, supra
note 138, at 592 n.108 (noting that Illinois legislative analysts believed that the state's successorship law was preempted).
NLRA jurisdiction is discretionary, but has been extended to all private-sector employers "having, in [the Board's] judgment, a substantial impact on interstate commerce," except
for transportation carriers, which fall under the RLA. F. BARTOSIc & R. HARTLEY, LABOR
RELATIONS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 27 (2d ed. 1986); see id. at 25-35; RLA § 1 First, 45
U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
239. However, three states have recently enacted severance pay laws that, if enforced, will
provide strong incentives to rehire and retain predecessor employees. Under the Pennsylvania
statute, for example, employees with more than three years' seniority are entitled to two
weeks' severance pay for each year of service if they are terminated within the 90 days
preceding or the 24 months following a business transfer. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., tit. 15,
§ 2582 (Supp. 1993); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., Ch. 149, § 183 (Supp. 1993); R.I.
GEN. LAWS, § 28-7-19.2 (Supp. 1993). Unfortunately, however, the Frst Circuit has recently
held the Massachusetts statute to be preempted by ERISA, on the ground that a system for
paying out severance pay pursuant to the statute constitutes an "employee benefit plan" offlimits to state regulation. See Simas v. Quaker Fabric Corp., 6 F.3d 849 (lst Cir. 1993).
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C.

Conclusion

American successorship law is little more than a hollow shell. In
this era of economic insecurity and instability, workers have almost
no "protection ... [against] sudden change[s] in the employment
relationship," 2' and business transfers can be catastrophic. It need
not be so. The political and intellectual obstacles to significant reform
can readily be transcended. As explained in the following section,
other leading industrial countries have all managed to provide their
workforces with meaningful protections against these disruptions. The
United States can and should follow suit.

III. A GLANCE ABROAD: SUCCESSORSHIP PROTECTIONS
IN OTHER INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES

Although comparative labor law usually threatens dangerous
pitfalls24' - the different legal systems in question may be as different as apples and oranges - problems of successorship are remarkably constant across borders. The fundamental difficulty is the
traditional liberal framework that considers a new employer a stranger
on the scene (particularly with regard to contractual undertakings242)
and fails to recognize the systematic inability of the freedom-of-contract model to protect employees. 43 The necessary modification, in
turn, involves negotiating this gap and imposing contract-related obligations upon "unconsenting" successors. In almost all major industrial
countries, this gap has been successfully overcome, as it was for a
time in the United States by the NLRB's Burns decision and in various court cases that had extended Wiley.
Below, I briefly discuss the successorship regimes of Canada and
the member nations of the European Community. Together these
regimes protect the workers of almost all the world's largest capitalist
economies.

240. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549.
241. See Clyde w. Summers, Comparative Perspectives, in LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS
CHANGE, supra note 25, at 139 [hereinafter Summers, Comparative Perspectives].

242. See Tony Kerr, Implementation of Directive 77/187 into Irish Law and Case Law of
the Court of Justice, in ACQUIRED RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES, supra note 82, at 1, 3 (describing

this traditional approach as it functioned in European Community jurisdictions before the
implementation of recent reforms).
243. See Ronnie Eklund, A Look at Labour Law in the Context of Transfers of Undertakings, 7 CoMp. LAB. LJ.70, 71 (1985-86).
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There is one notable omission here, that of Japan. In a way it is

a significant omission. Successorship law is of marginal relevance in
Japan because the sale of ongoing businesses has traditionally been

almost unheard of. It is indeed considered immoral

-

something akin

to selling a human being.2' As such, the view suggested in Bums

and in sympathetic commentary 5 that unrestricted transferability of
enterprises is an essential need of a market economy must be at least
somewhat open to question.
A.

Canadian Successorship Law

In contrast to the United States, another federal system with a
substantially similar approach to labor law,' Canadian labor legislation is established at the provincial level. The federal rules are only
applicable to the territories, which hold less than 1% of Canada's
population, and to federal works, undertakings, and businesses. 47

244. James C. Abegglen, Can Japanese Companies Be Acquired?, MERGERS & AcQUisITIONS, winter 1983, at 16, 18. But see Foreign Acquisitions Are Still the Exception in Japan,
L.A. TIMEs, June 29, 1992, at D5 (explaining that acquisitions have increased somewhat in
recent years, but that the companies offered for sale tend to have serious problems). To the
extent enterprise transfers do occur in Japan, however, the successor appears to be obligated
to hire the existing workforce and assume the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement.
See Jill R. Whitelaw, Note, Duties to Employees Affected by a Transfer of the Enterprise:
United States, Europe and Japan, 9 CoMp. LAB. LJ. 558, 582-83 (1987-88). But see K.
SUGENO, JAPANESE LABOR LAW 393 (1992) (suggesting some ambiguities).
245. See, e.g., Hylton & Hylton, supra note 28, at 853 (pointing to "the extremely important role of entry in bringing about productive efficiency in a competitive economy" and
suggesting that strict successorship rules "would reduce the rate of entry into manufacturing
and service industries").
246. The basic nature of union representation and the emphasis upon collective bargaining
agreements are similar in Canada and the United States, although many of the more technical
rules are distinctly more pro-union in Canada, especially with regard to organizing. Nevertheless, Canada is rather less than the workers' paradise portrayed in some commentary from
south of the border. See, e.g., GEOGHEGAN, supra note 61, at 257. For an instructive overview of the realities of Canadian industrial relations, see Daniel Drache & Harry Glasbeek,
The New Fordism in Canada: Capital's Offensive, Labour's Opportunity, 27 OSGOODE HALL
LJ. 517 (1989); and for an explanation of how free trade agreements are jeopardizing
Canada's labor and social welfare standards, see Maude Barlow, For the Down Side, Look
North, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1992, at M5. With the electoral successes of the labor-backed
New Democratic Party in several key provinces, however, several progressive labor law reforms have been enacted. See Canadian Provinces Strengthen Labor Laws, 141 Lab. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 344 (1992).
247. See Phillip M. Schreiber, Comment, Potential Liability of New Employers to PreExisting Collective Bargaining Agreements and Pre-Existing Unions: A Comparison of Labor
Law Successorship Doctrines in the United States and Canada, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
571, 573 (1992); C. FOISY Er AL., CANADA LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD POLICIES AND PROCEDURES § 1:2000, at 2-3 (1986).
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Nevertheless, because the different systems tend to learn from each
other's successes and mistakes,.' the divergences between the various Canadian jurisdictions are not overwhelming, and in all cases the
rules are noticeably superior to those that prevail south of the border.
Successorship in Canada rests on premises similar to those of
Wiley - that "[r]ealistically, one cannot expect the[ ] interests of the
employees and their union to be at the forefront of the business negotiations which employers are free to engage in."' 49 But the protective

regime that has been created to address this problem is considerably
more forceful. The crucial inquiry in Canada is whether a "sale" of
an enterprise has occurred. In considering this question, the federal

and provincial labor boards have taken a broad view, so as "to include almost any mode of transfer.""

°

When such a sale is found,

the new employer will be bound to the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement until the labor board orders otherwise. If no collec-

tive bargaining agreement is in effect at the time of transfer, a bargaining order will issue, but the successor will have no obligation to

maintain the pre-existing terms and conditions of employment.'
The tests for determining whether a sale has occurred vary somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with some provinces focusing

on the employee perspective and others looking more to business
considerations.
leases, 3 and

2

Many partial sales will also be covered, as will
several provinces now provide successorship

248. See Paul C. Weiler, Milestone or Tombstone: The Wagner Act at Fifty, 23 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 1, 26-28 (1986) [hereinafter Weiler, Milestone or Tombstone].
249. Kelley Douglas & Co. and W.H. Malkin Ltd., [1974] 1 C.L.R.B.R. 77 (B.C.L.R.B.).
250. W.W. Lester Ltd. v. U.A., Local 740, 76 D.L.R.4th 389, 410 (1990) (Can.).
251. See Schreiber, supra note 247, at 581; see also. e.g., Labour Relations Act, R.S.O.,
ch. L-2, § 64 (1990) (Ont.). The Ontario Labour Board is empowered to absolve a buyer of
successorship obligations in certain circumstances, but it has come to restrict this exception to
situations where "continued representation by the trade union" would be "'inadequate, inappropriate or unreasonable."' H.W. ARTHURS ET AL., LABOuR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN CANADA § 497 (3d ed. 1988).
As in the United States, Canadian labor boards may order an election if there are valid
concerns about the union's continuing majority status or the continuing appropriateness of the
bargaining unit. See id. § 495 (citing Silverwood Dairies, [1981] 1 C.L.R.B.R. 442
(O.L.R.B.)).
252. See Schreiber, supra note 247, at 589-92 (comparing the differing inquiries in British
Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, and the federal system). The business focus can sometimes border
on the bizarre. See, e.g., Crown Packers and Realties Ltd., 19 C.L.R.B.R. (N.S.) 390, 415
(1988) (O.L.R.B.) (undertaking a metaphysical search to see if the "dynamic intangible" of a
business had been transferred, so as to trigger successorship protections).
253. See Schreiber, supra note 247, at 593. Successorship statutes may also be used to
prevent employers from "double-breasting" - the common practice of dividing operations into
two nominally separate entities, one union and the other non-union. In Canada, a non-union
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protections when government operations are "privatized."' With
respect to these non-traditional transactions, though, and also in considering acquisitions that follow an operational hiatus, the Canadian
scheme actually appears less protective than that of the United States.

As in the United States, successorship obligations will apply in many
cases of insolvency, but, unlike in the U.S., will not usually do so
when one contractor replaces another."

As the Canadian Supreme

Court put it in an important recent case, "something must be relinquished from the first business and obtained by the second.' '

6

Canada also provides useful job security guarantees for employees of transferred businesses through its wrongful dismissal legislation. As a general matter, all employees are entitled to a certain

amount of notice of termination and to damages (usually one week's
pay for each year of service) if such notice is not given. In the successorship context, all employees not rehired by the successor are
entitled to such damages.' 7 Employees who are rehired by the suc-

cessor, meanwhile, are deemed to retain all seniority earned while in
the service of the predecessor, so that a subsequent dismissal by the

will entitle them to damages that reflect their initial date of
successor
8
hire.2

breast will be bound to union obligations "where it is established that because of the presence of the non-union company the union company is losing work, or the union company is
wound down." W.W. Lester, 76 D.L.R.4th at 413.
254. See, e.g., Successor Rights (Crown Transfers) Act, R.S.O., ch. S-27 (1990) (Ont.); cf.
Canada Labour Code, R.S.C., ch. L-2, § 145 (1st Supp. 1985) (establishing successorship
when federal services are transferred to public corporations under federal jurisdiction).
255. See C. FOIsY Er AL., supra note 247, § 7:1143, at 165 (citing Terminus Maritime
Inc., 50 di 178 (1983) (C.L.R.B.)). Terminus Maritime represented a retrenchment from earlier
decisions that used an "organic" approach, "which had relied exclusively on the transfer of
work classifications covered by the bargaining certificate." Id. Burns itself involved the imposition of bargaining obligations upon a successor contractor, and although this holding sparked
both a vigorous dissent and considerable academic criticism, it remains the law. Compare
Burns, 406 U.S. at 304-09 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting) and St. Antoine, supra
note 29, at 275 with Systems Management, Inc. v. NLRB, 901 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1990).
256. W.W. Lester, 76 D.L.R.4th at 410; see also, JKT Holdings Ltd., 5 C.L.R.B.R.2d 316,
320 (1989) (S.L.R.B.) (refusing to find successorship unless the new employer "acquire[s] the
essential elements of a business as a block or as a going concern").
257. See, e.g., Employment Standards Act, R.S.O., ch. E-14, § 13(3) (1990) (Ont.).
258. See, e.g., Employment Standards Act, R.S.O., ch. E-14, § 13(2) (1990) (Ont.); Addison v. M. Loeb, Ltd., 25 D.L.R.4th 151 (Ont. Ct. App. 1986). In the absence of legislation,
a contract term requiring the crediting of service with the predecessor may be implied unless
the successor advises the employee to the contrary at the time of rehire. See Sorel v.
Tomenson Saunders Whitehead Ltd., 39 D.L.R.4th 460 (B.C. Ct. App. 1987).
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B.

Successorship Law in the European Community

European Community successorship law springs from the socalled Acquired Rights Directive, enacted in 1977, which in turn took
its inspiration from West German legislation of 1972.' 9 All E.C.
member states are required to adopt their own national legislation to
implement the Directive; as such, although the touchstone is the
same, there are noticeable differences among the member countries.'
The Acquired Rights Directive imposes two key obligations.
First, all rights and obligations arising under the predecessor's
employees' employment contracts are automatically transferred to the
successor."sI In other words, the successor is required either to retain
the predecessor's workforce or to pay the appropriate damages for
unfair dismissal.' Second, the successor is required to observe the

259. See Council Directive 771187 of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws
of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses, 1977 OJ. (L 61) 26 [hereinafter Acquired Rights Directive]. See also Whitelaw, supra note 244, at 560, 579.
260. For example, Britain's implementing legislation, see Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations, S.I. 1981, No. 1794, flew in the face of the text of the
Directive until the House of Lords intervened. Under the early interpretation, a successor only
acquired obligations to employees who were actually employed at the time of sale, and as
such could escape liability by arranging for a mass termination on the eve of the closing.
Compliance with the Directive thus became entirely "voluntary." See Secretary of State for
Employment v. Spence, 1987 Q.B. 179 (Eng. C.A.); Hugh Collins, Transfers of Undertakings
and Insolvency, 18 INDUS. LJ. 144, 144 (1989). The House of Lords overruled this interpretation in 1989, holding that "dismissals occurring by reason of the transfer of a business,
albeit before the moment of sale of the business itself, give rise to claims against the transferee for fair dismissal." Collins, supra, at 146 (interpreting Litster v. Forth Dry Dock &
Eng'g Co., [1989] 2 W.L.R. 634); see Acquired Rights Directive, Art. 4(1). Ireland's implementing regulation, in contrast, clearly prohibits the kind of manipulation that once prevailed
in Britain. See Kerr, supra note 242, at 15 (citing the European Communities (Safeguarding
of Employees' Rights on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 1980, Reg. 5(1)).
261. See Acquired Rights Directive, Art. 3(1).
262. Loopholes may remain, however. See John McMullen, Takeovers, Transfers and
Business Re-organizations, INDUS. L.J., Mar. 1992, at 15 (1992).
E.C. countries provide comprehensive protections for displaced employees, not only
those who are terminated without good cause (in the American sense) but also for those
made "redundant" for economic reasons. See Whitelaw, supra note 244, at 574 & n.123.
Thus, under the Acquired Rights Directive and the Collective Redundancy Directive of 1975,
1975 OJ. (L 48) 29, a successor that acquired an enterprise previously employing 200 people, and "downsized" the operation so that it only required 150 employees, would have to
hire predecessor employees for those 150 slots, while the predecessor would also have to
compensate the 50 employees not hired as a result of the downsizing. See Summers, Comparative Perspectives, supra note 241, at 160. While I believe such a system would be ap-
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terms and conditions of the predecessor's collective bargaining

agreement until the expiration of that agreement or the negotiation of
a substitute contract.a
The crucial inquiry under the Directive is the existence of a
"transfer" that will trigger the Directive's obligations.'
digm is that of a traditional sale of an ongoing business

concern"

-

-

The para"a going

and thus some critics have criticized the ambiguity of its

application to different kinds of transfers, such as changes in contrac-

tors.'

Unlike United States successorship law, moreover, the "trans-

fer" question tends to be considered as a business matter, rather than
from the employee standpoint.' The Directive framework is also

less protective than the U.S. system in that it does not apply to assets
acquired through bankruptcy sales.

7

Finally, like American succes-

sorship law, and for the same questionable reasons, the Directive does

propriate in the United States, imposing such requirements would require major changes far
beyond the successorship area, and I will not make the case for them here. Accordingly, as
detailed below, I would propose an intermediate arrangement by which successors would be
required to fill all their positions with predecessor employees, but would not suffer legal
consequences if they reduced the number of available positions for economic reasons.
263. See Acquired Rights Directive, Art. 3(2). Member states have the option of limiting
the period for observing predecessor agreements, provided that the obligation extends for at
least one year. See id. This provision is of little practical significance in Britain and Ireland,
where collective bargaining agreements are not legally enforceable, although it is important in
the Continental member nations. See Kerr, supra note 242, at 19. Even the Continental conception is distinctly different from the (North) American model. The Directive has been interpreted only to require application of the predecessor's agreement to employees who had
worked for the predecessor, and not to extend to subsequent hires. See Case 287/86,
Landsorganisationen i Danmark on behalf of Tjenerforbundet i Danmark v. Ny Mdlle Kro,
1987 E.C.R. 5465.
The Directive also requires "information and consultation" with unions or unrepresented
employees concerning the effects of the transfer. This requirement is comparable to the
NLRA's "effects bargaining" obligation. Compare Acquired Rights Directive, Art. 3(1) with
Riedel Int'l (Willamette Tug & Barge Co.), 300 N.L.R.B. 282 (1990).
264. See Acquired Rights Directive, Art. 1(1) (establishing the scope of the Directive).
265. See Collins, supra note 260, at 155; compare Robert Seligman Corp. v. Baker, 1983
LC.R. 770 (Eng. E.A.T.) (finding no "transfer" when a new concessionaire took over an
existing operation) with Case 324/861, Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v. Daddy's
Dance Hall A/S, [1989] 2 CEC (CCH) 99 (finding that the substitution of lessees effected a
"transfer").
266. See Collins, supra note 260, at 154. Collins actually suggests a shift toward the
American approach. Id.
267. Compare Case 135/83, Abels v. Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalindustrie en de
Electrotechnische Industrie, 1985 E.C.R. 470 with cases cited supra note 81. The Abels ruling
left the matter of protections in this context to the individual member countries. Germany, for
example, has chosen to extend its implementing legislation to the insolvency context. See
Axel Flessner, German Report, in Symposium on the Protection of Workers' Rights in the
Event of Insolvency and Business Reorganization, 5 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 121, 143-44 (1989).
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nothing to protect workers against disruptions that result from stock
acquisitions.'
C.

Conclusion

The Canadian and European successorship regimes, although
certainly susceptible of improvement, give employees a decent measure of security against business transfers. While any American counterpart must necessarily function differently given the nature of the
United States' federal system, there is no mysterious and insurmountable barrier that prevents contract obligations from retaining their
force against new owners, or that prevents workers from staying in
their jobs when businesses are sold. Other countries survive and flourish despite - or perhaps in part because of - such restrictions.
IV. MECHANISMS

Although it is easy to state the basic principle of a strong successorship doctrine - that business transfers should be made as irrelevant as possible from the standpoint of employees - the structure
of the American legal system, particularly as it deals with labor matters, presents a barrage of technical difficulties. Reforms can be made
these mechanical complications, it is simpler
oposing the best result and then devising the
s to achieve it.
ae is clear: as in other industrial countries,
not disrupt the position of employees.
teed continued employment across a transfer
(provided that their jobs continue to exetain similar terms and conditions of emer - for a reasonable period of say one
-union employees, and for the life of the
Sement, in the case of unionized employct, the new employer would therefore stand
at 61. This omission is especially significant in that the
reland ensure that stock transfers are the overwhelmingly
sinesses. See id. at 61. The original draft of the Directive
ver. See Kerr, supra note 242, at 4.
ak here of non-managerial employees, insofar as new ownto replace key managerial personnel in connection with the
e.

iployers should be permitted to negotiate new bargalning

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

65

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 11:2

in the shoes of its predecessor, while in the non-union setting the

successor would actually be required to accept extraordinary limits on
its right to change the terms of employment of at-will employees.
There are a variety of means by which this proposal could be
effected, and each gives rise to its own particular problems of federalism and political reality. Although a sweeping federal legislative
reform would undoubtedly be the simplest method, the political rami-

fications of federalizing the general law of the workplace in such a
manner would be enormous, while a piecemeal state-by-state approach, even if fraught with preemption difficulties and very much a

second-best solution, might well be the most viable. I discuss the
various possibilities below.
A.

Federal Approaches

The easiest and most comprehensive reconstruction of labor law

successorship would simply federalize this entire area of law by
amending Section 8(a) of the NLRA to provide concrete protections

of the kind suggested above for all workers, union and non-union
alike. Although such legislation would undoubtedly be valid as a
constitutional matter, it would represent a remarkable expansion of the

federal role in the employment law realm at a time when the states'

agreements if they both desire. The Burns dictum about the importance of restructuring is not
nonsensical, just overbroad, and if economic circumstances justify new terms the parties
should be free to adopt them. There should be no special role for arbitration in this process,
however. I have no particular confidence in the ability of arbitrators to reshape the "law of
the shop," as some courts and commentators have proposed in this regard. See, e.g., United
Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir. 1964); see Henry, supra
note 76, at 275. The glory days of arbitration and industrial pluralism are dead and buried.
See, e.g., GEOGHEGAN, supra note 61, at 164-68 (providing a depressing revisionist account
of the arbitration process).
Tentatively, I would propose prohibiting renegotiation between employers and individual
employees. The imbalance in bargaining power creates an excessive potential for abuse. In
contrast, the European Community's Acquired Rights Directive does not bar renegotiation
here. The successor stands in the shoes of the predecessor, and if the predecessor retains the
power to change employment terms under the laws of the member state in question, renegotiation is permissible. See Case 324/86, Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v. Daddy's
Dance Hall A/S, [1989] 2 CEC (CCH) 99.
Finally, to the extent a business transfer results in the integration of two unionized
operations, I believe existing law, which deals with this matter through bargaining unit clarification and accretion proceedings, is substantially adequate. See NLRB v. Security-Columbian
Banknote Co., 541 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1976); Frederick K. Slicker, A Reconsideration of the
Doctrine of Employer Successorship - A Step Toward a Rational Approach, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 1051, 1068 (1973); see also McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 355 F.2d 352, 357
(2d Cir. 1966) (discussing § 301 problems in this area).
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role has been growing steadily for some decades."

Cutting against

the grain in this manner, moreover, would only redouble the tremendous political difficulties that such a proposal would be bound to
provoke by virtue of its substance. Practically speaking, then, this
idea is a non-starter.

As a second-best federal solution, a solution that would do noth-

ing for almost nine-tenths of the workforce, 2 the NLRA could be

amended so as to overrule Burns and provide that a successor's bargaining duty includes an obligation to abide by existing terms and

conditions of employment, including a "good cause" restriction on
discharge when the bundle of existing terms contains such a limita-

tion.' VWhile federalism concerns would evaporate under this proposal, business opposition would undoubtedly remain ferocious, and in
view of the reduced stakes the cause might not be worth the fight.
271. See Eileen Silverstein, Against Preemption in Labor Law, 24 CONN. L. REv. 1, 3343 (1991) [hereinafter Silverstein, Against Preemption].
272. Only 11.3 million workers are represented by unions in private sector workplaces,
and this figure includes several hundred thousand transport employees who work under the
RLA. The total workforce is 103.9 million people. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, UNION MFMBERS IN 1991, at tbl. 2 (1992).
An additional minor federal reform could add successorship protections to the RLA, so
as to preserve union certifications and collective bargaining agreements across transfers of
ownership or control. The total number of affected employees would not be great, however,
especially in view of the fact that many railroad employees are already protected by other
means. See supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text. On the other hand, as a practical
political matter the RLA does seem more open to reform than the NLRA. See Railway Labor
Act Study Recommended, 140 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 370 (1992).
273. As explained above, see supra note 272, ensuring the continuity of contract terms
should have the effect of imposing a "just cause" requirement on discharges/failures to "hire"
by the successor, so that specifying the obligation to rehire might be redundant. But given
the minority view that binding successors to such "good cause" provisions would not restrict
successor hiring, it would probably be best to spell out this obligation.
Legislation along these lines was introduced in the Senate in 1977 but got lost in the
shuffle amid the labor law reform fiasco of 1978. This proposal would have made it an
unfair labor practice for a successor to refuse to assume the predecessor collective bargaining
agreement and would have established § 301 jurisdiction to remedy violations of predecessor
agreements. See 95th Cong., IstSess. 2752, 2771 (1977).
It is worth noting here that Congress has never overridden a Supreme Court interpretation of the NLRA in the nearly sixty years since the passage of the Wagner Act. Professor
William Eskridge suggests that "organized worker groups," including unions, "fare particularly
well in overturning adverse [Supreme Court statutory interpretation] decisions," William
Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE LJ. 331,
352 (1991), but his point is directed more at broad employment-related overrides than at
"traditional" labor law. See id. at 345 n.62. For the last generation, labor has been considerably more successful in winning legislation that benefits all workers, as opposed to parochial
union-only legislation, and as such an all-out effort to protect all employees might actually
prove more successful than a proposal to overrule Burns per se, even though the universal
legislation would make a far more drastic change to existing law.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

67

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 11:2

Alternatively, and perhaps still less likely, an attempt could be
made to have Burns overruled administratively and judicially. Although the NLRB is bound by existing Supreme Court precedent,
overruling necessarily has to begin somewhere, 4 and perhaps a
challenge could be taken all the way up. There has been no relevant
change in the text of the NLRA, or in its basic policies, over the last
twenty years, though, and as such the essential argument would probably have to be the one suggested here - that the world has changed
since the days of Bums, and that the law must move with the
timesY Given the views of the Court's current personnel, such a
course would seem distinctly questionable. Almost as difficult would
be an attempt to modify the legal theory of successor obligations, although it is certainly intellectually possible; in the years between
Wiley and its own Burns decision, for example, the NLRB proved
quite creative in devising useful intermediate successorship
protections. 276
In addition, the NLRB unquestionably retains the power to make
marginal improvements to its own existing successorship doctrines.
Thus, as argued above, a reexamination of the peculiar exception for
stock transactions may be in order, and the basic continuity-of-theenterprise analysis should be simplified so as to eliminate the inquiry
into irrelevant business matters.' These revisions would not only
cover NLRA proceedings but might also then become the baseline for
the more substantial reforms proposed below.
One final, but extremely important, item for the federal agenda is
the matter of employee benefits. As explained above, ERISA essentially ignores the disruptions that result from business transfers even though disruptions to employee benefits have been one of the
most severe problems confronting workers in recent years.2 78 Here,

274.

It is possible, however, that the Supreme Court's successorship rules could be con-

sidered "ossified" by virtue of Congress' twenty-year acquiescence, so as to make them immune to overruling except by the legislature. Cf. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267, 288-89 (1974).
275. Cf.Eskridge, supra note 273, at 387 (suggesting that older precedents are only overridden when there has been intervening social change and an accompanying shift in societal

attitudes).
In contrast, William DuRoss has proposed using an "econometric" approach to "trigger
[a] review" of existing successorship doctrine, but his proposed review would involve shifting

the law still further in a pro-employer direction and still further away from the laws of other
industrial nations. DuRoss, supra note 20, at 433.

276. See cases cited supra note 17.
277. See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 204-17.
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however, there may be a real possibility of reform at the federal
level: unlike the NLRA, as to which the reform process "has been
paralyzed by the competing political demands of labor and management" for more than a generation,279 ERISA has been modified and
amended on several occasions since its enactment twenty years ago,
and Congress appears at least somewhat willing to adopt effective
mechanisms to protect and secure employee benefits. This openness is
fortunate, because ERISA contains an exceptionally broad preemption
provision that courts have applied with vigor, if not mean-spiritedness,
so as to prohibit almost all state regulation in this vital area.'
As such, and in accordance with the broad state-law reforms
proposed below, ERISA should be amended to require that successor
employers continue to maintain, or contribute to, all preexisting benefit plans for a period of at least one year from the time of transfer.
In the case of pension funds, then, successors should be prohibited
from terminating single-employer plans (or reducing the benefits
thereunder) and from withdrawing from multi-employer plans for that
one-year period. A comparable level of health benefits should also be
required, with appropriate assurances against hiatuses and discontinuity in connection with the transfer.
Unfortunately, with these peripheral exceptions, federal approaches to successorship reform do not appear politically viable at
this time. In accordance with the new federalism in progressive labor
law scholarship, then, I suggest that the more practical approach may
involve looking to the states.
B.

State Approaches

Successorship legislation at the state level would appear considerably more promising as a matter of practical political reality, although here there are a number of serious federalism concerns. As
noted above, seven states have recently enacted employee-protective
successorship laws, five of them within the last five years, and, en-

279. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption, supra note 100, at 366.
280. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). For examples of sweeping and
distasteful ERISA preemption decisions, see McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401
(5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992) (disallowing state regulation of an
employer's decision to impose extraordinary limits on health benefits for employees with
AIDS); Carpenters Southern Cal. Admin. Corp. v. El Capitan Dev. Co., 811 P.2d 296 (Cal.),

cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 430 (1991) (invalidating a state mechanic's lien law ensuring that
construction workers could recover employee benefits from the owners of real property improved by the workers' labor).
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couragingly, the newest statutes are the most progressive.' Unfortunately, but perhaps not accidentally, all these regulatory efforts have
been directed to the preservation of employment terms - specifically
those contained in collective bargaining agreements - rather than the
preservation of employment itself. Both areas must be addressed in
order to construct a truly meaningful successorship regime.
At the outset, it is necessary to confront a serious underlying
difficulty with the state-by-state approach: the prospect of business
voting with its feet against state regulation, and other states bidding
for its favors with inadequate labor laws. This capital veto has been a
serious concern ever since the enactment of right-to-work laws in
Southern states after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, and it has
intensified in recent years as business successfully demands tax concessions and other subsidies as the price of maintaining operations in
their current location or shifting them to green fields elsewhere.2"
Nevertheless, even though employers can be demonstrably irrational in
their response to legal interference," successorship restrictions
should not be considered such crushing obligations that capital is
bound to flee any state that adopts them. After all, Germany and Italy
have not experienced debilitating capital flight because of the strictures of the Acquired Rights Directive. In the final analysis, moreover, this capital veto is not much more than a form of blackmail,
and it should not deter a democratic government from doing the right
thing.
Below, I analyze the nature of the necessary reforms and their
potential pitfalls, first addressing the problem of preserving employment and then considering the means by which the terms of that
employment may be regulated effectively.
1. Employment-Preservation Laws
Because job insecurity is the central problem of the existing
successorship regime, reform must tackle the matter of employment
preservation as its first order of business. The law should guarantee

281. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
282. See Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's
Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEo. LJ. 1757, 1772-82 (1993). Note that only Northern industrial states have enacted successorship laws so far;, it might be predicted that other states that
have thrived on their anti-worker "business climates" will be rather more sluggish.

283. See, e.g., Randall Sambom, Study: Discharge Suits Alter Corporate Policy, NAT'L
L., Apr. 13, 1992, at 19 (describing employers' wildly disproportionate response to new
limitations on the right to fire at will).
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continued employment across a change in ownership or control unless the job is eliminated for valid economic reasons - and should
cover all employers, public and private, and whether or not a union
has been certified, so as to afford protections to all workers.
There are two major difficulties here. First, no state has yet
attempted to provide protections of this kind,' and it is uncertain
whether state legislators have the political will to do so. Second, there
are potential constitutional problems with state intervention, given the
expansive scope of federal preemption in the labor law context. Nevertheless, as explained below, I believe that employment-protection
laws can survive constitutional scrutiny. For in the end, the basic law
of hiring and firing still remains a matter for the states, and it cannot
fairly be said that Congress has occupied this field.'
Politically speaking, the prospects for such reforms are not at all
clear. By enacting their contract-preservation laws, several states have
evidenced some degree of willingness to protect workers against disruptive business transfers, but it is hard to tell how serious their
resolve really is. Some of these protections were only enacted amid
broader legislative efforts to deter hostile takeovers;' as such their
passage may not really reflect any particular concern over labor matters. It is also possible that legislators have considered their votes in
favor of contract-preservation statutes to be "free," politically popular
yet inconsequential in that the legislation could be relied upon to fall
under constitutional challenge.' Still more likely, employers may
not have mounted vigorous opposition to these proposals because they
too have felt confident such laws would be invalidated if ever put to
use. The prospect of serious legislation that would affect all employers and survive legal challenge would almost certainly inspire a different response.
Were they enacted and enforced, then, employment-preservation
laws would be sure to provoke preemption attacks, but they could
very well be upheld, provided that the judiciary retains some degree
of open-mindedness in the matter.' Of course, if the courts are
284. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island have come the closest, requiring that
successors pay severance to rehired predecessor employees if they are terminated within a
certain period following a transfer of control. See supra note 239.
285. See Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption, supra note 100, at 421-22.
286. See Sweeney, supra note 148, at 185-87.
287. This pattern is especially suspicious because legislatures are notoriously thick with
lawyers, who will readily understand the problems of preemption, and because preemption
risks were brought into the open as some contract-preservation statutes were being enacted.
See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
288. For an example of unconventional judicial thinking on preemption matters, see Mid-
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such as Eileen

Silverstein's recent proposal that state labor laws should be invalidated only if they "actually conflict" with federal protections,. 9 then
these statutes would survive with almost no trouble at all.

NLRA preemption contains two discrete strands. The principal
rule, derived from the Supreme Court's 1959 decision in San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon' 9° prevents the states from regu-

lating matters "arguably protected" by Section 7 or "arguably prohibited" by Section 8 of the NLRA.29 In its current incarnation, this
doctrine only blocks overlapping state regulation of "arguably prohib-

ited" conduct if the controversy presented to a state court would be
"identical" to that which might come before the NLRB.2' The second problem is "balance of power," or Machinists preemption,'"
which holds that state law cannot upset the balance of economic
forces struck by Congress. This second doctrine is most readily ap-

plied to prohibit the states from restricting the exercise of economic
weapons

-

such as a union's right to strike or an employer's right

to keep operating during a strike294 - but it can also work to deem
certain matters deliberately unregulated, so as to block states from
writing on what might appear to be a clean slate. These preemption

doctrines operate in many different ways and in many different contexts, but the Supreme Court has recently made clear that neither

west Motor Express, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 120, 139 L.R.RM. (BNA) 2563 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. 1992), aft'd. 494 N.W.2d 895 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), which upheld a state prohibition on
employer use of "permanent replacements" to break strikes. Laws of this kind are ordinarily
held preempted, and indeed a Minnesota federal district court has found the same statute to
be invalid. See Employers Ass'n v. United Steelworkers, 803 F. Supp. 1558 (D. Minn. 1992).
289. See Silverstein, Against Preemption, supra note 271, at 49, 50-51; see also Michael
H. LeRoy, The Mackay Radio Doctrine of Permanent Striker Replacements and the Minnesota
Picket Line Peace Act: Questions of Preemption, 77 MINN. L. REv. 843 (1993) (arguing that
Minnesota's anti-scab law should be upheld because it does not actually conflict with the
terms of the NLRA).
Strong successorship laws clearly would not "actually conflict" with the NLRA. No
provision of the statute even mentions successorship. At most, such laws would conflict with
the Supreme Court's decisions in Burns and Howard Johnson; but as Michael LeRoy points
out, conflict with an arguably unreasonable judicial interpretation of the NLRA is very different from a conflict with the statute itself.
290. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
291. See id. at 244-45.
292. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180,
190 (1978).
293. So named from the lead case, Lodge 76, JAM v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
294. See, e.g., Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 778 F. Supp. 95
(D. Mass. 1991).
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strand of preemption doctrine reaches so far as to affect a state's
conduct as "market participant" rather than regulator."9
Carefully dodging these constraints, Michael Gottesman has provided a powerful revisionist argument against preemption of employment-preservation statutes. Gottesman relies upon a novel "non-continuum" thesis of NLRA preemption: that "NLRA prohibition of certain
conduct does not justify preempting parallel state regulation of that
conduct, unless the conduct lies on a continuum some part of which
is protected by the NLRA."' Applying this principle to a (necessarily) hypothetical state employment-preservation law, he argues that
"while federal labor law prohibits purchasers from refusing to employ
the seller's employees for reasons of anti-union animus, it neither
establishes nor protects a countervailing right of purchasers to refuse
to employ the seller's employees for other reasons."2' Accordingly,
"[b]ecause there are federal interests on only one side of the line
29 federal law should not undo
(prohibiting certain failures to hire),""
a state command that successors retain predecessor employees.
Gottesman points to two potentially sticky preemption issues
here. First, under Garmon, such an employment-preservation law
might be considered an improper regulation of conduct "arguably
prohibited" by Section 8 of the NLRA, 9 because it would duplicate
the NLRA's prohibition on refusals to hire predecessor employees for
anti-union reasons, as part of its universal ban on refusals to rehire.
In actuality, however, the NLRA is simply not concerned with hiring
issues other than anti-union discrimination, and the basic choices in
this area are really for the states to make. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has confused the matter with a number of ill-phrased pronouncements, speaking in Howard Johnson of the successor's "right"
to hire a new workforce when the operative principle of the NLRA is
simply not to require retention of the old workforce." As

295. See Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 113 S.
Ct. 1190 (1993).
296. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption, supra note 100, at 410. This argument is a response to the traditional Gannon preemption doctrine. See supra notes 290-91
and accompanying text.
297. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption, supra note 100, at 418-19. This is

most clearly demonstrated by the unquestioned continuing force of the other federal restrictions on hiring discrimination. See supra note 75. Howard Johnson surely did not nullify
Title VII for the benefit of successor employers.
298. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption, supra note 100, at 423.
299. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245.
300. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 262,
264 (1974); Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption, supra note 100, at 422.
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Gottesman makes clear, however, the judiciary should be looking at
the origins and principles of labor preemption, not mechanically applying the overbroad formulae through which the doctrine has come
to be expressed. If the matter is considered with care, there is every
reason to believe that employment-preservation laws would be upheld.
Although Gottesman does not discuss it, the most useful Supreme Court decision on this point may be Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB,30 ' something of an old chestnut perhaps, but nevertheless a
useful corrective to the distorted vision that has been the legacy of
the preemption decisions that followed a generation later. In Phelps
Dodge, the Court observed that an employer
is as free to hire as he is to discharge employees. The [NLRA]
does not touch "the normal exercise of the right of the employer to
select its employees or to discharge them." It is directed solely
against the abuse of that right by interfering with the counter-vailing
right of self-organization.'
As such, if other, independent constraints are placed on the right of
the employer to select its employees, it is not the NLRA's concern.
Those new constraints will simply establish a new baseline - that
which is "normal."
In addition, an action to enforce a state employment-preservation
law would involve a substantially different controversy than an NLRB
discrimination proceeding, and thus should escape Garmon preemption
as that doctrine has now been limited in cases involving "arguably
prohibited" conduct.' In the employment-preservation context there
would be no need to establish the employer's motivation, which is
the centerpiece of the NLRA inquiry; the employee should be able to
prove her prima facie case by the simple fact of the successor's failure to retain her, and the employer's potential defense would involve
the continuing existence of the job slot, a factor that is entirely irrelevant in the NLRA context.
Second, Gottesman deals with the potential argument that employment-preservation laws would be invalid under the Machinists
doctrine because they would impose NLRA obligations on successors

301.

313 U.S. 177 (1941).

302. Id. at 186-87. The quoted material here is taken from the Court's earlier decision in
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937), although the Phelps Dodge

opinion does not note the source.
303. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180,
190 (1978). Gottesman's argument does not rely on Sears.
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that they otherwise would not have had. Again, the non-continuum
thesis inspires his answer. "Employers have no right to be union-free,
nor to hire to achieve that outcome. They have no right to escape

bargaining with a union that has been selected by their employees ....

Federal law is concerned only that the choice respecting

unionization

of those

actually

employed

be

honored. ''""s

In

Gottesman's view, the real federal interest here is confined to the

matter of timing: "providing employees a bargaining right as soon as
it is known that a majority of the successor's employees come from
the

predecessor's

workforce."3

Employment-preservation

laws

"would merely establish from the moment of [transfer] that a majority
come from the predecessor's workforce."'

The NLRA would then

operate as usual, imposing an immediate bargaining obligation on the
successor, but not requiring the maintenance of existing terms and

conditions of employment.'
Again, what is really required is a fresh look at the purpose of
the preemption rules. The Machinists doctrine is primarily intended to

304. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption, supra note 100, at 424.
305. Id. Taking this approach would get rid of one annoying issue under the existing
system - the problem of the "representative complement." At present, a successor only acquires a bargaining obligation when a majority of its workforce consists of predecessor employees. In many instances, however, the successor does not complete its hiring for a considerable period of time, and it cannot be promptly determined whether a majority of the final
workforce will consist of predecessor employees. To get over this problem, the Supreme
Court has approved the Board's "representative complement" rule, which creates a bargaining
obligation as soon as the successor's hiring has produced a predecessor majority in a "representative complement" of its new workforce. See Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 46-52. But
determining if and when such a complement has arrived can be complex and time-consuming.
In contrast, when it is clear from the outset that all the successor's employees will come
from the predecessor - as would always be the case if employment-preservation laws were
in effect - the bargaining obligation will take root immediately. See Burns, 406 U.S. at
294-95.
Ensuring continuity of the union presence would also avoid the annoyance of proving
a valid bargaining demand. See Williams Enters. v. NLRB, 956 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(denying enforcement to a Board successorship order because the union's request for bargaining was technically flawed).
306. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption, supra note 100, at 424.
307. Specifically, under Burns, it would be "perfectly clear" in all instances that the successor would end up hiring all or substantially all the predecessor's employees, so as to
require bargaining with respect to the "initial" terms and conditions of employment under the
successor. Burns, 406 U.S. at 294-95.
As an alternative to legislation in this area, discharging predecessor employees simply
because they are predecessor employees could be held to be a violation of public policy, so
that the employer would be required to provide a valid reason for its action. Under such a
regime, of course, a successor could not be permitted to discharge a predecessor employee
simply because it deemed someone else more qualified.
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avoid state interference with the use of economic weapons and the
process of collective bargaining;' it is a tremendous intellectual
stretch to extend it so far outside its original domain. To hold that
the states cannot enact employment laws of general application, merely because they might have the peripheral effect of triggering collective bargaining responsibilities on the part of a few employers who
might otherwise have chosen to escape those responsibilities, would
be pointless and unjustified overreaching. Such overreaching would be
especially inappropriate in light of the Supreme Court's unanimous
1993 Boston Harbor decision,' which firmly rejected an expansive
interpretation of the Machinists doctrine.
2. Contract-Preservation Laws
To be truly effective, a revitalized law of successorship must
also ensure some substantive regulation of the terms and conditions of
employment. It would make little sense to require the successor to
retain predecessor employees, yet simultaneously allow it to impose
massive wage and benefit cuts. Providing substantive protections to
non-union workers, in particular, requires fairly significant reform, for
without additional constraints a successor that was required to retain
predecessor employees could turn around and discharge them for a
good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all."' Effective reform in
this regard thus requires attention to the different problems of unionized and non-union workers.
With respect to unorganized employees, in the private and the
public sector alike, legislation should require both preservation of
employment for a period of one year following a transfer of their
employer's business, and continuation of the same terms and conditions of employment during that time."' Such a reform would give
308. Cf. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 487 U.S. 1 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
309. Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 113 S. Ct.

1190 (1993).
310. See Whitelaw, supra note 244, at 586. E.C. countries have apparently not had to
deal with this problem directly, perhaps because union density is generally much higher, but
also because the Acquired Rights Directive provides that if a "transfer" "involves a substantial change in working conditions to the detriment of the employee, the [successor] employer

shall be regarded as having been responsible for termination of the contract of employment
or of the employment relationship." Acquired Rights Directive, Art. 4(2). Such a "termination" will in turn create a claim for damages.
311. To avoid preemption problems that might arise with laws that preserve collective

bargaining agreements, see infra text accompanying notes 318-24, legislation dealing with
non-union workers should be enacted separately, thereby foreclosing the possibility that a
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protections to non-union workers in the successorship context far
more rights than they have elsewhere, thus producing an interesting
anomaly. Reform of this sort would very probably tend to discourage
transactioneering at the expense of workers, and might well discourage transactioneering of all kinds. However, Japan manages to get by
without selling its businesses, and discouraging the most destructive
kinds of corporate reshuffling simply cannot be expected to undermine the American economy. To the extent this argument goes
against the conventional wisdom of corporate America and those who
defend its interests, I believe that this wisdom has proven itself to be
folly. The time has come to pick up the pieces and move on from
the excesses of the laissez-faire renaissance.
With respect to unionized workers, the appropriate mechanism
for preserving existing rights would have to be somewhat different. If
state law ensured that all successor workforces contained a predecessor majority (indeed a "totality"), the existing federal regime would
impose an immediate bargaining obligation on the successor, but
would only require the successor to maintain the existing employment
terms if it did not succeed in altering them through this bargaining.312 Without some substantive protection, the successor might well
be able to take advantage of its strength during this time of uncertainty to win union acquiescence in inferior terms. Professor
Gottesman suggests that contract terms might still be imposed under
Section 301, insofar as every transferee would now inevitably be a
Howard Johnson successor, but as explained above, in the aftermath
of Burns courts and arbitrators alike have been extremely reluctant to
saddle new employers with predecessor agreements, even when total
workforce and enterprise continuity is present."' As such, without
reform, unionized employees might still suffer serious adverse consequences even if continued employment were guaranteed.
The best model for change is that of the most recent contract-

single statute could be deemed non-severable and invalidated in its entirety.
Sweeney argues that states are "realistically prevented from passing a successor statute
applicable to both union and non-union employees" because non-union employees typically
have no written contracts that could be preserved by operation of law. Sweeney, supra note
148, at 214. However, if the matter is considered in practical terms - a matter of wages,
benefits, and so on - there is no real obstacle. Only the obfuscatory imagery of "contracet"
makes the matter seem problematic. Cf. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 4. at 6.

312. Cf Burns, 406 U.S. at 294-95.
313. See Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption, supra note 100, at 425 & n.257.
The lead case here is Bartenders, Local 340 v. Howard Johnson Co., 535 F.2d 1160 (9th

Cir. 1976). See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
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preservation successorship statutes, those of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, which extend to all employers and continue
contractual obligations whether or not the bargaining agreement con-

tains successorship language."4 Unfortunately, there is a possibility

that these laws might be preempted, deemed to interfere either with
the NLRA or with Section 301 .3" All the same, predictions of demise may be exaggerated, whether the preemption doctrines are con-

ventionally applied, or revised so as to allow state laws to survive
unless they "actually conflict" with federal labor law, as Professor
Silverstein has proposed."6 Additionally, Professor Gottesman has
suggested that such laws could provide the basis for a new federal
3
rule of Section 301 successorship.

7

As noted above, NLRA preemption contains two distinct doctrines: primary jurisdiction (Garmon) preemption and balance-of-power
(Machinists) preemption.1 Garmon should not pose a significant

problem here, despite the potential for overlapping regulation of "arguably prohibited" conduct, for "[s]uccessor statutes have nothing to
do with what primary jurisdiction preemption protects" - the authority of the NLRB." 9 Further, the operative inquiry would not be

314. See supra note 237. Note that other states' contract-preservation laws apply only
when the bargaining agreement contains successorship language, and some exclude NLRA and
RLA employers.
315. See, e.g., Sweeney, supra note 143, at 219; Skjerven, supra note 138, at 592. In
contrast, although the new successor severance pay laws, see, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN., §
28-7-19.2 (1990), should also survive preemption challenge, on the authority of Fort Halifax
Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987), which upheld a similar protection against displacement caused by plant closings, the First Circuit has recently held Massachusetts' statute to be
preempted by ERISA, on the ground that the required distribution of severance pay would be
sufficiently complex to transform the compliance process into a forbidden "employee benefit
plan." See Simas v. Quaker Fabric Corp., 6 F.3d 849 (1st Cir. 1993).
316. See Silverstein, Against Preemption, supra note 271, at 50-51. Professor Silverstein
argues that successors could easily comply both with the NLRA and with state laws requiring
preservation of collective bargaining agreements, because the NLRA does not prohibit successor compliance but simply does not itself require such compliance. See id.
317. See Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption, supra note 100, at 425 n.257.
318. See supra notes 290-94 and accompanying text (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) and Lodge 76, LAM v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976)).
319. Sweeney, supra note 148, at 210. In accordance with Gottesman's non-continuum
theory, Sweeney points out that contract-preservation laws do not interfere with § 7 rights in
any way. The only issue here is a possible duplication of restrictions on matters arguably
prohibited by § 8, a less serious concern. Id. at 208. As a practical matter, moreover, the
NLRB's jurisdiction would rarely be invoked if a state suit could bring about the preservation
of the collective bargaining agreement, while an unfair labor practice charge could yield only
a bargaining order. Id. at 209; see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 189 (1978).
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"identical" to that of an NLRB successorship proceeding, as is now
required for preemption to take effect:3" where the NLRB first gives

attention to the question of majority status, and does not even consider other issues until it has satisfactorily resolved that question,32 ' a

state court action involving a contract-preservation law would sidestep
the workforce composition problem, since the matter would necessarily already have been resolved by operation of law, and would only
address enterprise continuity matters.3"
The Machinists doctrine is somewhat more problematic, and it is

here that the most detailed analysis of this question, that of Edward
Sweeney, has found the Achilles heel. By virtue of the Burns policies
of capital mobility and unfettered bargaining, Sweeney argues, labor

and management (or, more realistically, just management) must retain
the liberty to strike a new, economically realistic bargain based on the
balance of economic power, and the states cannot be permitted to

interfere.3" This conclusion is questionable: as vividly illustrated by
Burns, the NLRA is concerned with the process and not the outcome
of collective bargaining, and the Machinists doctrine is simply intended to ban state interference with that process." If state law operates
to provide certain basic protections that might otherwise be provided

through collective bargaining, it is simply not a problem under the
NLRA.
More important, this analysis is based on the paradigm of the
existing statutes, which target collective bargaining agreements and
ignore the needs of non-union workers. If preservation of wages and

benefits across transfers of ownership is assured for all employees
not just those in unionized workplaces -

-

this regulation would sim-

320. See Sears, 436 U.S. at 190.
321. See Dicker, supra note 93, at 173.
322. Indeed, if the NLRB continued to consider business-continuity criteria in its successorship analysis, a state-law inquiry that looked solely to employee matters might well be
considered different enough to escape preemption.
323. See Sweeney, supra note 148, at 219. Sweeney further argues that the employer is
prevented from using valid economic weapons to achieve a new agreement. Id. This argument
proves too much, for the Supreme Court has approved state laws that effectively prohibit
employers from using economic weapons to avoid agreeing to provide certain employee benefits. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985). In the absence of such laws, the employer would be
permitted to lock out its employees rather than agree to such terms, because benefits are
mandatory subjects of bargaining under the NLRA.
324. Cf. Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. 1; Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. 724. On this point Sweeney suggests rather sophistically that contract-preservation statutes interfere with "[t]he process
of forming an agreement" by imposing a pre-formed agreement on the parties and preventing
the formation of a new agreement. Sweeney, supra note 148, at 219.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

79

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 11:2

ply become another plank in the basic floor of rights that the states
are entitled to provide.3' In such circumstances, as Eileen
Silverstein comments, "this concern about upsetting the balance of
power established in the NLRA" can only provide a basis for preemption if one "is prepared to deny states the power to legislate on
any matter touching the employment relationship."3" In the era of
the new federalism, this surely cannot be the law.
Section 301 preemption involves an altogether different analysis.
Generally, a state cause of action will be preempted by Section 301
only if it requires the actual interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement."2 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that Section 301 "displaced all state actions for violations
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization,"3 so
that collective bargaining agreements cannot actually be enforced
except in Section 301 proceedings. As such, an action under a state
contract-preservation statute seeking a declaration that a successor is
bound to a predecessor agreement would be permitted unless contract
interpretation were required; but a suit to remedy a specific violation
of the agreement, which would necessarily demand such interpretation, could not be framed as an action under the state contract-preservation statute but would have to proceed under Section 301.
The more cautious state contract-preservation statutes would
stumble at the first hurdle, so that even a declaratory relief action to
determine the continuing validity of the agreement would be disallowed. These statutes only come into play if the collective bargaining
agreement contains a successorship provision, so that the agreement
would necessarily have to be scrutinized to determine whether such a
provision actually exists.329 On the other hand, where the statute is
framed more broadly, and seeks to impose obligations on all "successors" as defined in the legislation itself, there would be no need to
refer to the bargaining agreement at all.3" As such, broad contractpreservation statutes should survive this initial inquiry.
But a declaration that the contract bound the successor would be
little more than symbolic unless specific interstitial violations of the

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
271, at

Cf. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. 724.
Silverstein, Against Preemption, supra note 271, at 48.
See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 408-10 (1988).
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55 (1987).
See Sweeney, supra note 148, at 221-23.
See Sweeney, supra note 148, at 222-23; Silverstein, Against Preemption, supra note
51 & n.239.
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agreement could then be remedied as well. As noted, such remedies
can only come through Section 301 proceedings. In this regard, Professor Gottesman has proposed that state contract-preservation statutes
might properly provide the basis for a revised body of federal law
under Section 301 - that is, the law that would be used in an action
to remedy the breach of a collective bargaining agreement made
binding by virtue of a state contract-preservation statute. As with
federal common law in general,33 Section 301 analysis may rely on
related state law for its rules of decision, and the Supreme Court
gave at least some weight to New York's law of mergers in
332
Wiley.

As such, Gottesman suggests "that there is no reason why a
state's decision to alter the rule that purchasers of business assets are
not bound by predecessors' agreements should not ...
be honored. 333 Like his discussion regarding employment preservation
laws, this argument rests upon a version of the "non-continuum"
thesis: that state regulation should be permitted unless it interferes
with conduct of a kind that may be affirmatively protected by federal
labor law.31 In the context of contract preservation, Gottesman suggests that federal law has no interest in assuring the non-continuity of
collective bargaining agreements, and that its reluctance to bind successors to predecessor agreements may arise from "a desire not to
intrude upon interests established by state law. 335 As such,
Gottesman proposes, "the federal law of Section 301 would be that
purchasers of business assets are not bound by predecessors' collective bargaining agreements unless state law declares the state prefer''3
ence to be that purchasers are bound. 1
There are several problems with this argument, but they certainly
need not be fatal. First, Gottesman's suggestion that no federal interest is frustrated by the survival of predecessor agreements must surely
be open to question in light of Burns and its influential pronounce-

331.

See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979).

332. See Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550 n.3; see also id. at 547-48 & n.2 (explaining the union's
argument and quoting the operative statute).
333. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption, supra note 100, at 425 n.257.
334. Gottesman's article deals with NLRA preemption, not § 301 preemption, and, as
explained above, his non-continuum argument is originally a response to the traditional
Garmon preemption doctrine. Id. at 394-426. Although the policy underlying this revised
approach can be usefully applied to the § 301 context, it must be emphasized that this view,
however imaginative and persuasive, is not the law at the moment.

335. Id. at 425 n.257.
336. Id.
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ment about the importance of unfettered capital mobility. 37 Recall
that this policy was expressly made applicable to Section 301 in the
Howard Johnson decision.3" Although Wiley does technically remain
alive, assuring capital mobility has long been the dominant policy of
labor law successorship, as shown most strikingly by the near-total
unwillingness of arbitrators and courts to enforce predecessor agreements even when the new employer is properly a Howard Johnson
successor.339 But this trend among the lower courts and among arbitrators is not entirely sound from an intellectual standpoint - it simply does not follow from the Supreme Court's various successorship
holdings' - and thus Gottesman's view may retain vitality by virtue of its technical correctness.
Second, Gottesman's suggestion that federal law is neutral about
successorship rules and will follow state modifications may rely too
heavily on judicial ingenuousness and ignore potentially serious problems of national uniformity. As he points out, Howard Johnson distinguished Wiley in part because the merger at issue in Wiley was
conducted against a background of state law that held predecessor
contracts enforceable against the entity that survived the merger,
whereas the Howard Johnson transaction involved an asset purchase
that took place against a background of state law that generally held
such purchasers immune from claims under predecessor contracts.3 41
As such, if an asset purchase were to take place against a different
state law background, in which predecessor contracts generally continue their effectiveness, Wiley should continue to command the preservation of the agreement.
But it is not entirely clear that these statements in Howard Johnson should be taken at face value. After all, the Court was straining
to distinguish a precedent that was extremely difficult to distinguish.
Wiley's references to state corporate law were dictum of the most
tangential kind. The.holding was based squarely on the "impressive
policy considerations favoring arbitration,"' 2 and the Howard John-

337. See Burns, 406 U.S. at 288.
338.

See Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 255; see also supra note 148 and accompanying

text.
339. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
341. See Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption, supra note 100, at 423 (citing
Howard Johnson. 417 U.S. at 257). Michigan follows the general common law rule and

imposes obligations on asset purchasers only in isolated circumstances. See Conrad v. RofinSinar, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 167 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
342. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550.
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son Court knew that perfectly well. 3 In an era when the principle
of stare decisis has become more honored in the breach than in the
observance, moreover, it is not at all certain that a nuanced distinction such as this would be taken seriously.
More important, allowing the states to upset the general rules of
successorship would tend to undermine the uniformity of Section 301
law.' Implicit in Wiley and Howard Johnson was the understanding
that the rules concerning mergers and asset purchases in New York
and Michigan, where those cases arose, were the general common law
rules, applicable throughout the nation. Mergers in all states take
place against a background of corporate law that preserves contractual
obligations; asset purchases in all states take place against a background of corporate law that rejects such continuity except in extraordinary circumstances.' 4 The Court might well have been less willing
to defer to state rules had they varied substantially from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. At this point, the analysis appears to be at odds with
the basic policy underlying preemption, the need for uniformity;
which Gottesman's rethinking does not seek to challenge, and not
simply the unplanned and unjustified consequences of poorly framed
preemption doctrines.' This problem is compounded by the fact
that the state contract-preservation laws in question are not general
modifications of corporate law rules, but specific revisions of the
rules concerning collective bargaining agreements and collective bargaining agreements alone. A state's choice to hold all contracts binding upon asset purchasers is surely something quite different from an
attempt to impose collective bargaining agreements while preserving
the existing rules for every other sort of contract 47
If, however, as proposed above, the statute preserving collective
bargaining agreements were but part of a broader legislative effort to
preserve independent employment contracts and the terms of employ-

343. Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 254.
344. Cf. Seymour v. Hull & Moreland Eng'g, 605 F.2d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 1979) (describing national uniformity in the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements as the
"overriding" policy of § 301).
345. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
346. See Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption, supra note 100, at 373.
347. I recognize and firmly support the principle that "a collective bargaining agreement
is not an ordinary contract." Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550. However, I do not believe it provides a
valid basis in this context for different treatment of bargaining agreements by the states. Cf.
Silverstein, Against Preemption, supra note 271, at 10-11 (arguing that state laws that "target[
] collective bargaining agreements" cannot be upheld based on the principle that the states
may impose threshold obligations on all contracting parties) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 753 (1985)).
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ment where the "contract" is only a legal fiction, that statute would
appear a more legitimate attempt at ensuring stability in business
transfers, and not a directed effort to interfere with the balance struck
by national labor policy.' Under such circumstances the federal
courts might rightfully choose to accept such a revised approach
under Section 301.
As a final alternative, given the complexity of the various preemption analyses, the scope of reform could be trimmed back so as
to reduce supremacy clause problems. Rather than seeking to preserve
all the terms of collective bargaining agreements, state law might
simply provide that all successors must continue to provide the same
level of wages, along with comparable hours of work, 9 for a period
of one year following the takeover. Such a law could apply to both
non-union workers, as described above, and to unionized workers,
who would then lose their collective bargaining agreement and all its
protections other than the most basic ones concerning wages and
hours. But even such a reduced protection would make a substantial
improvement over the rules that currently prevail.
A statute of this kind would seem immune to preemption attack.
Collective bargaining agreements, and thus Section 301 difficulties,
would obviously be irrelevant. Most important, such a comprehensive,
basic set of protections would surely survive a Machinists-based
NLRA preemption challenge. Such a reform would be similar in
character to the state wage-and-hour laws, which are unquestionably
valid. In this era of decline and diminishing expectations, half-loaves,
even crumbs, should not be scorned.
CONCLUSION

Protracted economic difficulties and the now-manifest failings of
deregulation and laissez-faire seem to have brought about a new
openness in crucial matters of national policy. Coordinated strategies
for research, development, training, and education are higher on the
agenda than they have been in years, and many observers are looking
enviously at other countries' innovations. In such a climate it seems
appropriate to suggest reconsideration of the fate of workers in eco-

348.

Cf. Silverstein, Against Preemption, supra note 271, at 10-11 (suggesting difficulties

with this argument in the context of state laws that do not apply universally but "target[ ]
collective bargaining agreements").
349. For example, full-time workers could not be involuntarily cut back to part-time sta-
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nomic transition and business change. The current approaches, minimal in their scope, were devised under very different circumstances
and have not adapted well to changing conditions. The time has come
for something better.
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